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This dissertation examines emerging trends in networked politics through
an analysis of the rhetorical forms and functions of internet memes as a unique response
to the increasing force of technocratic rhetorics. Frequently dismissed as mere trivialities
of networked discourses, memes have increasingly been mobilized to articulate new
positions and structures of feeling around the significant issues of the day. As new
iterations of memes are rapidly developed and circulated across networked public
spheres, these rhetorical technologies provide new opportunities for amateur participation
in the development of symbolic content. Such participation is particularly important as
the intensification of control society has enabled technocrats to increasingly govern and
narrow the domains of more traditional political rhetorics.
Drawing a synthesis between Bernard Stiegler‘s focus on the importance of
technics and the rhetorical concepts, methods, and orientations of Kenneth Burke, I argue
that digital memes – particularly the image macro – are an exemplar of the rhetorical
affordances and constraints that define the politics of subjectification that drive
networked publicity. Through the analysis of three controversies where technocratic and
memetic rhetoric developed in tension with one another, I argue that through their
sophistic politics of play memes promote a multitudinous mode of individuation that
makes them particularly apt resources for the uncoiling and resistance of control.
Specifically, these amateur dominated technics built meta-narratives that disrupt

bureaucratization, remediate terms to destabilize anti-rhetorics, and disrupt national
memories through their cosmopolitan tendencies. Combined these features lead to the
conclusion that memes themselves to function as a rhetorical critic par excellence in
networked rhetorics, fostering a politics of care particularly suited to disrupting the
proletarianizing force of technocratic rhetorics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Memes and The Rhetorical Tradition
―Hey girl…‖ While this colloquial phrase might sound like a simple youthful
greeting, it is at the center of a networked phenomenon that helped to redefine the career
of an actor, networked communication, and, most surprisingly, men‘s perceptions of
feminism. Specifically, the phrase is the defining textual feature of a series of memes
built around actor Ryan Gosling (figure 1.1). The image in the meme often appears to be
proclaiming its love/desire for the female viewers of the meme – the ―girl‖ addressed by
the ―hey.‖1 The power of these memes draws from Gosling‘s reputation as a leading
figure in romantic films, and, ironically, the social caché of the meme is such that ―hey
girl‖ emerged as a catch phrase for Gosling despite the fact that Gosling never uttered it
on screen.2

Figure 1.1: First iteration of Feminist Ryan Gosling (left), Foucault example (right).

1. The initial iterations of the meme were made popular on the Tumblr ―Fuck Yeah! Ryan
Gosling.‖ This site now hosts a range of Ryan Gosling memes.
2. Joanna Robinson, ―How Ryan Gosling Tried, and Failed, to Escape the ‗Hey Girl‘ Meme,‖
Vanity Fair (March 14, 2015), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2015/03/ryan-gosling-guillermo-deltoro-sxsw.

2

Although the meme enhances Gosling‘s image as a Don Juan, the greatest impact
of the meme may be how it contributes to feminist critique. Feminist iterations of the
meme came into being when a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin used the
―hey girl‖ style of the meme to create a series of flashcards to study the central ideas of
different gender theorists.3 Early posts featured a summary of particular theorists‘ key
thoughts reinterpreted into the textual form of the meme. The meme framed these ideas
as responding to the particular image of Gosling the text is imposed over. For example,
the oldest post features an image of Gosling wiping away a tear under the text
Hey girl, sometimes I think about Foucault‘s theory of marriage as a
governmentally developed tool that interferes with the appropriation of
land rights, normalizes heterosexuality and subjugates a woman‘s
sexuality and it makes me want to cry with you. (Figure 1.1)4
After feminist web magazine Jezebel posted an article about the Tumblr the flashcards
were posted on, it quickly gained the attention of media outlets, ranging from online press
giants like The Huffington Post and BuzzFeed to more conventional media outlets like
CBS, TIME, and The Guardian.5 As the meme grew in popularity, it expanded beyond
theory flashcards, proving an outlet for participants across networked publics to express
their views on feminism. The memes range from expressing broad feminist themes ―hey
girl… I mean woman‖6 to commenting on specific issues related to women like ―Hey

3. ―Feminist Ryan Gosling,‖ Know Your Meme, accessed December, 23, 2015,
http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/feminist-ryan-gosling.
4. An iteration of the meme with image can be found at:
http://feministryangosling.tumblr.com/post/11171215605.
5. ―Feminist Ryan Gosling,‖ Know Your Meme.
6. The meme can be found at: http://feministryangosling.tumblr.com/post/11171488856.
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girl, yes means yes.‖7 This ability to place a humorous lens on feminist theory aided in
their rapid circulation across internetworked sites of communication. In this way, the
memes became a prominent way in which participants in networked forums thematized
controversies about gender.
Certainly, these memes are entertaining; the Jezebel article proclaims they will
―cure what ails you.‖8 However, the rhetorical force of these memes is more significant
than simply being able to elicit a smile. Indeed, social scientific research suggests that
these seemingly trivial networked texts have the capacity to change the ways that
participants – both producers and viewers –relate to feminism. In 2015, Researchers at
the University of Saskatchewan found that when they confronted participants in the study
with the meme, their pro-feminist sympathies increased upwards of ten percent.9 These
findings suggest that the feminist Ryan Gosling meme not only provides a platform for
the increased circulation of feminist thought which have the ability to directly change
attitudes in participants.10 The impact of this politically focused meme highlights the

7. The meme can be found at: http://feministryangosling.tumblr.com/post/14469966929.
8. Lane Moore, ―Feminist Ryan Gosling Flashcards Will Cure What Ails You,‖ Jezebel (October
8, 2011), http://jezebel.com/5847935/feminist-ryan-gosling-flashcards-will-cure-what-ails-you-girl.
9. Tristin Hopper, ―Men More Open To Feminism When It‘s Paired With A Photo Of Canadian
Actor Ryan Gosling: Study,‖ The National Post (January 27, 2015),
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/men-more-open-to-feminism-when-its-paired-with-a-photo-ofcanadian-actor-ryan-gosling-study. The researchers presented groups with either the feminist Ryan Gosling
memes or images of Gosling without text. While they did not study the effects of simply presenting readers
with feminist messages, they argued this variation was not important to their study because such messages
do not gain wide circulation in networked participants without the meme.
10. Throughout this dissertation, I generally try to avoid the use of the term audience. This terms
implies a passive group either reacting to or constituted by a rhetor. However, in recognizing that all
rhetorical production is collectively constituted, a trend that is both highlighted by and intensified in
networked rhetorics, I instead use terms like users and participants. These terms position both the speaker
and audience as co-constituting the rhetoric. Even passive users play into the relationality that defines the
force of memes. Moreover, as the processes of intertextual reference, remix, and circulation make rhetors
and audiences ambiguous and at times one in the same in networked media ecologies, this term is also
simply a more accurate description of the rhetorical environment I seek to explore. When I do use the term
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larger rhetorical potential of memes. If Ryan Gosling memes can teach about feminism,
memes as a genre – while often dismissed as trivialities of networked communication –
have the potential to be profound persuasive tools.
This dissertation takes memes seriously as a site of rhetorical production, arguing
that memes ought to be critically interpreted as texts significantly shaping public
deliberation in networked publics. However, taking the rhetorical potential of memes
seriously is difficult in a discipline firmly rooted in oral communication, the primacy of
the solo rhetor, and a focus on overtly ―civic‖ discourse. Therefore, before I delve into a
study of the unique rhetorical force of memes in contemporary political struggles, I must
first answer a more basic question: are memes a form of public address? More
specifically, are memes a mode by which publics address one another? As part of this
question, I must also address if memes have the capability to shape and direct public
deliberation. Feminist Ryan Gosling‘s capacity to prompt discussion and change minds
about feminism suggests they can, in addressing publics, stimulate deliberation. This
chapter charts memes‘ relationship with the rhetorical tradition, identifying points of
convergence and divergence between traditional models of oral rhetoric and the digitally
networked rhetorics that now populate political discourse. To outline these contact points
between rhetoric old and new, I will first elaborate on the history and evolution of the
concept of meme and its migration to digital rhetorics. Then, to demonstrate their
rhetorical features, this chapter will situate memes within classical rhetorical concepts.
Next, to establish the ideological potency of this networked rhetorical form, I locate

audience it is an effort to remain felicitous to a particular author or theoretical tradition. I similarly avoid
the term individual because it obfuscates the complex relation between singular actors and the collectivities
to which they are related and from which they emerge. For more on this later tension see, Paolo Virno, A
Grammar of the Multitude (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004).
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memes within theories of myth, narrative, and genre. Finally, to address their ability to
function units of political discourse, I will consider the relationship between memes,
public opinion, and the networked public sphere.
Memes: From Dawkins to Networked Rhetorics
The vernacular use of the term ―meme‖ coalesces around assorted genres of
networked rhetoric. However, the concept of meme originates not in particular forms of
networked technics but rather as a conceptual heuristic, coined by the evolutionary
biologist Richard Dawkins, to explain the spread and evolution of cultural phenomena.
This conception, which still has wide traction in a range of academic fields, does not
necessarily encompass or define the types of memes in which I am interested in this
dissertation. That being said, as the root of contemporary understandings of memetics,
the original sense of the meme provides etymological and historical context relevant to
understanding internet memes. Moreover, many of the concepts rooted in Dawkins‘
evolutionary standpoint continue to inform scholarly understandings and debates
surrounding internet memes.
While writing the 1976 book The Selfish Gene, which argues that the gene is the
central actor in biological evolution, Dawkins ran into a problem – how to explain those
human behaviors that seem to operate in direct opposition to the survival of genes. A
notable example of this concern is the presence of voluntary celibacy in human societies,
which prevents the reproduction of genes.11 To explain phenomena such as this, Dawkins
argues that culture is a force that competes with and can overcome genetic interests. Yet

11. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 198.
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just as life does not perpetuate itself without the replicatory functions of genes, Dawkins
needed a concept to explain the way that culture circulated and reproduced.
Seeking to explain the replication of culture, Dawkins posited the existence of the
―meme‖ as the cultural analog to genes, as both memes and genes enable informational
transmission through a process of evolutionary imitation.12 Dawkins derived the word
meme from the Greek word mimema, meaning ―to imitate.‖ Dawkins then truncated the
term to ―meme‖ so that it would rhyme with gene, bolstering the parallelism of the two
concepts.13 While genes carry the instructions for the reproduction of particular biological
traits, Dawkins contends memes carry the instructions for the reproduction of culture.
Under this definition, memes take a variety of forms ranging from specific cultural
artifacts such as songs and fashion to broader cultural phenomena including ideologies
and religion.14
Because memes can exert force on such a grand scale, Dawkins contends that they
have the potential to be more powerful than genes.15 Their reproduction can influence a
much larger population more quickly than genes, which take generations to exert new
force. Moreover, because of their quick spread and ethereal nature they are much less
likely to be extinguished by the death of a few members of the species. Three
characteristics, all rooted in evolutionary logics, enable the proliferation of memes:

12. Ibid., 192.
13. Ibid. Dawkins also notes that meme is also the French word for memory, further justifying the
truncation.
14. Leslie Hahner, ―The Riot Kiss: Framing Memes as Visual Argument,‖ Argumentation and
Advocacy, 49 (Winter, 2013): 153.
15. Richard Dawkins, ―Just for Hits‖ Satchi and Satchi New Directors Showcase (June 22, 2012),
on YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=305&v=GFn-ixX9edg.
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gradual movement from individual to society, reproduction via imitation, and diffusion
through competition and selection.16 For followers of Dawkins, memes operate
independent of human agency, ―jumping from brain to brain.‖17 As ideas spread and
mutate, they fight to ensure their continued survival, adapting to new cultural forms that
best allow their reproduction. Just like genes and viruses, some memes will spread widely
and have a long influence, some will fail to spread beyond a few hosts, some will explode
and quickly contract (e.g. fads), and others will fail to gain any social traction.18 As part
of this logic, memes may relate to one another to help ensure their survival, creating
―‗memeplexes,‘ or interdependent families of memes‖ that work together to exert similar
social force.19 Given the vast power of this concept to explain the evolution of culture,
memetic studies gained popularity in a range of academic fields, even getting its own
journal in 1997.20
Despite this growing popularity, the concept of the meme is not without its critics.
Its opponents argue that in its applicability to both concrete phenomena and broad
cultural concepts, the meme is difficult to define with exactitude, essentializes the
complexity of human behaviors, and removes the centrality of human agency.21 If every
concept can be theorized as a meme, what is the analytical utility of the term? Further, if
memes are so powerful, does any consequential sense of human agency get consigned to
16. Limor Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2014), 29.
17. Susan Blackmore, The Meme Machine (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 6.
18. Hahner, ―Riot Kiss,‖ 153.
19. Davi Johnson, ―Mapping the Meme: A Geographical Approach to Materialist Rhetorical
Criticism,‖ Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 4 no. 1 (2007): 38.
20. Ibid., 29.
21. Limor Shifman, ―Memes in a Digital World: Reconciling with a Conceptual Troublemaker,‖
Journal of Computer Mediated Communication 18 (2013): 364.
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the dustbin of history? While these criticisms have merit, they do not necessarily apply to
the variant of networked memes. Under Dawkins‘ logic, the very concept of the meme is
a meme itself – a verbal configuration that both carries social understanding of
phenomena and is capable of adapting and evolving. As such, it comes as no surprise the
term is evolving with the development of networked culture, adopting a new, more
widely circulated form. As Dawkins asserts:
An internet meme is a hijacking of the original idea. Instead of mutating
by random chance, before spreading by a form of Darwinian selection,
internet memes are altered deliberately by human creativity. In the
hijacked version, mutations are designed, not random, with the full
knowledge of the person doing the mutating.22
This vernacular use of the term meme challenges many of the criticisms of Dawkins
original conception.23 To explicate this point, I will next outline the ways networked
culture changed the very concept of the meme.
Memes Go Digital
A wide range of networked phenomena fall under the category of networked
memes, including reaction photos, misheard lyrics, rage comics, LOLcats, and stock
character macros.24 In the face of this wide range of phenomenon, scholars have
attempted to find a unifying definition of networked memes. Amongst the most popular is
Limor Shifman‘s, which defines memes as ―a group of digital content units sharing a
common content, form, and/or stance.‖25 Ryan Milner‘s definition, focuses more on

22. Richard Dawkins, ―Just for Hits.‖
23. Limor Shifman, ―Memes in a Digital World,‖ 364.
24. Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture, 184.
25. Ibid,, 188. As part of clarifying the definition of memes, Shifman delineates between memes
and virals. Memes circulate through a process of imitation, transmitting the cultural information through
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process and outcome rather than content. Milner argues ―memes [are] multimodal
artifacts remixed by countless participants, employing popular culture for public
commentary.‖26 Contrary to Dawkins‘ theory of the meme, which invests agency in the
meme at the expense of the human, these definitions focus on the capacity of participants
to mobilize formal expectations to participate in existing memeplexes. Shifman stresses
that ―human agency should be an integral part of our conceptualization of memes by
describing them as dynamic entities that spread in response to technological, cultural, and
social choices made by people.‖27 Because human rhetorical activity leads to the
production, reinterpretation, and circulation of memes, they are not independent agents. If
memes are a communicative techne, they are amenable to rhetorical analysis.28
With this rhetorical understanding of memes, an internet meme forms when
participants take any piece of spreadable media (media that is networked and remixable)
and modify it in such a way that it is participatory, is remixed, and diffuses quickly.29
However, this does not mean that memes exist independently; as Shifman notes, memes
should not be treated as ―isolated, discreet units, but as the building blocks of complex

the reproduction and alteration of the original unit. Conversely, users circulate virals in their original form.
A viral can, and often does, become a meme, but not all memes originate as virals.
26. Ryan Milner, ―Pop Polyvocality: Internet Memes, Public Participation and the Occupy Wall
Street Movement‘. International Journal of Communication, 7 (2013): 2357
27. Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture, 184.
28. Once considered as techne, memes are inexorably linked to the rhetorical canons. Processes of
invention help explain their creation and circulation, arrangement helps explain formal concerns, and the
visual nature of memes highlights issues of delivery and style. Finally, as Dawkins highlights, the very
nature of memes as cultural replicators ties them to memory.
29. Bradley E Wiggins and G Brett Bowers, ―Memes as Genre: A Structurational Analysis of the
Memescape,‖ New Media & Society 17 no. 11 (2015): 1896.
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cultures, intertwining and interacting with each other.‖30 Beyond sharing circulatory
features, memes tend to embrace an aesthetic of amateurism or ugliness. The material
limitations of early image and video editing software created the expectation that
authentic internet culture lacked the polish of professional image manipulation.31
The cultural norms of networked ecologies created the conditions under which
memes circulate. This led Shifman to conclude, ―only memes suited to their sociocultural environment will spread successfully.‖32 However, the question of what exactly
makes a networked meme situated to a particular rhetorical environment ranges widely;
explanations include that which drives participation and attention of particular
audiences,33 ambiguity and memetic agency,34 multivocal coverage of controversy,35
appealing to shared social function,36 or humor, rich intertextuality, and juxtapositions.37
These explanations of the circulatory power of memes all rely on the force created by the
interplay of varied textual performances by memetic participants. The performances are

30. Limor Shifman, ―An Anatomy of a YouTube Meme,‖ New Media & Society 14 no. 2 (2011):
189.
31. Nick Douglas ―It‘s Supposed to Look Like Shit: The Internet Ugly Aesthetic‖ Journal of
Visual Culture 13 no. 3 (2014): 337
32. Shifman ―Anatomy,‖ 188.
33. Ibid., 199.
34. Johnson, ―Mapping,‖ 42.
35. Hahner ―Riot Kiss,‖ 164.
36. Jan Blommaert, ―Meaning as Nonlinear Effect: The Birth of Cool,‖ AILA Review 28 (2015):
19.
37. Michele Knobel and Colin Lankshear, ―Online Memes, Affinities, And Cultural Production,‖
In A New Literacies Sampler, ed. Michele. Knobel and Colin. Lankshear (New York: Peter Lang, 2007),
200.
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grounded in particular cultural and political contexts and are built around a particular
rhetorical form.
Memetic performances take place on a wide array of networked platforms,
ranging from participatory social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr, to more
static sites including blogs and news media. The popularity of memes is such that users
even print them to comment on events happening in ―real life.‖38 Although memes
circulate anywhere a picture or video can be posted, the most prolific sites of memetic
creation and circulation are 4chan and Reddit. 4chan is ―a[n] imageboard website on
which users upload and discuss visual images.‖39 As a site dedicated to the discussion of
images, its focus on memes is perhaps inevitable. Specifically, the /b/ sub-board – which
is dedicated to random, unmoderated conversation – emerged as a location where memes
are created through a logic of competition and where awareness of the proper usage of
memes is a form of cultural capital.40 For those users who find 4chan too unruly, with its
ethos of radically free expression and excessive vulgarity, Reddit is a more mainstream
social media site where users participate in comment threads built around themes.
Popular comments, including the particularly impactful use of memes, can be voted to the
top of the page, increasing their circulation.41 The competitive logic of these sites allows
for the social negotiation of the ―proper‖ form of particular memes and enhances their
circulation across the larger networked public sphere.

38. Alan White and Sebastian Fiebrig, ―A Door In Germany Broke Down and The Most
Memetacular Thing Happened,‖ Buzzfeed (March 13, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/alanwhite/thissage-of-a-broken-german-door-that-became-a-wall-of-meme?utm_term=.gsnj0Mr9va.
39. Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture, 178.
40. Ibid., 184.
41. Ibid., 189.
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The Stock Character Macro

Figure 1.2: Initial iteration of Advice Dog (left), example of other popular iteration
(right).
There are a range of genres of networked memes, each with their own unique
functions and formal expectations. While some are mundane, such as Lip-sync Videos
and Misheard Lyrics, others have more overtly civic oriented forms. For example, the
Photo Fad genre, which centers on the form of participants re-creating existing
photographs, led to the ―I am the 99%‖ meme.42 This meme let networked participants
around the world to show their solidarity with the Occupy movement. Because of this
diverse range of possibilities, Shifman argues, scholars must evaluate specific genres of
memes to best understand their function and circulation.43 Consequently, for this
dissertation, I choose to focus primarily on stock character macros. Certainly, these
memes have idiosyncratic elements; however, their wide circulation, popularity, and
roots in established internet aesthetics mean that they function as a representative
anecdote for memes writ large. In fact, the reach of this particular genre of meme is so

42. Ibid., 143.
43. Ibid., 184.
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significant that vernacular uses of the term meme usually refer specifically to stock
character macros.44
So what exactly is a stock character macro? This genre of memes finds their roots
in the culture and technological affordances of the internet. Kate Brideau and Charles
Berret note that the term itself originates in programming culture:
Image macros are named after macro instructions, scripts that save time
and effort for a programmer by replacing a lengthy or repetitive task with
a set of defined procedures. For instance, you might write a macro
instruction to automatically rename a batch of files. Indeed, many timesaving features like cut and paste are forms of macro instruction.
Likewise, rather than opening an image and placing text by hand, meme
generators take the chosen text and set it automatically. The image itself
and the style of text are largely fixed within the code of these memegenerating macro instructions. 45
These memes take a variety of forms. The most famous include Socially Awkward
Penguin, Condescending Willy Wonka, and Scumbag Steve.46 While not all stock
character macros follow identical layouts, the majority abide by the template established
by the first stock character macro, Advice Dog (Figure 1.2).47 Advice Dog features a
picture of a puppy who seems to be smiling imposed over a rainbow background with
lines of text above and below the face. This text is almost universally in the Impact font,
a font chosen both because it was native to most early computer platforms and because it
was easy to read over images.48 In networked vernacular, participants labeled this text

44. Ibid., 123.
45. Kate Brideau and Charles Berret ―A Brief Introduction to Impact: ‗The Meme Font‘,‖ Journal
of Visual Culture 13 no. 3 (2014): 309.
46. The website ―Know Your Meme‖ is useful for finding typical examples and histories of each
of these memes.
47. Lee Knuttila, ―User Unknown: 4chan, Anonymity and Contingency,‖ First Monday 10 no.
3(2011): http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArticle/3665/3055.
48. Brideau and Berret ―Impact‖: 308-10.
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―top line‖ and ―bottom line.‖ In each stock character macro, these lines have a unique
function. In Advice Dog, the top line typically offers a reasonable piece of advice and the
bottom line twists in a humorous, lewd, or disturbing fashion – e.g. ―live wires // are
delicious‖ or ―suck helium // defy gravity.‖49 Due to its popularity, users imitated Advice
Dog through a variety of other so-called ―Advice Animals‖ including Courage Wolf and
Philosoraptor (Figure 1.3).50

Figure 1.3: Examples of Courage Wolf (left) and Philosoraptor (right).
While beginning with animals dispensing advice, the genre of stock character
macros has since expanded to include all sorts of characters, not all of whom give advice.
Each macro performs unique behaviors, attitudes, and affects. Despite this range of forms
and functions, the genre of stock character macros centers around two formal features:
the use of an image of a stock character with a particular personality and the use of the
top-line/set-up bottom-line/punch line textual format. Although these stock character

49. For the sake of clarity, I chose to use ―//‖ to denote the break between the topline and the
bottom line on a stock character macro.
50. Examples of current advice animals, as well as the ways that memetic participants use
comments to police/negotiate form can be found on the advice animals Reddit:
https://www.reddit.com/r/AdviceAnimals/.
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macros began with users editing images on their computers with programs like Paint or
Photoshop, these memes diffused to more general use with the rise of websites such as
Meme Generator, Quick Meme, and Reddit. These sites provided a database of stock
images and software that enabled participants to easily caption pictures in the
conventional format. These memes have become more than just humorous pictures: they
serve as a way to connect participants to communities and politics. Such circulation leads
Shifman to conclude that although memes ―spread on the micro basis [their] impact is on
the macro.‖51 If memes are a genre of symbolic action that influences others, then they
are amenable to a rhetorical hermeneutic; thus, in the next section, I detail contact points
between memes and the rhetorical tradition.
Invention and Topoi: Memes and the Classical Tradition
Given its roots in Athenian Democracy and the Roman Republic, it is no surprise
that inheritors of the Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition have – on balance – historically
privileged public speeches delivered on policy issues. The concepts we turn to as
originating points often reify this orientation. The Aristotelian definition of rhetoric as
―the available means of persuasion,‖ Quintilian‘s ―a good man speaking well,‖ as well as
the focus on civic affairs that spans from the sophists through Cicero all orient rhetoric
towards questions of the civic good as developed through public deliberation. Certainly,
the insights of scholars of cultural studies and feminisms with their focus on the personal
and everyday, the proliferation of internetworked communication technologies, and the
theorization of alternative modes of subjectivity and social relation all put pressure on
these classical concepts. However, since 2500 years of influence suggest profound insight

51. Shifman, ―Memes in a Digital World,‖ 365.
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into communication, the rhetorical terms of antiquity continue to have explanatory
power.
Thus, it is not surprising that one of the tasks of contemporary rhetoric is to
examine how concepts from classical traditions may inform but also be expanded by
application outside the realms of the tradition. Such a move is particularly apt considering
the fact that the norms afforded by networked technologies and culture foster a
communicative environment that in many ways is closer to the norms of antiquity than
modernity.52 The recognition of the parallels between pre-modern and contemporary
rhetorical norms not only makes ancient concepts germane to contemporary civic life but
also helps to legitimate the field of networked rhetoric as its practices are rooted in a
rhetorical – rather than literary or technical – tradition. As part of the call to update
rhetoric to the conditions of networked communication, Damien Smith Pfister notes that
the native terms and concepts emerging from networked media ecologies provide a useful
way to understand the unique qualities of this new mode/era of communication.
Moreover, Pfister calls upon critics to explore the new forms of expressiveness that are
uniquely enabled by digital technology.53 It is in the spirit of this call that I have chosen
to focus this study on internet memes. Digital memes, which are almost exclusively
networked texts, function as a recurring form of networked discourses that influence
individual and collective attitudes. This claim can be parsed by exploring how digital
memes connect to the general tradition of invention and in particular the topoi.
52. Thomas Pettit, ―Bracketing the Gutenberg Parenthesis,‖ Explorations in Media Ecology 11 no
2. (2012): 101.
53. For more on the rationale for these calls see, Damien Smith Pfister, Networked Media,
Networked Rhetorics: Attention and Deliberation in the Early Blogosphere (University Park, PA; The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2014); and Colin Gifford Brooke, Lingua Fracta: Towards a Rhetoric
of New Media (Cresskill, NJ; Hampton Press Inc., 2009).
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Inventive Memes
Central to Cicero‘s rhetorical pedagogy, the rhetorical canons remain one of the
most influential attempts to offer a comprehensive and systematic accounting for the
issues central to rhetorical production. These canons emerged in a rhetorical environment
primarily focused on democratic discourse and as such are particularly suited to public
orations delivered to a civic audience. Traditional rhetorical scholarship often gives
invention primacy amongst the canons. Some of this is no doubt because it is the canon
most suited to modernist glorification of the rational, liberal, unified subject. However, it
is also a necessary precondition for the other canons within a rhetorical context.
Certainly, delivery, memory, style, and arrangement all inform invention. However,
rhetors cannot activate these canons without some process of invention. Consequently, I
devote my attention to the ways that memes call for a refiguring of this canon in order to
argue that while they may seem like small-scale personal musings, memes are part of a
rich network of public address that is central to contemporary rhetorical life. Specifically,
I argue that although concepts relating to the content of invention remain useful – stasis
can be used to diagnose networked controversy as easily as ancient orations and digital
texts still employ a range of artistic and inartistic proofs – networked rhetorics challenge
two assumptions that emerged in modern interpretations of invention: the role of a
unitary author and the novelty of the text.
First, any theory of networked rhetoric must decenter the role of a unitary rhetor
as the primary force of invention. Modern usages of the word invention evoke images of
scientists in a lab shouting ―eureka!‖ as they make their discovery. Under this conception,
invention focuses on the means available to an individual rhetor to invent the argument
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most suited to a particular occasion. Such an approach is consistent both with modern
conceptions of human agency, as well as contemporary vernacular understandings of
communication and persuasion. However, the proliferation of networked communication
technologies suggests that such a conception is no longer tenable, if it ever was. In a call
to update the canons, Pfister asserts that networked technologies afford increased
intertextuality, remix, and interactivity, making it nearly impossible to consider any one
participant as the inventor of a rhetorical text.54 Therefore, the question of who (or what)
is the rhetor is central to understanding invention in networked rhetoric.
On the most basic level, while human action drives internetworked
communication, the technologies behind this ecology destabilize the possibility of a
single unified rhetor at the heart of communicative action. This is not to say that the
rhetor disappears. Linguistic and cultural markers embedded within particular iterations
gesture to the subjectivity of a particular rhetor.55 However, the focus on the anonymity
of the internet is largely a product of antiquated understandings of the web, when the
majority of content was the textual production from a single keyboard. Even in these
cases, the unity of the rhetor is a fantasy. These message board posts or blogs are, at best,
the distillation of a range of historical and textual forces focused through a particular
rhetor functioning as a point of articulation. However, newer networked rhetorical
phenomena complicate this already questionable unity of the rhetor. As networked
technologies increase the range of information available and connect participants to wider
networks of symbolic exchange, networked modes of invention becomes increasingly
54. Pfister, Networked Media, 189-91.
55. Alice Crawford, ―The Myth of the Unmarked Net Speaker,‖ in Critical Perspectives on the
Internet ed. Gary Elmer (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 100.
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intertextual and socially generated.56 Participants hyperlink arguments, add GIFs, re-edit
videos, and create new iterations of memes. Under these conditions, pinpointing a lone
rhetor as the genesis of invention seems impossible. Individual participants deploy
particular iterations of a meme, but the process of invention expands well beyond their
individual capacities.
Yet the loss of a definitive rhetor is not a loss for rhetoric; indeed, freeing
memetic composition from the mythologies of a specific author ―enables generative
practices and renders the form highly malleable.‖57 In their capacity as remixed
intertextual texts, much of networked invention takes the form of what Roland Barthes
would call a writerly text. They are ―incomplete, plural, indeterminate. As open texts,
they call upon the reader to supply or fill in meaning. …texts that are dispersed and
designed to be experienced rather than to provide closure.‖58 Following this observation,
Collin Brooke notes that networked invention is proairetic rather than hermeneutic.
Brooke critiques hermeneutic understandings of invention because their focus on
meaning and resolution prevents participants from attending to other functions and
processes enabled by a text.59 Conversely, a proairetic focus not only draws attention to
the collective nature of networked (and really all) invention but also suggests invention is
an ongoing, rather than static process. Brooke notes proairetic invention focuses on the

56. Eric S Jenkins, ―The Modes of Visual Rhetoric: Circulating Memes as Expressions,‖
Quarterly Journal of Speech 100 no. 4 (2014): 443.
57. Patrick Davison, ―The Language of Internet Memes‖. In Michael Mandiberg (Ed.), The Social
Media Reader (pp. 120–136). (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 132.
58. Barbara Warnick, ―Looking to the Future: Electronic Texts and the Deepening Interface,‖
Technical Communication Quarterly 14 no. 3 (2005): 328.
59. Brooke, Lingua Fracta, 76.
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generation of possibilities, rather than their elimination until all but one
are gone and closure has been achieved. Closure is no less important now
than it ever has been, but with the advent of new media and interfaces that
resist closure, proairesis provides an important corrective to the
hermeneutically oriented inventional theory that has prevailed in our field
to date.60
Because of the ―openness‖ of the text, networked rhetorical spaces resemble or enable
Kenneth Burke‘s unending conversation.61 For example, the history of a meme informs
any particular iteration of a meme and shape future iterations. No one participant can
locate the genesis of the conversation, but they can modify its flow via their participation
in the perpetual process of invention afforded by digital media ecologies.
While Brooke‘s proairetic stance suggests that any rhetorical iteration is always
already part of a larger inventional process, the role circulation plays in contemporary
processes of invention also disrupts the novelty of a particular rhetorical text. On the
most basic level, the increase of circulation afforded by networked technologies makes
remix and other intertextual maneuvering proliferate. The more a particular meme
circulates, the easier it is for networked participants to call on that meme and assume
other participants will understand its rhetorical trajectory.62 The very act of circulation by
itself is an impactful rhetorical act. Zizi Paracharissi notes that circulation, even without

60. Ibid., 86.
61. Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1941): 110-11.
62. When I speak of participants understanding memes, I am not referring solely to the inference
of particular meaning. Instead the meaning/understanding of memes is an effect of their circulation.
However, this effect, once created as a product of memes exerts its own force – which would be
colloquially understood as meaning. These common ―understandings‖ of memes afford publics the
resources to police proper usage and infer memetic force.
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the addition of content, intensifies the affective force of digital texts.63 Every user who
(re)circulates a meme subtly alters its rhetorical force.
The internetworked nature of memes makes authorship a complicated question, as
a meme may have hundreds, or even thousands, of participants who added to its
rhetorical force. However, tracing the constitution of this rhetorical force by pursuing
questions related to authorship is useful, orienting the critic towards the social
collectivities that come together to imbue particular meaning/force into a meme or other
networked text. It is only through multiple users playing with the form of the meme that a
larger narrative and socially constructed narrative emerges, translating it from a single
image to a cultural phenomenon capable of political commentary and organizing force.
Thus, it is the collective invention of memes, an invention that relies entirely on the
possibility of public conversation, which allows them to function as invented public
address. Once we move toward a proairetic understanding of invention demanded by
memes, we can explore the practical implications of this shift through memes‘
relationship to topoi.

63. Zizi Papacharissi Affective Publics: Sentiment, Technology, and Politics (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015), 116. As there are many different understandings of affect, Papacharissi grounds
her conception of concept in the writings of Spinoza. Papacharissi argues Spinoza defined affects as ―states
of mind and body that included, but also extend beyond, just emotions and feelings to describe driving
forces that are suggestive of tendencies to act in a variety of ways, or not to act at all.‖ This conception
allows affect to function as more than simple emotion or precognitive reactions. Instead it opens space for
reason, ideology, emotion, and other forces to function as part of an affective public; Ibid., 12. To this I add
Deleuze‘s interpretation of affect in Spinoza. Deleuze defines affect in the following manner: ―Affectus is
thus the continuous variation of someone's force of existing.‖ Moreover, Deleuze defines force as the
changing of intensities. Therefore, to speak of affect is to speak of those things that modulate the intensities
of particular relations. Affect is what things do. Gilles Deleuze, ―Spinoza‖ (lecture, Cours Vincennes, Paris,
January 24, 1978), http://deleuzelectures.blogspot.com/2007/02/on-spinoza.html. While I draw heavily
from this tradition, as it provides a useful vocabulary and orientation to forces beyond the rational, I move
away from any conception of affect as fully preindividual. Rather because I also draw from theories of
individuation, I am operating from the assumption that the individual — even if it is only an effect of preindividual forces – has the capacity to mobilize and redirect the flow of affects.
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Memes as Networked Topoi
While the question of proairesis has profound ramifications for considerations of
the evolving nature of invention and agency in networked rhetorics, the most direct way
that scholars connected memes to the tradition of rhetoric is through the concept of topoi.
Ben Wetherbee highlights how memes are instructional in understanding the
contemporary function of the concept:
We might begin to reconcile rhetoric and memetics by considering how
some memes function as rhetorical topoi. Scholars of rhetoric, thanks in
part to disagreement among ancient rhetoricians, disagree over the exact
definition of topoi, though the term typically denotes the ‗locations‘ or
‗places‘ where rhetors can go to invent arguments. Generally, topoi are
regarded as either heuristic patterns one can follow to generate arguments
in the right circumstances – a la Aristotle‘s twenty-eight ‗common‘ topics
– or stock ‗commonplaces‘ the rhetor commits to memory, seen most
notably in early Roman rhetorical handbooks.64
Combining the memetic and rhetorical traditions, Wetherbee expands the definition of
topoi to include any ―appropriate set of conceptual and emotional associations for a given
audience within a given cultural context.‖65 When understood within this framework,
memes exhibit the capacity to function as rhetorical resources for the generation of more
traditional rhetorical texts.
To help explain the generative potential implied in understanding memes as topoi,
scholars turned to the success of pre-digital memetic technologies. Specifically,
examining political pinback buttons as a historical precursor to memes, Madsen and
Fritch note that while memetic buttons likely have not changed the outcome of any one
election, they have functioned to identify community members and distill arguments that

64. Ben Wetherbee, ―Picking Up Fragments of the 2012 Election: Memes, Topoi, and Political
Rhetoric,‖ Present Tense 5 no. 1 (2015): 2.
65. Ibid., 3.
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were central to campaigns.66 In this way, the buttons function as a material reminder of
the arguments that were available. As a circulating form of argument, they certainly
served as a resource for the proairetic invention of other forms of political argument.
Interlocutors can easily expand a distilled slogan into a larger conversation, the likes of
which can sway elections.

Figure 1.4: Meme referenced by Ben Carson in a presidential primary debate.
Focusing on this relational function, Hahner argues that memes, through their
provision of alternative topoi to established narratives, spur contestation and thus advance
public argument.67 Memes enable this opening of deliberative space because they have
the potential to both condense argument and make their own arguments through their
functioning as political topoi. A 2016 South Carolina Republican presidential primary
debate demonstrates this potential. During the debate, Republican presidential candidate
Ben Carson used a quotation, incorrectly attributed to Stalin, which came from a meme
that had been circulating across Republican-dominated networked ecologies (Figure

66. Arnie Madsen and John Fritch, ―100 Million Buttons Can‘t Be Wrong: Argument in Political
Pinback Buttons‖ Disturbing Argument: Selected Works from the 18th NCA/AFA Conference on
Argumentation, ed. Catherine Palczeski (New York: Routledge, 2014), 199.
67. Hahner, ―Riot Kiss,‖ 163.
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1.4).68 While the information gleaned from the meme was factually incorrect, the meme
consolidated certain anti-leftist attitudes. The focusing of this sentiment into usable topoi
inspired Carson to draw directly from the meme, allowing the meme to shape electoral
discourse and open new topics for public deliberation.
The Stories Memes Tell: Genre, Narrative, and Myth
Proairetic invention and the connection to topoi begin to explain the ways that
memes function as arguments and thus contribute to deliberation between publics.
However, memes also have the ability to operate independently of other modes of address
while still fitting within the rhetorical tradition. To evaluate this larger rhetorical
potential, I will now turn to an evaluation of how memes independently work within
three concepts central to post-classical conceptions of rhetorical criticism: genre,
narrative, and myth.
Rhetorics of Form: Genre and Memes
The explosion of memes across networked forums led to a proliferation of the
variety of memes circulated by participants, thousands of memes emerged taking myriad
forms. To manage this diversity, both popular media – most notably Know Your Meme –
and academics led by Shifman, devoted great effort to the categorization of different
families of memes.69 Yet, websites and academics do not simply create these categories
of memes top-down. Participants in networked rhetorical spaces police the norms of
particular memes from the bottom-up. Specifically, participants often refuse to circulate

68. Ashley Feinberg, ―Ben Carson‘s Fake Stalin Quote Came from a Right-Wing Facebook
Meme,‖ Gawker (February 13, 2016), http://gawker.com/ben-carsons-fake-stalin-quote-came-from-a-ringwing-fac-1759025587.
69. Shifman‘s Memes in Digital Culture provides a detailed categorization of the most influential
genres of memes.
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memes that violate generic norms. Further, they chastise usages of those memes that do
not meet the normative standards established through communal participation in a
particular meme.70 For example, in evaluating the meme Confession Bear, which often is
used to narrate ―something shitty you did that you regret,‖ users chastised those iterations
that participants used to issue more boastful confessions (Figure 1.5).71 As users both
create and consume not only memes but also the norms that drive those memes, Wiggins
and Bowers note ―Memes are a genre, not a medium, of online communication and are
artifacts of participatory digital culture characterized specifically by an agency of
consumption-production.‖72 Memes are not just a tool networked participants can use but
also a unique genre of communication formed through social deliberation. Once created,
these genres then place constraints on the conditions for deliberation. This orientation
towards memes highlights their capacity to uniquely enable cross public exchanges.

Figure 1.5: Standard example of Confession Bear (left), criticized version (right).

70. Jacqueline Ryan Vickery, ―The Curious Case of Confession Bear: The Reappropriation of
Online Macro-Image Memes, Information,‖ Communication & Society 17 no. 3 (2014), 313.
71. Ibid., 323.
72. Wiggins and Bowers, ―Memes as Genre,” 1896.
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Genre has long been a central concept in understanding rhetorical production. In
his field re-defining book on rhetorical criticism, Edwin Black notes that genre is central
to understanding the historically created expectations and functions of families of texts.73
When a rhetor or critic knows the expectations of a genre, they can evaluate if a
particular text contains the potential to flourish within these norms. In understanding its
capability to enable particular rhetorical effect, theorists of genre imply that the power of
genre goes beyond simple categorization. Genre functions as a historically produced
series of relations, which help define the ways that particular rhetorical iterations can act
within contingent rhetorical relationships.74 From this perspective, Campbell and
Jaimison argue that form is central to genre. As they note, ―formal similarities establish
genres.‖75 For example, the genre of the eulogy not only demands a rhetor define their
relationship to the deceased and confront mortality but also uses the qualities of the
deceased to establish community values and set future goals.76 The form shapes not only
the content but also the political function of the rhetoric.
Yet, deciphering the power of form does not simply involve the identification of
similar structural characteristics. As opposed to this formalist approach, I use form in the
Burkean sense. Burke defines form as ―the creation of an appetite in the mind of the
auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite.‖77 Thus for Burke, form is predicated
73. Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 133-34.
74. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, ―Form and Genre in Rhetorical
Criticism: An Introduction," in Form and Genre: Shaping Rhetorical Action (Falls Church, VA: The
Speech Communication Association, 1978), 17.
75. Ibid., 18.
76. Ibid., 20.
77. Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1968), 143.
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upon negotiation and identification between participants in a rhetorical exchange. Such a
relation implies that form has persuasive impact because ―forms can induce participation
by others.‖78 This is not to say that a singular form defines any particular genre; rather,
generes emerge as a ―constellation of forms‖ that develop across related texts.79 Arguing
genre exerts persuasive force beyond particular iterations, Miller asserts that the action
that participants use form to accomplish is central to the character of a genre.80 While
seeking to deemphasize form, Miller does not abandon it, noting that genre is a particular
type of form focused on the creation of action. For Miller, although critics still use genre
as an ―index to cultural patterns and as tools for exploring the achievements of particular
speakers and writers,‖ genre has a different function for consumers of rhetorical acts: it
teaches participants how to engage in the community for whom the genre exists.81 Simply
put, it is only in understanding the way that a genre is both constituted by and constitutive
of community that a single user begins to operate within and influence that community.
Consequently, form – following the Burkean definition – is key to understanding
how rhetorical actors engage in action. Barry Brummett notes that for Burke, literature is
only able to function as ―‗equipment for living‘ because it connects to our lives formally,
and is thus able to offer advice as to how to live.‖ 82 Rhetorical forms establish the

78. Campbell and Jaimieson, ―Genre,‖ 19.
79. Ibid., 20.
80. Carolyn R. Miller, ―Genre as Social Action,‖ Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 (1984): 151.
81. Ibid., 165.
82. Barry Brummett ―Form, Experience and the Centrality of Rhetoric to Pedagogy,‖ Studies in
Philosophy and Education 34 (2015), 378.
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patterns that order the world and shape participants‘ thought. Brummett notes that in this
capacity, form is eminently rhetorical:
[Form] becomes the template for how we organize wide swathes of
experience, text, and media. Our own subjectivity, the world, and our
experiences in the world body forth from form. The seed planted by
repeated exposure to single texts is internalized and grows into the kudzu
vine of form hooking wide ranges of life into itself through its formal
tendrils.83
Brummett‘s focus on form underlines Miller‘s claim that to understand the social force of
genre requires a focus on form. This relation is particularly important as form functions
as a persuasive force that underlies the production of rhetorical texts. While the specific
content of an individual text does matter, it can neither be interpreted nor exert force
without the generic forms that come to define it. For example, the text, ―one does not
simply // ignore the political economy of memes,‖ suggests the importance of attending
to larger political/economic conditions that allow for the creation of memes (Figure 1.6).

Figure 1.6: Example of the “One Does Not” meme.
However, when read within the formal expectations of the meme, which dictate that the
bottom line is an action taken at grave peril (such as walking into Mordor in the Lord of
the Rings universe – the inspiring line of the meme), the meme suggests an intensity of
this warning not possible in the words alone.

83. Ibid., 381.
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Because networked spaces bring together diverse participants, often without
previous connection, genre is particularly salient in the creation of networked
communities. Specifically, particular technologies, such as computer programs including
meme-generating software, play a key role in the development and proliferation of
genres.84 By creating constraints on the structure, length, and form of networked
communication, these technologies often define the relationships and functions of
networked participants and texts. Through this ability, they are central to the function of
genre in networked spaces. Consequently, Shifman contends that the study of genre is
particularly useful in the networked public sphere:
digital culture seems to represent a new amalgamation between top-down
mass-mediated genres and bottom-up mundane types of rhetorical actions.
Thus if, previously, acts of ‗vernacular creativity‘ – everyday innovative
and artistic practices that can be carried out by simple means of production
– were ‗hidden‘ in domestic settings, in the digital era they were reformulated as highly visible public culture.85
The unique relations between rhetorical producers in network space make genre more
fluid and, I think, more democratic. Within networked media ecologies, the thematization
of genre is a public process where all participants engage in defining the norms of
rhetorical culture. For example, the Scumbag Steve meme, used to criticize particular
actions, attitudes, or policies as undesirable, is a locus for the negotiation of social values
(Figure 1.7). Each iteration of the meme offers judgment on a new action or affect. The
community decides if the iteration is an acceptable fit within the form of the meme,
effectively judging the social desirability of the action and offering metacommentary
84. Justin Lewis, ―Content Management Systems, Bittorrent Trackers, and Large-Scale Rhetorical
Genres: Analyzing Collective Activity in Participatory Digital Spaces,‖ Journal of Technical Writing and
Communication 2016, Vol. 46, no. 1: 4–26.
85. Limor Shifman, ―The Cultural Logic of Photo-Based Meme Genres,‖ Journal of Visual
Culture 13 no. 3 (2014): 342.
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about the generic fit. As users make new memes, circulate popular ones, and condemn
those they think do not fit a particular meme, the form emerges as not simply the use of a
picture and a specific textual format. Instead, formal expectations are negotiated through
affective and narrative judgment. In the case of Scumbag Steve, social negotiations of
what it means to be a scumbag emerge as central to the form.

Figure 1.7: Examples of the Scumbag Steve meme
Narratives from Fragments
Beyond the rhetorical force exerted through the construction and deployment of
memetic genres, memes also exert rhetorical force through their creation of, and
commentary on, varied social narratives. The rhetorical influence of narratives has long
been established: not only are narratives experientially central to communication
processes, but the rhetorical negotiation of symbols within narrative structures is key to
how participants make sense of them.86 On face, as minute textual/visual fragments, it
would be easy to dismiss the role memes play regarding larger narratives. However,
rhetorical texts are not just the amalgamation of traditional texts and the contextual
86. Walter R. Fisher, ―Narrative as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral
Argument,‖ Communication Monographs 51 (1984), 2.
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fragments that surround them. Instead, following Michael McGee‘s claims about how
contemporary public culture offers fragments of texts rather than ―finished‖ discourses,
textual fragments may also be constructed by participants and critics into a larger, more
consequential rhetorical text/narrative.87 From this perspective, memetic fragments
engage narratives in three ways: they may construct ―new‖ narratives, they affectively
recast existing narratives, or they perform narrative metacommentary.
First, memes have the capacity to coalesce diffuse public sentiment or affects into
a concrete narrative. Specifically, with their focus on an embodied subject in a particular
context, image macros often function as a dramatized version of the morality of digital
cultures.88 For example, Scumbag Steve serves as a sort of metonym for scumbaggery. A
disdain for overly self-interested individuals is not a new phenomenon. However, through
the implied and embodied presence of Scumbag Steve, the personification of a certain
variety of young male egotism, this feeling of disdain gets a body to focus upon.89
Moreover, the framing of the photo in a doorway gives this body a story (Figure 1.8). The
scumbag-ness of Steve comes from not just Steve‘s attitude but also the figure‘s
imposition on your space – entering the door towards the viewer of the meme. This
common story (especially among younger meme producers and circulators) of a scumbag
crashing a party enables identification between participants. This identification creates
conditions that enable a specific affective response that comes to life in the narrative it
87. Michael Calvin McGee, ―Text, Context, and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture,‖
Western Journal of Communication 54 (1990): 280. McGee attributes this fragmentation to the explosion of
media. Consequently, the rise of networked ecologies in the 90‘s and the subsequent networking of moist
conditions of life suggests this condition intensified since McGee offered it in 1990.
88. Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture, 124.
89.Billy Baker, ―Millis Man Savors His Time As An Internet (Punching) Bag,‖ The Boston Globe
,(November 12, 2012, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2012/11/24/the-internet-favorite-punchingbag/ijnRiZeT502KmClwC8orDO/story.html.
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constructs. Specifically, this enthymematic narrative creates identification around the
sense of empathy between the varied participants in the meme.90 Each iteration extends
this narrative, as each meme demonstrates Steve engaging in a new action, adding more
detail to the narrative of Steve‘s assorted scummy exploits.
Yet the rhetorical force of a meme is not just in the public enjoyment of a
recognizable narration of social understandings of affects. Instead, memes also function
to incorporate existing actors and narratives; doing so enables participants to deploy
memetic action to comment on and affectively recast existing narratives and events.
Specifically, in their ability to mimic existing social narratives, memes create spaces to
promote particular ―affective resonances.‖91 Participants can then use these resonances to
judge events. Textually commenting on an event over the image of scumbag Steve
equates the event with scumbag-ness.92 Similarly, the creation of a meme around the
infamous image of a Californian police officer pepper spraying college protesters
recasted the events. Andrew Peck argues that as participants in the production of Casually
Pepper Spray Everything Cop memes were able to impose the officer onto different
social struggles, they were able to propagate
a sense of marginalization by institutional forces, framing themselves as
victims of everyday coercion, force, and obfuscation. Similarly, the
practice of sharing these photoshops was framed by users as an alternative
discourse that represented freedom of expression, civic engagement, and
90. D. Travers Scott, ―The Empathetic Meme: Situating Chris Crocker Within the Media History
of LGBT Equality Struggles,‖ Journal of Communication Inquiry 38, no. 4 (2014): 308-09.
91. Ibid., 316.
92. Burke‘s understanding of cluster analysis is useful for understanding the interplay of memes
with each other and the contexts in which they are deployed. Questions of what goes with what and what
equates to what are useful in relating the forms of memes with their contingent usage. For a more complete
understanding of cluster analysis see: Kenneth Burke, Essays Towards a Symbolic of Motives, ed. William
H Ruckert (West Lafayette: Parlor Press, 2007), 49-73.
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exposing abuses of power in a flawed system of institutions. In effect,
photoshopping came to represent a fight against these institutions and the
marginalization they represented.93
Memes thus function as a tool for assorted networked participants to circulate their
affective response to already existing narratives. While some of these memes may
support dominant narratives, these affective expressions often circulate a remediation of
events. This proliferation of competing narratives then opens deliberative space, as
citizens debate the disparities between these differing evaluations of events.94 When the
Obama administration announced the killing of Osama bin Laden, they released a photo
of the situation room watching the raid. Meme users repurposed this image by recasting
the image, inserting other figures and repositioning the participants (Figure 1.8). For
example, one iteration of the meme recast the viewers in the situation room as members
of the Justice League, recasting them as cartoon heroes rather than serious American
leaders. These reframings of the image serve to question the seriousness of the event as
well as appeals to American values, creating a space for debate over the killing of bin
Laden.

93. Andrew M Peck, ―A Laugh Riot: Photoshopping as Vernacular Discursive Practice,‖
International Journal of Communication 8 (2014): 1657.
94. Lars Tønder, ―Comic Power: Another Road Not Taken?,‖ Theory and Event 17 no. 4 (2014):
accessed August 29, 2015, Project Muse Database.
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Figure 1.8: Original Situation Room photo (left), a memetic recast (right).
Beyond constructing and commenting on social narratives, memes also engage
narrativity by highlighting the implicit norms of existing narratives. As condensations of
complex social relations into a single image, memes undeniably rely on stereotype.
Moreover, as many meme creators (and subjects) are white privileged men, these
stereotypes are often those that reinforce dominant social relations.95 However, this does
not mean that memes are uncritically reinforcing stereotypes, although many users
circulate them in this manner. Instead, Shifman argues that memes can function as a form
of hypersignification, a state where ―the code itself [is] no longer concealed, but [is]
turned into a sign.‖96 Hypersignification then turns the stereotypes of memes into a
productive force. For many memes, because the stereotype is central to understanding the
meme, it turns these unspoken social codes into the subject of discussion. The
highlighting of these assumptions demands critical reflection. For example, the meme
Successful Black Man relies heavily on the differing economic power of different racial
groups in the US. As part of this, the image behind the meme highlights what
presentations of the black body social stereotypes assume most likely lead to success
95. Shifman, ―Cultural Logic,‖ 348.
96. Ibid., 344.
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(Figure 1.9). Moreover, the meme‘s textual form relies heavily on negative stereotypes of
the black community. The top line typically contains stereotype such as ―I left my wife
and kids‖ or ―I got arrested.‖ However, the bottom line turns these stereotypes into
―successful behaviors‖ such as ―a healthy breakfast before I went to the gym‖ or
―development on DVD.‖97 Certainly, this meme reinforces the success of black men as
atypical and reinforces the top lines as normative. However, in making these assumptions
explicit, the meme also demands that participants interrogate the stereotypes, asking why
they may exist and if they are productive or problematic.

Figure 1.9: Examples of the Successful Black Man meme.
Mythic Memes
While all varieties of narratives are potentially politically significant, one of their
most impactful forms is that of myth. As is cliché, albeit necessary when discussing
myth, I refer not to the colloquial usage of myth as some sort of untrue narrative but
rather to a particular type of narrative with a corresponding function. Although many
myths may indeed be untrue by empirical standards, they contain some kernel of social
truth that helps participants make sense of reality. Specifically, Burke notes that a
narrative gains a mythic character when it purports to identify some sort of first principles

97. Examples of the meme can be found at http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/successful-blackman.
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or essential characteristics of the culture that uses the narrative.98 Under Burke‘s
conception, myths are tools for the production and organization of reality.99
Consequently, in a political context, myths manifest as ―ideologically marked narratives‖
that are held to have some degree of truth within the public that accepts them.100 Most
often, participants mobilize these myths in the service of dominant politics because their
narrative cohesion and focus on essential causes serves to naturalize the complex and
contingent realities of history.101
Because of their strong narrative components, memes have potential to engage
citizens on a mythic level. As a mode of hypersignification, they often draw attention to
the unnatural underpinnings of dominant myths. For example, Condescending Wonka, a
meme that mobilizes a condescending attitude to highlight the simplicity of other‘s
opinions, often questions the stability of the American dream myth: ―Oh so you believe
in the American dream // I‘m sure thousands of unemployed Americans do too‖ (Figure
1.10).102 Here the meme suggests that the myth may not be an essential truth but rather
serves a political function by placating those whom the rising tide of economic growth
leaves behind.

98. Kenneth Burke, ―Ideology and Myth,‖ in On Symbols and Society (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1989), 308-09.
99. Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935),
267.
100. Christopher Flood, Political Myth (New York: Routledge, 2001), 44.
101. Roland Barthes, Mythologies (London: Paladin, 1973), 11.
102. The visual form of the meme, as well as other examples, can be found at:
http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/condescending-wonka-creepy-wonka.
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Figure 1.10: Condescending Wonka comments on the American Dream.
Memes are particularly suited to engaging with mythic narratives because of their
fragmented and visual nature. Flood notes that while political myths may stem from
particular texts participants‘ exposure to varied fragments that corroborate the myth
facilitate their internalization into the social fabric.103 In this capacity, memes, with their
wide and rapid circulation, have the potential to either reinforce or disrupt this
internalization process. Further, Flood notes that because of their flexibility and
polysemy, visual presentations of myth allow for particularly diverse and complex
understandings of myths.104 Images may invoke a myth directly, or they might place a
non-mythic character into a mythic context – disrupting social understandings of both.
Similarly, because visuals condense narratives, a single image can draw from multiple
myths, juxtaposing them against one another. Memes may not always be the source of
myth itself, but they contain the ―capacity to evoke a political myth or even entire
mythology.‖105 Moreover, because these evocations can both reify and remediate political

103. Flood, Political Myth, 86.
104. Ibid., 174-79.
105. Ibid., 166
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ideologies, they both address publics and create the conditions under which these publics
must deliberate varied mythic narratives.
Fragments of Publics: Memes and Public Opinion
If a central assertion of this dissertation is that memes are a form of public
address, the question becomes what is a public and how might it be addressed? As
fragmented, mass produced, and visual texts, memes seemingly have little in common
with the political speeches that are central objects of analysis within traditional
conceptions of public address. This difference is particularly pronounced in digital media
ecologies, as communication through networked media is more fragmented, personal, and
(often) ironically grounded than traditional political discourse. However, in an era where
not only is the personal political, but traditional modes of public politics are viewed as
under corporate control, these non-traditional features make networked native
communication phenomena such as memes central to understanding the kinds of civic
address that populate the networked public sphere.106 Simply put, in an era where
mainstream politics are subject to the influence of unlimited campaign financing, those
outside the orbit of conventional electoral politics seek—and need—new rhetorical
avenues to exert political force.
As political communication outside traditional political contexts, memes are
particularly suited to political expression because participants construct them within the
vernacular experiences and communicative practices of networked communities.107 As

106. Ronald Walter Greene, ―Rhetorical Capital, Communicative Labor, Money/Speech, And
Neo-Liberal Governance,‖ Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 4, no. 3 (2007), 328.
107. Ryan M. Milner, ―Media Lingua Franca: Fixity, Novelty, and Vernacular Creativity in
Internet Memes,‖ Selected Papers of Internet Research 3 (2013),
http://spir.aoir.org/index.php/spir/article/view/806..
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part of this vernacularization, memes become a sort of language onto themselves, with
individual meme forms operating as topoi for participating in public deliberation.108 For
example, the meme ―#ThanksObama‖ emerged as a powerful lens for explaining how
those with different political leanings experience the Obama presidency.109 Right-leaning
Americans often use the hashtag sarcastically, in an effort to blame the president for what
they see as political failures. Conversely, left-leaning Americans use the hashtag either to
genuinely praise the president or ironically apply it to non-political contexts to argue that
right-leaning uses of the hashtag are absurd. Because of its reach, Obama even used the
meme as part of an effort to promote the rollout of the Affordable Care Act.110 Since
memes are clearly influencing politics (in both a macro and micro political sense), which
is a traditional function of public address, I will now expand on this potential by
exploring the ways in which memes are constitutive of new publics. To do so I will
briefly explicate my positions on publics and publicity, next look at the ways these
concepts change in a networked rhetorical ecology, and finally explore the ways in which
memes function within this ecology to create and alter public opinion.
Publics and Publicity
Rooted in Habermas‘ theorizations of the bourgeois public sphere, the idea of
―publics‖ is a useful heuristic for understanding the ways that collectivities form and how

108. Susan A. Sci and David R. Dewberry, ―Something Funny?: The Laughing Joe Biden Meme
as Digital Topoi within Political Argumentation,‖ in Disturbing Argument: Selected Works from the 18th
NCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation, ed. Catherine Palczewski (New York: Routledge, 2014), 233.
109. Hunter Schwarz, ―‘Thanks Obama.‘ The Evolution of a Meme that Defined a Presidency,‖
Washington Post (February 13, 2015): http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/wp/2015/02/13/thanks-obama-the-evolution-of-a-meme-that-defined-a-presidency/.
110. Byron Tau, ―Obama Embraces Meme Clichés in Healthcare.gov Pitch,‖ Wall Street Journal
(February 12, 2014): http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/02/12/obama-embraces-meme-cliches-inhealthcare-gov-pitch/.
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their participants mobilize them for engagement in political action. Habermas focused on
the dominant mode of bourgeois publicity, either as a normative or idealistic vision of
politics. However, the problematic implications of this conception of the public sphere
led most theorists to either turn away from or complicate this concept. Specifically, some
scholars argue by focusing on this dominant modality of publicity, Habermas‘ conception
reduces all political action outside this sphere to the private and in doing so affords nonpublic rhetorical activity less legitimacy.111 This historically privileges the rhetoric of
white wealthy men as political, relegating all other rhetorics as either counter to or
outside of politics.112 Consequently, many scholars found the need to speak of neither a
public sphere nor publics and counterpublics but, rather, to theorize a multiplicity of
publics with permeable boundaries that encompass all ranges of political action from the
private lives to state action (both excluded by Habermas‘ original conception of the
public sphere).113 In this tradition, I turn to Michael Warner‘s understanding of publics as
the entities built around particular instances of discourse.114 For Warner, the circulation
of every text – even memes – creates a public, which in turn operates as a force to shape
and direct rhetorical action.115

111. Robert Asen, ―Seeking the ‗Counter‘ in Counterpublics,‖ Communication Theory 10 no. 4
(2000): 431.
112. Catherine R. Squires, ―Rethinking the Black Public Sphere: An Alternative Vocabulary for
Multiple Public Spheres,‖ Communication Theory 12 no. 4 (2002): 449.
113. Kendal R. Phillips, ―A Rhetoric of Controversy,‖ Western Journal of Communication 63 no.
4 (1999): 506.
114. Michael Warner, Publics and Counter Publics (New York: Zone Books, 2002), 67.
115. In dealing with this diversity of publics, I also reject a conception of counterpublics as such,
as identifying any public to such a label reduces it to its relationship with some sort of dominant public.
However, recognizing the need for a demarcation of non-dominant publicity, I follow the call of Erik
Doxtader to move from understanding counterpublics as a noun to focusing on counterpublicity as a verb.
Erik Doxtator, ―In the Name of Reconciliation: The Faith and Works of Counterpublicity,‖ in
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The Networked Public Sphere
When theorizing the bourgeois public sphere, Habermas was examining a culture
largely defined by print media. Although many theories of publics and publicity sought to
correct the varied oversights of Habermas, a focus on print-based politics remains central
to many extensions and complications of his work. Warner‘s emphasis on the text as the
center of a public evidences this continued focus on print. Consequently, most
conceptions of publics rooted in modern technologies tend to remain invested in
discourses related, or reacting, to large-scale economy and government, elite nations and
individuals, and dominant ideologies.116 However, the emergence of a networked society
destabilizes this historical tendency of publicity and public formation. A major part of
this shift can be credited to new digital media technologies. These media are particularly
influential because they do not necessarily compete with older media – as television
might have competed with books and newspapers – but rather subsume them.
Internetworked media incorporate older forms of media into their networked processes,
remixing and redeploying their potential.117

Counterpublics and the State ed. Robert Asen and Daniel C. Brouwer (New York: State University of New
York Press, 2001), 65-66. This move allows counter-ness to exist as a process. However, it also recognizes
this is but one of the many ways in which an excluded public might engage dominant processes of publicity
and the publics that inhabit them. This breaks a binary understanding of publicity, as it no longer claims a
monopoly on excluded publics. This break opens also allows attention the fact that counterpublicity is but
one mode in which a marginalized public, or group of marginalized publics, can engage dominant publics.
Thus some memes may engage in processes of counterpublicity. For examples of some other modes of
oppositional publics see Squires, ―Rethinking the Black Public Sphere,‖ 448. Aside from the oppositional
logic of counterpublics, non-dominant publics can also enclave, excluding themselves from dominant
publics (this is still a mode of publicity as it defines the relation between publics) or by satellite publics,
which separate from dominant public for non-oppositional reasons while maintaining a relationship with
the dominant public. I contend that memes allow for the formation of a range of publics, which may then
engage in a range of relations to other publics.
116. Papacharissi, Affective Publics, 39.
117. Manuel Castells, ―Informationalism, Networks, and the Network Society: A Theoretical
Blueprint,‖ in The Network Society: A Cross-cultural Perspective ed. Manuel Castells (Northampton:
Edward Elgar, 2004), 22.
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Yet the networking of public life involves more than simply a shift in
technologies. Castells notes that networked society is defined by a range of social factors
including the expansion of globalization, the rise of immaterial labor, ideological
pluralism, and constant archiving.118 These sensibilities create a rhetorical environment
that is defined by increased participation and many-to-many communication. This is not a
system that replaces the norms of modernity but rather one that remixes and hybridizes
it.119 The ―networked public sphere‖ is not an appeal to a Habermasian deliberative ideal,
nor does it encompass the entirety of networked rhetorical action. Rather, the term
highlights the affordances and constraints of deliberation within a networked media
ecology, particularly how they create social conditions that shape the ways that different
publics form, operate, and interact.
Major features of the networked public sphere include a decentralization of
national politics, increased encounters with diversity, and the internetworking of
media.120 The result of this is a vastly different experience of publicity. Writing in the
early years of networked media, Thompson noted these shifts – which have only since
intensified:
The development of communication media has created a new kind of publicness
which is very different from the traditional conception of public life. This new
kind of mediated publicness does not involve individuals coming together in a
shared locale to discuss issues of common concern. Rather, it is a publicness of
openness and visibility, of making available and making visible, and this visibility

118. Ibid., 22-41.
119. Pfister, Networked Media, 47.
120. Ibid., 19.
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no longer involves the sharing of a common locale.121
This destabilization is furthered because the texts that define publics are mutually
constituted by participants through many-to-many communication.122 Under this process,
a wide range of actors influences the formation and alteration of publics, as any
participant can ―shift, re-form, circulate, or consolidate ties with any act of
communication.‖ 123 Furthermore, much of life in the modern era could go undocumented
by modern media – this is not to say that this life existed independent of the public, but
rather that it was not explicitly publicized.124 Conversely, internetworked media, with
their easy translation onto mobile applications, make all parts of life potentially public.125
These changes increase the potential for participation in publics; however, it is important
to note that emergence of the networked public sphere does not guarantee democracy,
freedom, or dignity; instead, it intensifies and networks a plurality of spheres of
existence.126
This plurality of spheres of existence, while not inherently democratic, does open
up the range of rhetorical actions available to publics. Most notably, the networked public
sphere allows more publics to be accessible to a greater range of participants. This is not
solely because these new public texts circulate on the internet but also because they drive
121. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1995),
236.
122. Papacharissi, Affective Publics, 119.
123. Pfister, Networked Media, 178.
124. The ability to be excluded from active publicity is what Iris Young theorizes as the most
productive contemporary conception of private/privacy. Iris Marion Young, Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas
of Gender, Political Philosophy, and Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 338.
125. Jonathan Crary, 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (New York: Verso, 2013), 89.
126. Papacharissi, Affective Publics, 72.
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other media production. In many cases, conversations started in the networked public
sphere migrate to traditional media, helping to set and drive the agenda of more
traditional politics.127 Not only have blogs forced responses from traditional politicians
and mainstream media, but, more recently, memes have shaped political debate. The
meme ―Texts from Hillary‖ gained such cache in portraying Hillary Clinton as a cool and
―bad ass‖ candidate that the Clinton campaign submitted their own iterations to the blog
that popularized the meme (Figure 1.11).128 This move highlights the power of memes to
drive other media. In this sense, memes are engaging other publics and shaping their
relations to political events. In practice, they seem to be influencing public opinion.129

Figure 1.11: The original “Text from Hillary Meme” (left), the campaign’s response
(right).
127. Pfister, Networked Media, 4.
128. Megan Garber, ―Hilary Clinton Responds to Her Meme…With a Meme,‖ The Atlantic (April
10, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/04/hillary-clinton-responds-to-her-memewith-a-meme/255698/.
129. I engage public opinion recognizing that it is traditionally rooted in a representational logic
that is oppositional to the concept of more radical democracy (such as the multitude). Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Time of Empire (New York: Penguin Books, 2004),
263. However, as public opinion is central to understandings of the force of rhetoric and publics, it is a
concept I must engage. Consequently, when engaging the concept, I am not referring to the public opinion
that reduces singularities to a singular people. Rather, I am interested in opinions of publics. As publics are
fluid and multiple, they do not confine their participants to singular representative subjectivities. Any
singular participant can engage a multiplicity of public opinions, via different publics, at any given time.
Rather these opinions are simply a manifestation of the collective production of singularities engaged
around a particular text.
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Memes and Public Opinion
As part of the vernacular expression of participants in the networked public
sphere, memes provide an avenue for publics to form that directly comment on and direct
public opinion. Specifically, the flexibility of memes allows for easy yet profound
political commentary because they open incongruous readings of events and ideologies
that allow political commentary and beg deliberation.130 The aforementioned meme
referenced by Carson used a quotation, misattributed to Stalin, which sought to link the
Democratic Party‘s rhetoric with cold-war anti-American rhetoric (Figure 1.4). In this
case, the form of the meme allowed it to produce an exaggeration of a political party that
seemed antagonistic to patriotic Americans. Carson‘s repetition of the meme‘s text
highlights that as a meme‘s circulation expands it enfolds evermore participants into their
constituted public. Further, circulation increases a meme‘s chances of intertextually
linking to other public discourse. Carson‘s invoking of the meme allowed it to jump
contexts, from a closed audience of conservative social media to the debate stage and
mainstream news media. Once connected to larger political institutions, memes can serve
to ―connect and critique.‖131 Specifically, because they often focus on micropolitical
issues, memes are able to disrupt dominant narratives by turning attention to ways that
identity, relationships, and consumptive practices exist outside these dominant logics.132
For example, within the highly censored media atmosphere of China, memes are often
able to sneak by censors. This ability to evade censorship allows these seemingly trivial

130. Knobel and Lankshear, New Literacies, 218.
131. Benjamin Burroughs and Gavin Fuller, ―Religious Memetics: Institutional Authority in
Digital/Lived Religion,‖ Journal of Communication Inquiry 39 no. 4 (2015): 359.
132. Johnson, ―Mapping,‖ 38.
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texts to voice perspectives with the potential to rupture the hegemonic voice of dominant
media.133 While many western nations lack the overt censorship of China, the seeming
banality of memes still allows them to offer alternative viewpoints that may not gain
traction in more traditional media environments.
This constitution of political identities also extends beyond the commentary
offered by a particular meme. While emerging within a particular election cycle as a
commentary on the sexual politics of the Romney campaign and the Republican Party,
the Binders Full of Women meme lives beyond the 2012 elections. The meme itself is no
longer specifically germane to electoral politics, yet the public created around it remains
politically active. Rentschler and Thrift note that as of 2015 the Facebook page built
around this meme
has become a place to post news stories and discuss current US politics,
Hillary Clinton‘s candidacy for the US presidency, state passage of gay
marriage laws, and gender issues on the Internet, among other topics. In
the first day of posts, a contributor shared a link to an 11 April 2012 report
from the National Women‘s Law Center on the racialization and
regionalization of the wage gap between women and men.134
Certainly, this public is larger than the meme that inspired it, and that is exactly the point.
Memes encourage participants to form publics around particular shared interests
following the form, content, and stance of the meme.135 Much as a traditional public

133. An Xiao Mina, ―Batman, Pandaman, And The Blind Man: A Case Study in Social Change
Memes and Internet Censorship in China,‖ Journal of Visual Culture 13 no. 3 (2014): 362.
134. Carrie A. Rentschler and Samantha C. Thrift, ―Doing Feminism in The Network: Networked
Laughter and The ‗Binders Full of Women‘ Meme,‖ Feminist Theory 16 (2015): 22.
135. Shifman clarifies that content refers to the ideational and ideological content of the meme,
form to the physical iteration (although I use this term even here in a more Burkean sense), and stance
referrers to the ―information memes convey about their own communication‖ which ―depict the ways in
which addressors position themselves in relation to the [meme].‖ Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture, 51.
Therefore, when I refer to stance I am drawing attention to the ways a particular memes orient participants
to participate in the form and content. Stance lets us know if a meme should be read literally or ironically,
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speech turns the crowd into an audience; the meme‘s constituted public unifies
participants who otherwise may never connect in networked spaces, creating a public that
is capable of engaging in larger political action. Moreover, memes such as Binders Full
of Women have the potential to sustain political interest because they are never complete.
Rather, their very nature as proairetic texts demands further dialogue and participation in
the political conversations enacted through the meme.136 The political potential arising
from seemingly trivial texts leads Shifman to conclude, ―Bad texts make good memes in
contemporary participatory culture.‖137
Finding Bad Texts: On Method and the Scope of This Project
If bad texts do indeed make good memes, the following questions emerge: How
does one analyze memes, and, what makes a meme particularly ―good‖ for academic
analysis? Consequently, the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to an elucidation of the
methods of my analysis, principles of selection for determining case studies, and a
preview of those case studies.
Following the observations of Barry Brummett, I eschew the application of a
methodology independent of my theoretical framework.138 Brummett argues that this
divide, indicative of social scientific research, is neither possible nor practical in the
realm of rhetorical studies. Instead, Brummett posits that theory contains method; for
example, when using the artistic proofs or Burkean dramatism, the theoretical concepts
and in doing so directs the relationship between a public and the ideological content of both a meme‘s form
and particular iterations.
136. Shifman ―Anatomy,‖ 198.
137. Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture, 86.
138. Barry Brummett, ―Rhetorical Theory as Heuristic and Moral: A Pedagogical Justification,‖
Communication Education 33 (1984), 99.
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that drive the inquiry also provide concepts (ethos, scapegoating, etc.) to unpack the
forces that drive the rhetorical artifact.139 Thus, I turn to the theoretical insights of
Bernard Stiegler to evaluate memes. Stiegler‘s focus on the ways that communicative
technologies – such as memes – are central to the creation of subjects and publics makes
it a useful framework for evaluating the ways that memes reposition participants in
relation to political issues. Specifically, Stiegler‘s concept of transindividuation explains
the co-constitutive relationship between individuals, collectives, and technologies. This
theory can thus explain both how and why memes circulate, as well as the force that
circulation exerts. However, since Stiegler does not have a fully rhetorical sensibility, I
will supplement this theory with rhetorical concepts such as perspective by incongruity,
narrative, and myth, which can help explain how rhetorical forces drive
transindividuation. The second chapter of this dissertation is therefore dedicated to
outlining these theoretical concepts and their relationship to memes.
However, just because the focus on rhetorical theory does not explicitly
foreground methodology does not mean it is without method or rigor. Brummett notes
that rhetorical ―method uses ordinary skills of research such as reading, library
techniques, etc., as guided by the extraordinary sensibilities given to one by the
theory.‖140 Similarly, Burke argues good criticism always begins with a close read of a
text, focusing on prominent themes and the relationships and antagonisms between these
themes. 141 Once these relationships are established, I use theoretical concepts to establish
the force and nature of these relationships. Therefore, I begin my analysis with close
139. Ibid., 100.
140. Ibid., 99.
141. Burke, Philosophy, 19-35.
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reads of the generic form and various iterations of particular memes, as well as their
circulation within particular controversies. I turn to internet archives, such as Know Your
Meme, to establish the history of particular memes, and use Google Analytics and press
coverage to determine their circulation in relation to particular times and controversies.
These initial readings then provide the foundations to utilize a rhetorically-inflected
reading of Stiegler to explain these phenomena.
The concept of individuation – explicated in the following chapter – has
implications for the analysis of memes. Because memes are iterations emerging out of a
preindividual formal state, the criticism of memes cannot simply focus on their particular
iterations. To do so would ignore both their individuating potential as well as their larger
social force. Paolo Virno notes that when dealing with processes of individuation, the
individual should never be the center of the investigation, both because they emerge from
the preindividual and because they never exhaust the preindividual.142 In this context, no
single iteration of a meme can illustrate the full capacity of a meme. Instead, the critic
must turn to the meme itself as the beginning of the analysis, before then using the
individuating iterations to understand contextually based changes and manifestations.
In a practical sense, this focus on pre-individual modes means a foregrounding of
form.143 However, a critic must be careful to not suggest that form is rigid, nor that it
fully determines the force of a particular iteration. First of all, transindividuation assures
that the form changes in each individuation as much as the form dictates the individual
iteration. Second, a single formal appetite may not be the only force driving a particular

142. Paolo Virno, ―Angels and The General Intellect: Individuation in Duns Scotus and Gilbert
Simondon,‖ Parrhesia 7 (2009): 60.
143. Jenkins, ―The Modes of Visual Rhetoric,‖ 448.
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process of individuation. Any given meme may exist at the intersection of multiple
forms. Therefore, an awareness of an iteration existing at the interplay of multiple modes
enables a fuller understanding of the individuating potential of any meme and its
iterations. This does not mean that any one study must focus exclusively on a singular
meme but rather that a critic should not explore iterations of memes without prior
consideration of how their form enabled their particular individuation.
In the process of trying to explore the capacity of memes to demonstrate the
potential of networked media as a democratic counter to technocratic control, I plan to
turn to three case studies. I chose these case studies because they highlight the
individuating capacities of memes in political contexts. Specifically, I identified three
instances where memetic publics were explicitly responding to technocratic rhetorics and
their drive towards what Stiegler calls ―proletarianization,‖ the transformation of
individuals from political actors to passive consuming subjects.144 The first case study
focuses on the genesis and evolution of Old Economy Steve. This affords an analysis of
the changing individuations of a particular meme while responding to the ways that the
rhetorics of economic used by technocrats frame consumption as the only relation
between consumers and the economic. Conversely, in the other case studies, participants
redeploy popular memes to respond to political controversies – the NSA leak scandal and
the Russian ban on memes. Not only do these cases help to demonstrate how the forms of
memes may be reindividuated to comment on new political forces – creating new publics
– but in doing so they demonstrate how memes exist as repositories of common
knowledge, ready to be deployed in new rhetorical contexts.
144. Bernard Stiegler, ―Suffocated Desire, or How the Cultural Industry Destroys the Individual:
Contribution to A Theory of Mass Consumption,‖ Parrhesia 13 (2011): 54-5.
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The first case study focuses on the ways that the meme ―Old Economy Steve‖
responds to the bureaucratization of economic messages during the aftermath of the
―Great Recession.‖145 In an effort to manage the economy, technocrats, such as the
officials of the Federal Reserve, promoted a rhetoric that dehumanizes individuals by
rhetorically repositioning them as tools in the service of the economy. The ―Old
Economy Steve‖ meme challenges this orientation. By enthymemematically creating a
narrative that challenges the myth of the American dream, the iterations of the meme
combine to offer a narrative that the economy failed younger generations. This
conclusion is created by juxtaposing conditions of life under a late industrial economy
with those under the control economy that prompted the recession. This juxtaposition is a
potent illustration of Stiegler‘s politics of care because it searches for a more caring
industrial economy by relating of individual stories of economic woe to a larger social
struggle. In this sense, it demonstrates the capability of memes to re-politicize
proletarianized subjectivities. Beyond this potential, this particular case study is useful
for elaborating on the rhetorical importance of form in the process of individuation.
Because this study focuses on the evolution of a single meme, not only does it focus on
the individuation of the particular iteration studied, but it also focuses on
transindividuation that occurs across iterations of the memes. This case study shows both
how form acts and is acted upon.
The second case focuses on memes circulating in reaction to Edward Snowden‘s
leak regarding NSA domestic spying programs. Here, the technocratic rhetoric of the

145. Although the ―great recession‖ only technically lasted from 2007-2009 under technical
definitions of recession, even officials from the Federal Reserve recognize that its effects lasted well into
the following decade. John Weinberg, ―The Great Recession and Its Aftermath,‖ Federal Reserve History
(December 3, 2013), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Period/Essay/15.
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NSA provides a narrative of security and accusations of Snowden‘s treason designed to
foreclose alternative rhetorical individuations. However, networked rhetorics responded
with a variety of memes that included parodies of the Verizon ―can you hear me now‖
slogan, as well as memes reframing the alleged treason of Snowden. Further, a range of
popular memes like Overly Attached Girlfriend and Annoyed Picard were used to
comment on the controversy. As each of these memes provides a different affective
casting of the controversy, this case provides an opportunity to expand explorations of the
role the ironic plays in individuation, especially irony‘s potential to create a range of
potentialities that subjectivities must then negotiate. Such a case expands understandings
of the democratic potential of memes as they create the space for multiple perspectives by
incongruities. This not only allows for the democratic transindividuation of a particular
preindividual state, but the creation of multiple individuations related to a particular
controversy that then must be democratically reconciled.
The final case study focuses on Russian efforts to limit the political use of memes.
Specifically, after a range of negative memetic reactions to Russian foreign and domestic
policy, memes were denied the status of protected speech through a Roskomnadzor social
media post clarifying existing defamation laws. Not surprisingly, digitally networked
participants responded to this effort at curtailing communication with even more memes.
Aside from being a demonstration of the inability of technocrats to control the production
and force of memes, these memes highlight the particular power of the amateur creation
of narratives. While each of these cases feature amateur meme production, these Russian
memes are the re-articulation of a specific and focused control-based narrative regarding
the authority of Vladimir Putin. In this context, they are not simply memes that emerge
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from collective (rather than technical) expertise, but rather the direct transformation of
what Stiegler calls a grammatizing hypomnemata into a participatory amateur form.
Moreover, despite the Russian political context, many of the memes around this
controversy were in English. This chapter then has the potential to answer questions such
as: what does memeing about control one does not experience, and may not be replicable
in one‘s own culture, do to the individuating process in each context? And how does
American memeing about Russian politics change the movements of individuation within
that culture?
From these case studies, this dissertation concludes by considering what unique
affordances memetic technics provide for contemporary rhetorical culture. Specifically,
their reliance on rhetorical forms grounded in irony uniquely empowers modes of
individuation that are particularly suited to resisting the proletarianizing forces that drive
contemporary control. Moreover, this accelerated individuation enabled by digital
technics suggests that digital politics are driven by a multitudinous subjectivity. As every
participant in a meme can democratically alter the form, these memes become the
common manifestation of these participants. They are the argumentative and affective
product of the collective negotiated structures of feelings of networked publics.
Combined, these features enable memes to function as critics who offer a new vision of
politics. A politics where digital participants can reshape politics and participate in
technics, revitalizing the potential of democracy that is stifled by control.
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Chapter 2
Individuation, Identification, and Imitation: Toward a Theory of Memes
As is common to the life of the doctoral student, one of the most frequent
questions I am asked is ―what is your dissertation about?‖ Not wanting to bog down my
interlocutors in complex orations about the changing nature of rhetoric in networked
media ecologies and the potential of politics in an era of control, I often simply reply
―memes.‖146 In such conversations, two responses are the most common: ―that sounds
fun‖ and ―they will let you study that?‖ While both are (usually) well-meaning jabs built
around stereotypes about esoteric research subjects, they also hint at a cultural skepticism
about the seriousness of memes. Rather than forms of consequential political discourse,
many view memes as a trivial and juvenile fad of online banter.
This view of memes as a fad of digital culture led to arguments that their
popularity is waning. Specifically, Nick Douglas proclaimed the specific genre of the
Advice Animal dead.147 Douglas argues that these memes originated as part of a ―cool‖
web native culture but that they have been supplanted by a ―post-meme‖ that is
reminiscent of pre-networked cartoon merchandize. These memes, which appeal to
participants that are not embedded in native network discourses, have taken over
Facebook and large social media venues. These memes lack the adaptability and required
social knowledge of traditional image macros. Instead they rely on popular figures such as
Garfield (Figure 2.1), Calvin (from Calvin and Hobbes), and Minions. For Douglas, post-

146. When speaking of control society, I draw primarily from Gilles Deleuze‘s writings on the
subject of the intensification of biopower under conditions of contemporary politics. Gilles Deleuze,
Negotiations: 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). The
emergence and nature of control society will be further explored later in this chapter.
147. Nick Douglas, ―Facebook Moms Run the Meme Game,‖ The Message (July 7, 2015),
https://medium.com/message/god-tier-facebook-moms-run-the-meme-game-1e56ef0d31ec#.b41trdl80.
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memes are the consumer friendly and content light version of the meme, reminiscent of
pre-digital window decals and bumper stickers sold as kitsch. They facilitate participation
by older, more conservative, and religious, participants in networked media ecologies. In
this way, they serve as a foil to the traditional Advice Animal, which is rooted in the
irreverence of places like 4chan and Reddit where they originated.

Figure 2.1.: Example of a post-meme.
Although Douglas does identify a rising trend within meme usage, his concerns
regarding the future creativity and impact of memes are not warranted. Initially, while
Douglas‘ theory of ―post-memes‖ gained traction across social media, these variants are
neither banal nor without impact. The meme that inspired Ben Carson to wrongly quote
Joseph Stalin in a presidential debate is one kind of rhetorically impactful post-meme.
Moreover, the Advice Animal is certainly not dead. Instead, they have become a sort of
lingua franca of networked rhetorical production. Never immensely popular on the highly
corporatized platform of Facebook, this family of memes continues to circulate on venues
like 4Chan, Reddit, and Tumblr – sites populated by younger participants. The social
influence of these memes is such that the form based logic of communicating with text
over pictures of bodies in some kind of affective state dominates many emerging media
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forms. For example, Snapchat, currently one of the most popular modes of networked
communication, allows participants to quickly transform their daily experiences into
images akin to Advice Animals.148
However, this tension between the Advice Animal and the post-meme is more than
simply a generational difference; it is representative of a larger political struggle facing
contemporary rhetorical ecologies. While networked media have the ability to evoke the
political potential within the creative individuation of networked publics, the program
industry – Bernard Stiegler‘s updating of the culture industry for hyper-industrial times –
constantly works to re-territorialize these technologies into mass consumable texts that
reify individuals into ―herd-like‖ consumers.149 Viewed in this light, memes are far more
than an outdated or trivial web discourse – although as this chapter seeks to prove, their
comic nature is part of their political potential. Moreover, if memes seem juvenile, it is
because they do not fit within more so-called mature genres of political discourse
dominated by political elites and corporate interests. Consequently, memes work to
oppose more traditional rhetorical genres, which many dissatisfied participants criticize as
out of touch or even anathema to the political values of participants in the networked
public sphere.

148. Logan Hill, ―The New Media is Made of Memes,‖ Backchannel, (March 7, 2016),
https://backchannel.com/the-new-media-is-made-of-memes-572216e71716#.zcnpseiaa.
149. Stiegler, ―Suffocated Desire,‖ 57. Stiegler borrows these ideas heavily from Horkheimer and
Adorno. However, he does so with the explicit goal to ―revise and strengthen their work in the light of the
technical and economic developments that have taken place since they wrote.‖ Johann Rossouw
―Translator‘s Introduction,‖ in Bernard Stiegler, ―Suffocated Desire, or How the Cultural Industry Destroys
the Individual: Contribution to A Theory of Mass Consumption,‖ Parrhesia 13 (2011): 53. To see the basis
of the culture industry thesis see Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, ―The Culture Industry:
Enlightenment as Mass Deception,‖ in Dialectic of Enlightenment (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press,
2007), 94-136.
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By no means are memes the only technology, symbolic or otherwise, contributing
to this realignment of political discourses. However, they are a representative anecdote for
how amateurs generate participatory, vernacular symbolic activities to create a subversive
political subjectivity under the conditions of control society. Recognizing the significance
of this struggle, this chapter is dedicated to articulating the social and political significance
of memes under contemporary political conditions. This chapter proceeds in four parts.
First, rather than viewing memes as a historical idiosyncrasy, I position memes as a
networked manifestation in a longer tradition of participatory vernacular politics. Next, I
examine how the emergence of control society has moved political struggle from
questions of candidates and speeches to a struggle between bureaucrats and networked
publics. Third, I explore how Bernard Stiegler's commentaries on control, particularly
their focus on technics, individuation, and care, open a space for memes as politically
productive. Finally, as Stiegler lacks a fully rhetorical sensibility, I turn to the conceptual
vocabulary of rhetoric – particularly that of Kenneth Burke – as a complement to these
more contemporary critical theories.
The Tradition of Visual Participatory Politics
The residue of the bourgeois public sphere is apparent in the long valorization of
traditional oratorical public address and mass news media as the avenues for
consequential political discourse. However, the rational argumentation of these forms has
never been the sole contribution to political rhetoric. Rather, visual participatory rhetoric
serves as an alternative to traditional political discourse. For example, through an analysis
of the political nature of art, Murray Edelman posits that while aesthetic compositions
may contain less specific political warrants than traditional political discourse. This
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vagueness has the potential to help deliberation move beyond disputes of policy. Instead,
the aesthetic shifts focus towards more fundamental questions of social politics.
Specifically, for Edelman, art ―excites minds and provokes attention. It creates new
realities and this promotes reflection.‖150 Aesthetically focused rhetoric prompts
participants to reflect on larger social issues. Specifically, the aesthetic can frame
participants‘ evaluations of the worth and morality of particular political projects by
commenting on the underlying perceptions and beliefs that motivate political action. 151
Beyond engaging in meta-politics, art attunes participants to the consequences of
politics as a socially, rather than individually, driven phenomenon. Edelman notes:
That art is always a social product, never an individual fabrication, also
means that it can both buttress democratic institutions and serve as a
potent weapon for elites. The ideas that issue from works of art reflect
group interests, as do the particular channels through which art becomes
available to a susceptible public.152
Although aesthetic politics are a product of social negotiation, much like memes, it is
important to recall that they are easily coopted because this sociality is comprised of
fragmented texts. Aesthetic political struggles often focus on the legitimacy of and
control over participants‘ expression, rather than simple contestation of particular
argumentative premises. As a form of communication firmly rooted in aesthetic
production, memes‘ political functions tend towards meta-commentary and social
evaluation.

The Varied Forms and Forces of Proto-Memes
150.Murray Edelman, From Art to Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995), 143.
151. Ibid., 9
152. Ibid., 144
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While memes may be one of the newest and most intense forms of visual
participatory rhetoric, they are not an entirely new phenomenon. Instead, they emerged as
an extension of varied participatory visual rhetorics. This history reaches all the way back
to cave paintings and pictograms; however, I focus on a few of their prominent 20th
century precursors, as these offer the most direct link to the contemporary form and force
of memes.
Although aesthetic rhetorics are traditionally juxtaposed against more rational
forms, political cartoons represent a long memetic tradition. Within the newspapers that
Habermas argues fueled the public sphere, political cartoons rely more on intertextual
understanding, aesthetic and formal qualities, and affective force than the expected
rationality of the public sphere.153 In this capacity, these cartoons function as a sort of
proto-meme. For example, despite the term ―Fat Cat‖ originating in an editorial, its
translation into visual form allowed it to serve as a memetic distillation of the populist
distrust of the wealthy.154 In this case, the ability to visualize the concept increased its
capability to function as a site of social negotiation of values. Although memes circulate
more easily because of their digital form, popular iterations of cartoons were (and still
are) clipped out of newspapers, shared with friends and colleagues, and posted on cubicle
walls and office doors. This ability to circulate outside of the context of their initial
iteration suggests a longer prehistory of memetic forms with distinct social uses.
The ability to recirculate reproductions of these images demonstrates the
participatory element of pictorial political art, yet other historical analogues highlight the
153. Dann L Pierce, ―Cultural Molding of a Provocative Rhetor: Thomas Nast and Graphic
Persuasion,‖ Journal of the Northwest Communication Association 26 no 1 (1998): 56.
154. David G. Farber, Sloan Rules: Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2002), 117.
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power of increased aesthetic participation within politics. For example, beyond
functioning as topoi within the context of traditional electoral politics, the previously
referenced pinback button functions as a proto-meme. These buttons, which distill broad
campaigns to fragmented visual and textual slogans, provide political participants a way
to externalize their identifications with individual policies and political affiliations.155
Moreover, pins often feature pictures of candidates, expanding their discursive force
beyond words. Thus, they more explicitly open electoral politics to the force of
representation of bodies and their affects. Further, the variety of available pins allows
participants to express a range of identifications, moving between political communities.
Consequently, the success of particular buttons may best be explained memetically. The
strength of an identification directly relates to the willingness of a larger community to
circulate and identify with the distilled message.156 The pins served as memes, albeit ones
created by political elites to foster political identification with participants who posted
them on their bodies.
Bumper stickers provide another example of political fragments circulating
memetically. Usually a combination of images and slogans, bumper stickers often distill
politics into slogans that are easy to understand via their vernacular roots and use of
intertextual references.157 Like internet memes, these messages are easy for participants
to circulate because of the low cost of replication. They make political rhetoric mobile,
transforming cars, laptops, dorm room doors, and other objects by rendering these
155. Madsen and Fritch, ―100 Million,‖ 196
156. Ibid., 198
157. Linda Renee Bloch, ―Setting the Public Sphere in Motion: The Rhetoric of Political Bumper
Stickers in Israel,‖ Political Communication 17 (2000): 436.
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ostensibly non-political locations political.158 While their memetic potential can define
their success, much like pinbacks, they are still products of political parties and
companies. Although participants can reinterpret and redirect this force, this institutional
grounding denies them the full participatory potential of contemporary internet memes.
Traditional visual art such as political cartoons and mass produced texts such as
stickers and buttons represent more established (read: bourgeois) manifestations of
participatory visual political rhetoric. These forms highlight the power of circulating
simple fragments; however, more anti-establishment forms of aesthetic political rhetoric
demonstrate the tradition of participation and irreverence that manifests in contemporary
internet memes. Forums like Reddit and Tumblr provide locations where participants can
directly compare and discuss memes; however, much of the mobilization of memes is as
posts in comment threads across the internet. One of the defining rhetorical
characteristics of memes is their ability to impose themselves onto established rhetorical
texts. This imposing nature of memes also stems from a pre-digital rhetorical tradition.
As mobile sources of communally negotiated meaning posted onto other
rhetorics, graffiti may be one of the most natural predecessors to the logic of
contemporary internet memes. Although similarly denigrated as juvenile, graffiti has an
undeniable history as a politically important mode of communication. Graffiti tags not
only function to negotiate social and spatial identity throughout urban areas but also
played important roles in negotiating political struggles in such locations including

158. Ibid., 433.
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Bosnia, the West Bank Wall, and Northern Ireland.159 Adrienne de Ruiter argues that the
appeal of street art lies
in its ability to function simultaneously as a medium of communication
and a contentious performance, combined with the particular power of the
aesthetic to change conceptions of social reality of the audience through
what Rancière has called the ‗(re)distribution of the sensible.‘ Graffiti and
street art thus present artists with singular possibilities to express their
political ideas and appeal to the public because street art combines the
power of framing, the power of performance and the power of
imagination.160
As both resistive performance (defacing public space) and articulation of particular
ideological views, graffiti allows for a wide range of political expressions. Much like
memes, this range of expressions led to a wide range of graffiti genres, including art
graffiti, slogans, gang, and private graffiti.161 The implementation and integration of
varied generic norms changes the ways that participants attend to particular iterations of
graffiti. The same piece of street art will have vastly different understandings based on
community relations. Moreover, as the process of graffiti often obfuscates the identity of
authors, much like memes, the publics built around graffiti exist as an ―affiliation
between strangers with temporary bonds.‖162 By mobilizing these community
connections to express social values and unexpressed political concerns, graffiti provides

159.Adrienne de Ruiter, ―Imagining Egypt‘s Political Transition in (Post-) Revolutionary Street
Art: On The Interrelations Between Social Media and Graffiti as Media of Communication,‖ Media,
Culture & Society 37 no. 4 (2015): 582.
160. Ibid., 581.
161. Nick Lynn and Susan J Lea, ―‗Racist‘ Graffiti: Text, Context and Social Comment,‖ Visual
Communication 4 no. 1 (2005): 41.
162. Caitlin Bruce, ―Public Surfaces beyond the Great Wall: Communication and Graffiti Culture
in China,‖ Invisible Culture 15 (2010): http://ivc.lib.rochester.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/PublicSurfaces-Beyond-the-Great-Wall_-Communication-and-Graffiti-Culture-in-China-_-InVisible-Culture.pdf.
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an avenue for a ―vernacular creativity‖ that directly translates into the social logic of
memes.163
As technological improvements allowed the internet to surface as the site for the
rapid circulation of varied textual, visual, and video materials, it has served to unify the
methods of proto-memetic technologies. Specifically, as technological developments
made it easier for participants to not only post images and video but also edit and remix
them, networked rhetorics have centered on ―replication, repetition, and reiteration.‖164
With this focus, varied digital memes have become platforms for aesthetic production
rooted in an ethos of participation and play. For example, the Downfall videos – a series
of parodic videos all based on a single scene in the Nazi era war drama Downfall165 –
offered participants the capacity to parody not only specific controversies but also a
larger culture of seriousness.166 Participants placed their own subtitles over the video of
an outraged Hitler to express their frustration with FIFA, gamer culture, politics, and
even the Downfall parodies themselves. One of the first YouTube videos to receive the
full memetic treatment, the circulation of these videos is emblematic of the larger
rhetorical shift enabled by networked technologies. Like pins and bumper stickers, these
videos allow participants to proclaim ideological affiliations and to impose outside
messages on official rhetorics through graffiti-esque posts on message boards and

163. Ben Light, Marie Griffiths and Sian Lincoln, ―‗Connect and Create‘: Young People,
YouTube and Graffiti Communities,‖ Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 26, no. 3 (2012),
343.
164. Christopher J Gilbert, ―Playing with Hitler: Downfall and its Ludic uptake,‖ Critical Studies
in Media Communication 30 no. 5 (2013): 409.
165. Downfall, directed by Oliver Hirschbiegel (2004, Munich, Constantin Film Produktion,
2004), DVD.
166. Gilbert, ―Playing with Hitler,‖ 413.

64

comment threads. While internet memes are certainly a new genre, they are the product
of a range of previous rhetorical traditions and technologies.
A Note on Triviality and Play
Beyond being precursors to the digital meme, these proto-memes share another
common characteristic: the ease of their dismissal within discussions of ―serious‖
politics. For many, buttons, cartoons, stickers, graffiti, and memes are simple, irreverent,
and lacking in deeper meaning. Combined, these traits make it easy to frame them as a
poor substitute for formal public debate: popular frames position play, graffiti, guerrilla
theatre, and online performance as native to youth, criminals, or artistic weirdos, not
respectable public citizens. In short, the popular imagination dismisses this entire
tradition as childish and idle curiosities.
However, in an exploration of the nature of politics in a post-Fordist era, Paolo
Virno claims that neither of these are liabilities. Virno argues that childishness has
important political utility in struggling against the political exploitation and stagnation
inherent to state driven representational politics. Virno questions the deprecatory tone
used with the dismissal of childish rhetorical genres, noting, ―it might be worth it to ask
ourselves if there is something of consistency (in short, a kernel of truth) in the
connection between metropolitan life and childhood.‖167 Specifically, Virno argues that
for children, ―Repetition is understood as a protective strategy in the face of the shock
caused by new and unexpected experiences.‖168 However, Virno notes this repetition can
be equally useful for adults. Furthermore, playing childish (rhetorical) games creates
common symbolic spaces within which participants form larger social connections. In
167. Virno, Grammar, 39.
168. Ibid.
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this way, to play with communication might just be key to Deleuze‘s call to ―hijack
speech‖ as these games break the universializing drive of communication, instead
individuating participants within locialized, less controlling collectivities.169 Just as the
childish repetition of a word helps a baby understand itself within a particular linguistic
milieu, the childish recirculation of buttons or graffiti enables participants to understand
themselves as part of a community. Thus to paraphrase Virno, memes may have
―something childish in [them]: but this something is as serious as can be.‖170
Virno similarly argues for the valorization of the idleness of communication.
When the classical and modern rhetorical traditions valorize ―meaningful‖ speeches and
so called substantive discourse, they reduce idle fragments to mere chatter. Martin
Heidegger, in theorizing the problems of ―idle talk,‖ admonishes such speech, claiming
its fleeting and potentially vacuous nature detaches itself from deeper investigation.171
However it is precisely in this divorce from substantive speech that idle talk has profound
power. Virno notes,
Communication, instead of reflecting and transmitting that which exists,
itself produces the states of things, unedited experiences, new facts. I am
tempted to say that idle talk resembles background noise: insufficient in
and of itself (as opposed to noises linked to particular phenomena, such as
running a motorbike or a drill), yet it offers a sketch from which the
significant variances, unusual modulations, sudden articulations can be
derived.172

169. Gilles Deleuze, ―Control and Becoming,‖ in Negotiations: 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 175.
170. Virno, Grammar, 40.
171. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson,
(New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 212.
172. Virno, Grammar, 90,
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The seeming banality of memes, graffiti, etc. is precisely what makes them of political
consequence. As Kenneth Burke notes, the power of community negotiation is unlikely to
come from ―one particular address;‖ rather, it resides in ―trivial repetition and dull daily
reinforcement.‖173 Consequently, the ubiquity of memes not only establishes the
normative conditions of symbolic behavior but in doing so also creates a backdrop
against which changes in the symbolic landscape become apparent. Such idleness may
seem oppositional to modes of ―intellectual learning,‖ yet Virno argues that this
distracted idleness empowers ―sensory learning.‖174 It creates spaces where participants
may both feel and experience politics, rather than only thinking them through. Memes, in
being both childish and idle, are demonstrative of alternative modes of politics enabled
by participatory vernacular aesthetic production. Thus as products of the tradition of
participatory visual rhetorics, the political force of memes is emblematic of a
fundamental shift in the nature of politics where elections and deliberation are no longer
central.175 Instead the alternative politics of subjectification through performance and
symbolic renegotiation have emerged as central in contemporary life. To fully understand
this shift, I now turn to an explanation of the shift in modes of power that predicated this
change – the emergence of control society and the resultant politics of individuation.

Technocrats and the Emergence of Control Society

173. Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 26
174. Virno, Grammar, 93.
175. The performative politics of 60‘s era groups like the Yippies as well as increasing use of
culture jamming are indicative of this shift.
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Drawing on Foucault‘s genealogy of the shifts from sovereign, to disciplinary, to
biopolitical regimes of power, Gilles Deleuze famously posited the rise of control society
in 1990. While Deleuze‘s comments on control are seen to be enigmatic and sometimes
conflicting with the theorist‘s prior writings, the central claim is that contemporary
modes of capitalistic production have intensified the biopolitical regime of power to the
point that its very nature has changed. Under control society power is increasingly diffuse
and mobile, no longer bearing down on populations but rather on modulating each
subjectivity through their relation to consumption.176 Control society emerges as a
consequence of the real subsumption of labor: capitalism has found ways to valorize
almost every waking and even many sleeping moments.177 Under the logic of control,
where capitalism works to manage subjectivities across interactions, the very nature of
subjectivity then becomes the location of political struggle.178
My interest in control society stems from the fact that memes in general, and
stock character macros specifically, are both native to, and operate under, the logics of
control society. However, this does not mean that they are without subversive potential.
Specifically, memes often operate in opposition to the technocratic rhetorics that are
central to biopower. Therefore, before further detailing the regime of power that is
control, I first turn to the conditions of biopower from which it emerged.
Biopolitical Technocrats

176. Deleuze, ―Control and Becoming,‖, 174-5.
177. Crary, 24/7, 14. Although Crary notes that the trend of neoliberalism is to diminish sleep and
similar restful moments, mobile apps that track sleep patterns and other health data are examples of how
even these moments are transformed into data that may be valorized and traded as a commodity.
178. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University, 2009), 172.
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Understanding biopower is not only useful because it created the conditions for
control but also because discourses and institutions of the biopolitical regime of power –
such as bureaucratic agencies – continue to exert considerable rhetorical sway.179 As a
regime of power, biopower is not interested in placing boundaries on particular lives, but
rather regulating the production of life itself. Focused on the conditions of the continued
production of life, biopower is no longer interested in containing the individual, but
rather maintaining the life of the population as a whole.180 Biopower extends power
beyond particular spatial conditions, as discursive regimes manipulate populations across
localities. These discourses are ―discontinuous segments whose tactical function is
neither uniform nor stable.‖181 Instead, they function through a series of collective
relations that can be mobilized to define the conditions under which life may exist, may
be reproduced, and who deserves access to life itself.
As biopower is primarily concerned with the regulation of life, bureaucracies
managing that life emerge as dominant rhetorical agents in the production of biopolitical
179. Bernard Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Volume 1: The Hyper-Industrial Era (Cambridge, UK:
Polity, 2014), 47. When speaking of the shift from one regime of power to another, I am not suggesting that
all vestiges of the prior regime of power disappear. In explaining the rise of biopower, Foucault does not
suggest that disciplinary power simply ceases to function. Rather, vestiges of older regimes of power
remain both as independent forces and as forces that merge with biopolitical discourses. Raymond
Williams explains process with the vocabulary of dominant, emergent, and residual forces. Raymond
Williams, ―Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory,‖ New Left Review 83 (1973):10. Within
any cultural production, Williams argues that while the dominant form is most evident, considerations of
rising and falling forces offer a more complete picture. For example, while industrial labor remains the
quantitatively dominant mode of capitalist production, information economics have emerged not only as
independent locations of valorization but also as altering the productive foci of factories. Factories can no
longer simply focus on commodity output. Instead, following the logic of informational economics, they
must also on capitalizing on the knowledge base of their workers through processes like suggestion boxes
and bonuses for ideas that increase efficiency. Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 65. Also see Gilles Deleuze,
―Postscript on Control Societies,‖ in Negotiations: 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1995), 179.
180. Michael Foucault, History of Sexuality: Volume I: An Introduction (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1978), 102.
181. Ibid., 100.
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discourses. More specifically, technocrats – the political figureheads of the bureaucracies
that regulate human behavior via their deployment of expertise – are central to the
construction and circulation of restrictive rhetorics.182 Murray Edelman notes that while
the entirety of the state apparatus is vested in the exercise of power, executive agencies
and the bureaucrats who run them make the decisions that directly influence
individuals.183 Consequently, their leaders – appointed technocrats, rather than elected
officials – have an influential political voice. They not only marshal their expertise to
influence policy making but also engage larger publics to justify their vision for the
maintenance of the economy, environment, security apparatus, etc. In their position as the
creators and curators of the knowledges that define political life, these technocrats wield
expansive force in outlining the average political subject, bureaucratizing them as agents
in motion to support the administered apparatus.184 Further, because biopower focuses on
the regulation of populations, it is also reliant on the politics of publics to organize
subjectivities into collective populations.
While contemporary biopower empowers technocrats as the rhetorical managers
of many dominant publics, contemporary questions about the efficacy of collective civic
action enhance the power of technocrats. Across the postindustrial world, critics assert

182. G. Thomas Goodnight, ―The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A
Speculative Inquiry into the Art of Public Deliberation,‖ Argumentation and Advocacy 48 (2012): 206.
183. Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1988), 55
184. Burke, Permanence, 60. When I use the term subject, I am not referring to the enlightenment
notion of a unified, independent human being. Rather the subject is simply a convenient term for the effect
of the process of subjectification. Under this view, there are still subjects who engage in particular acts, but
these entire conditions must also be understood as a result of larger regimes of power and knowledge.
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that civil society has begun to wither under the influence of finance democracy.185 For
example, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell argues that in the United States, ―public discourse
about issues and candidates financed chiefly by major corporations and fostered by the
norms and conventions of commercialized, corporate owned outlets drives other kinds of
public discourse out of circulation.‖ 186 Lamenting this increased role of money in
American politics, Ronald Green argues that the political economy of political rhetoric
provides a barrier to the efficacy of the citizen as a traditional political actor.187 Electoral
politics are increasingly under control of financial elites, all the while government has
become increasingly polarized and stagnant. Combined, these factors have emboldened
many publics to question traditional politics. For example, citizens looking for politicians
outside of this government structure dominated the 2016 political primaries in the United
States.188 In the face of dissatisfaction and polarization, technocrats – with their
seemingly non-partisan credentials and technical expertise – are able to exert rhetorical
influence above that of traditional politicians.189 These technocratic actors, although part
of a residual regime of power, are some of the only subjectivities that exist at the
intersection of social expectations of legitimate and visible power. Thus, even as control
moves power to diffuse, non-state, capitalistic forces, many technocrats retain influence

185. Michael Hardt, ―The Withering of Civil Society,‖ Social Text 45 (1995): 27.
186. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, ‗‗Marketing Public Discourse,‘‘ Hedgehog Review 6 (2004): 48.
187. Greene, ―Rhetorical Capital,‖ 328.
188. Matt Herring, ―Outsiders‘ Chance,‖ The Economist (January 30, 2016):
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21689539-primary-contest-about-get-serious-it-has-rarely-beenso-ugly-uncertain-or.
189. Goodnight, ―Spheres of Argument,‖ 206.
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not only through their support of this neoliberal power but also as the only seemingly
functional vestige of governance.190
The Emergence of Control Society
As capital faced the limits of expansion under biopolitical regimes, power shifted
away from the state to more elusive and all-encompassing forms – which Deleuze termed
control.191 Foucault‘s comments on neoliberalism suggested that the dominant regime of
power was already moving beyond biopower in 1979.192 In 1990, as neoliberalism began
to settle into the normative mode of power, Deleuze argued that as the primary agents of
neoliberalism, ―marketing is now the instrument of social control and produces the
arrogant breed who are our masters. Control is short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the
same time continuous and unbounded.‖193 Because they are continuous and market
driven, control societies are not interested in regulating life at the level of population but
rather in reconstructing each subject through their personal consumptive practices. While
biopower used technologies such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders to define norms capable of regulating mental states of populations, in control
society, capital now creates books, programs, and products that turn this difference into
pure consumption – masking the larger systematic, social, and capitalistic forces that
exploit this difference.
While the celebration of such diversity seems (and to a certain degree is)
empowering, one of the great capabilities of control society is precisely that it has
190. Greene, ―Rhetorical Capital,‖ 328.
191. Deleuze, ―Control and Becoming,‖ 171.
192. Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France 1978-1979
(New York: Picadore, 2008),259-60.
193. Deleuze, ―Postscript on Control Societies,‖ 181.
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managed to mask its operation as a regime of power. Bernard Stiegler argues that control
has seemingly de-politicized life despite its intensification of power. Stiegler asserts that,
A fable has dominated the last decades, and to a large extent deluded
political and philosophical thought. Told after 1968, it wanted to make us
believe that we have entered the age of ―free time,‖ ―permissiveness‖ and
the ―flexibility‖ of social structures, in short, the society of leisure and
individualism. Theorized under the name of the post-industrial society,
this tale notably influenced and weakened ―postmodern‖ philosophy. It
inspired the social democrats, claiming that we have passed from an epoch
of laborious, consumptive masses, which was the industrial age, to the
time of the middle classes, while the proletariat was supposedly
disappearing.194
This fable is particularly problematic because although the western world embraces this
―free time‖ – which is often converted into unpaid labor for corporate interests – for
many around the world Deleuze notes, ―one thing, it's true, hasn't changed – capitalism
still keeps three quarters of humanity in extreme poverty, too poor to have debts and too
numerous to be confined.‖195
As part of the explanation of the changing nature of power under control society,
Deleuze turns to the language of molds and modulation. Deleuze argues, ―confinements
are molds, different moldings, while controls are a modulation, like a self-transmuting
molding continually changing from one moment to the next, or like a sieve whose mesh
varies from one point to another.‖196 The logics of disciplinary society, and even the
194. Stiegler, ―Suffocated Desire,‖ 54.
195. Deleuze, ―Postscript on Control Societies,‖ 181. While control is intensifying some capacities
of biopower, Deleuze notes that this regime of power is not intrinsically better or worse than biopower.
Deleuze argues, ―It's not a question of asking whether the old or new system is harsher or more bearable,
because there's a conflict in each between the ways they free and enslave us.‖ Ibid. 178. For example,
although control increases capital‘s influence on the time of the consumer, Deleuze argues that the mobility
of control challenges the efforts of ―technocrats‖ to establish ―uniform administration and rules.‖ Deleuze,
―Control and Becoming,‖ 172 The difficulty in confining production and expression under control leads
Deleuze to posit that there is potential for resistance in control society. According to him, it is simply a
matter of finding new tools. Deleuze, ―Postscript on Control Societies,‖ 178.
196. Ibid., 178-79
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discourses of biopower, seek to confine individuals into molds, subjectivities that set the
boundaries on normative behavior. Conversely, control society instead refigures
subjectivity within modes. A concept borrowed from Spinoza, Deleuze notes that modes
are ―bodies in relational assemblages, in engagement with one another.‖197 As
assemblages, modes create the conditions of potential for the directions of particular
affect – the ways that bodies relate to one another, which establishes the ways that they
may affect and be affected.198 While molds rigidly limit bodies at the level of discursive
population, modes function as the very pre-subjective potentiality that enable a particular
body – as an assemblage of relations – to engage in action.
Eric Jenkins‘ conception of memes as modal texts is grounded in an assumption
that memes can participate in the logics of control society. Drawing from Deleuze,
Jenkins notes,
Modes circulate across media platforms, producing a recognizable
structure that enables the emergence of an open set of images subject to
continual remaking. The set remains open to further adaptation and
addition because the virtual mode constitutes a manner of engagement or
interfacing with images shared by rhetor and audience, a seeing as that
circulates and thereby shapes both image production and reception. In
brief, modes will be defined as manners or ways of engaging (image-)
texts or, alternatively, as relational assemblages, such as the assemblage of
image, medium, and viewer constituted in the processes of constructing
and perceiving.199

197. Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco, CA:
City Light Books, 1988), 125–26. In this case, Deleuze and Spinoza are not referring to bodies only in the
sense of the embodied form of the human or other animals. Rather, they use body in a more expansive
sense, referring instead to the varied entities that might relate within a mode.
198. Jenkins, ―The Modes of Visual Rhetoric,‖ 443.
199. Ibid.
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Under this modal logic, individual iterations of memes exist as parts of a larger modal
assemblage of texts, contexts, and participants. These varied forces work in tandem to
negotiate the form of the meme.
The form created by these larger assemblages centers around modal poles, which
Jenkins describes as essential to the functioning of the memetic assemblage. Poles are the
socially invented formal elements of an assemblage ―that limit what is and is not
selected.‖200 For example, the meme PTSD Clarinet Kid forms around the pole of the
intense juxtaposition of affective expressions of his two faces as well as the pole of a top
line that sets up an innocent action and the bottom line that takes a dark turn (Figure 2.2).
However, these poles, while reliant on a logic of form, do not refer to rigid boundaries;
rather, they draw on a modified sense of Burkean form. If form for Burke, as I mentioned
before, is ―the creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate
satisfying of that appetite,‖ then memetic forms provide the appetite that the individual
iteration of the meme fulfill.201 Those iterations of memes, the modal poles of which
actualize a particular affection, meets a particular appetite and will ―circulate more
widely thanks to an affected viewer-become-rhetor.‖202 Iterations of PTSD Kid whose
text satisfies the affective appetite of participants are the ones that get circulated as
exemplars of the meme.

200. Ibid., 450.
201. Burke, Counter-Statement, 143.
202. Jenkins, ―The Modes of Visual Rhetoric,‖ 452. Jenkins argues the focus on modal poles
outweighs attention to particular iterations of the meme: Ibid., 445. However, this assertion suggests that
the modal poles overdetermine the individual iterations, turning the poles into molds, which denies the
broader relationally of the memetic modal assemblage. Instead, working within Deleuze‘s ontology of
becoming, an assemblage exerts force based on the interactions of all of its parts. With each new relation
added the assemblage is always already becoming anew. Deleuze, ―Control and Becoming,‖ 171-172.
Modal poles are but the summation of the relations between individual iterations of a meme and the
contexts in which they circulate.
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Figure 2.2: The first iteration of PTSD Clarinet Kit (left), a later iteration (right).
Further, both the circulation of existing memes and development of new iterations
of a meme alter the assemblage. When participants recirculate the same form of a meme,
the repetition of the iteration intensifies its force, driving the particular affective stance of
the assemblage.203 Similarly, the deployment of new iterations, and the subsequent debate
over their validity, alters a mode and its poles in their entirety, redefining the force of the
meme. Early iterations of PTSD Kid focused almost exclusively on commenting on the
horrors of the Vietnam war – suggesting its most profound outcome was PTSD.
However, as the meme iterated, bullying, neglect, and general ennui all became topics. In
this way, subsequent iterations move the modal pole, suggesting that the affect of the
photo relates to conditions beyond war.
Although Deleuze theorized control before the so-called internet revolution, the
relations afforded by these technologies have only accelerated the rise of control as the
dominant regime of power. Specifically, networked technologies increase the reach and
speed of the subsumption of human relations into informational capitalism.204 Put simply:

203. Papacharissi Affective Publics, 54.
204. Bernard Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Volume 2: The Katastrophe of the Sensible (Cambridge,
UK: Polity, 2015), 48.
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it is easier to capitalize a conversation over Facebook messenger than a conversation had
while walking down the street. Deleuze notes that new technologies influence the
functioning of control; however this theorization avoids technological determinism,
arguing, ―the machines don't explain anything, you have to analyze the collective
apparatuses of which the machines are just one component.‖205 Consequently, it is in the
face of such technically-enhanced control that the project of resistance becomes the
paramount concern of the critic.206
Bernard Stiegler and the Evolution of Control
Although influential, Deleuze‘s theorization of control is remarkably brief and
lacks a clear articulation of the forces that empower control as well as the specific
techniques of resistance. While colorful, concepts such as hijacking speech207 or
uncoiling the snake of control208 offer little in the way of a comprehensive political
program. Moreover, Deleuze theorized control prior to the emergence of internetworked
technologies, which have certainly intensified and altered the functioning of control. In
this capacity, I recognize that certainly memes operate within the logics of control;
however, Deleuze‘s theorization fails to provide the theoretical tools needed to explain
the rhetorical force of memes. Moreover, while a modal orientation attunes critics to the
formal forces that define memes, it does not provide a clear explanation for the
relationship between individuated iterations and form and how this interplay shapes
memes, drives their circulation, and defines their cultural force.
205. Deleuze, ―Control and Becoming,‖ 175.
206. Pfister, Networked Media, 194
207. Deleuze, ―Control and Becoming,‖ 175.
208. Deleuze, ―Postscript on Control Societies,‖ 182.
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Therefore, to better understand not only the way memes function in control
society but also how they react to technocratic biopower, I turn to Bernard Stiegler. This
turn is apt because Stiegler positions the Symbolic Misery series as an explicit
commentary on Deleuze‘s control thesis. While Deleuze was suspicious of
communication, Stiegler‘s focus on the role that technics play in the establishment and
maintenance of control is especially suited to opening theoretical space for the rhetorical
force of networked communication technologies – such as memes.209 Further, Stiegler‘s
focus on individuation as an explanation of the interrelation between the individual,
social, and technical provides not only a more robust theoretical apparatus for explaining
how memes gain their rhetorical force but also greater insight into their capability to
impact and drive social evolution. Finally, although Stiegler‘s concept of the program
industry shades towards deterministic readings of media, the interplay between this
controlling media environment and the subversive potential of amateur participatory
forms serves to illustrate the political struggle between programming technocrats and
memetic individuated politics.
In extending Deleuze‘s control thesis, Stiegler is interested in the ways that the
marketing logic of control changes the political capacity of subjectivities. Specifically,
Stiegler contends that control created new aesthetics, which ―functionalized the affective
and aesthetic dimension of the individual so as to produce a consumer.‖210 Stiegler warns
that control is predicated around the ―program industry‖ – the technologies of mass

209. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol. 1, vii.
210. Ibid., 4.
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media that work to synchronize consumption to fuel contemporary capitalism.211 The
drive for synchronicity is particularly problematic for Stiegler because it threatens the
very nature of the political subject. In constructing participants as consumers, they are no
longer an individuating ‗I‘ in relation to a ‗we‘ but rather a ―one‖ dissociated from the
political.212
Borrowing from Deleuze‘s observation that the primary products of capitalism are
―wealth and misery,‖213 Stiegler posits that a sense of ―symbolic misery‖ defines
subjectivities produced by control. Symbolic misery refers to the singularity‘s inability to
participate in the development of the technics that define contemporary life.214 Without
collective participation in the individuation of technics, it is easier for dominant
institutions to control bodies and affects, directing them towards consumption.215
Consequently, Stiegler not only replicates Deleuze's call to find new weapons but also
expands it to include a range of new technics to challenge control.216 For Stiegler, the
critical project is the development of concepts that empower the creation of political
subjectivities that are capable of a politics of care, undermining the hyper-individualism
that feeds neoliberalism and control.217
While critical of the mass mediated environments of television and popular music
because their bureaucratizing force fuels biopolitical power, Stiegler argues the
211. Stiegler, ―Suffocated Desire,‖ 53.
212. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol. 1. 6.
213. Deleuze, ―Control and Becoming,‖ 172.
214. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol. 2, 23.
215. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol. 1, 8.
216. Ibid., 10.
217. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol. 2, 2.
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participatory nature of digital technologies breaks the distance between producer and
consumer present in older media.218 This mobile and ever present mediation certainly has
the potential to intensify control; however, writing about the disruptive nature of new
technologies, Stiegler insists,
This rupture is not a rejection of new technical possibilities. On the
contrary: it aims to socialize these possibilities, that is, to put them in the
service of society, rather than in the service of a destructive ‗innovation‘
founded on disposability, and on the social regression that is its inevitable
result; in the services of a social innovation that cultivates that which, in
the evolution of the technologies and society that it socializes and
concretizes, allows it to take care of the world of its future.219
Central to this call for new modes of participation, Stiegler argues that there is potential
to restore the individuation that is key to contemporary liberatory politics.220 Recognizing
this potential, Stiegler argues that as contemporary control disrupts individuation, it
destabilizes the very potential of a productive political future landscape.221 However,
because they are central to the process of individuation and its political ramifications, I
first explore Stiegler's focus on technics.222
The Forgotten Importance of Technics

218. Bernard Stiegler, The Re-Enchantment of the World (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 37.
219. Ibid., 24.
220. Following Gilbert Simondon, Virno argues that the power of individuation, the negotiation
between a pre-individual milieu and the constant re-emergence of individuated subjects, is the ontological
condition of control. Virno, ―Angels,‖ 63.
221. Stiegler, The Re-Enchantment, 96.
222. Although I focus primarily on Stiegler‘s work, in a sense this project is more deeply indebted
to Simondon. Although Simondon‘s work is just now being translated into and interpreted in English,
Simondon was deeply influential on not only Stiegler but also Virno and Deleuze. Although not widely
cited in Deleuze, Simondon‘s influence bears heavily influence. For a thorough analysis of both
Simondon‘s influence on Deleuze as well as the reasons Simondon is not cited in Deleuze see: Andrew
Iliadis, ―A New Individuation: Deleuze‘s Simondon Connection,‖ MediaTropes 4 (2013): 83-100.
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Central to Stiegler's theoretical project is an emphasis on the importance of
technics. Stiegler uses the term technology to refer to any externalization of human
physical, cognitive, or mnemonic function into an ―organized inorganic material
form.‖223 These technologies are not limited to a vulgar sense of material. While an axe
or a computer is a technic – as they externalize physical and mental capacities – so too
are language and culture, which are the materials through which memory is externalized,
collectivized, and passed on.224 This concept of technics is particularly suited to memes,
as they represent not only digital technology but also an influential form of contemporary
communicative and cultural technics.
Stiegler asserts that western thought from Plato to Heidegger largely ignores the
role technics play in understanding and creating the world. Stiegler argues these
philosophies instead sought to understand the world by focusing primarily on the
consciousness of the being.225 However, Stiegler asserts that a focus on being is short
sighted because technics are ―ontogenetic.‖ That is, ―the identity of an individual emerges
from his or her relationship with technics, it does not precede this relationship.‖226 In
positioning technics as prior to identity and being, every technic is both a connection to
―a past that we have never lived‖ as well as an orientation towards the future. 227

223. Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1998), 49.
224. Stiegler, The Re-Enchantment, 65.
225. Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 31.
226. Sophie Fuggle, ―Stiegler and Foucault: The Politics of Care and Self-writing,‖ in Stiegler and
Technics, ed. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2013),
204.
227. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore, ―Introduction‖, in Stiegler and Technics, ed. Christina
Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 4.
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Technics‘ connection to the past creates the very possibility of social memory, which
Stiegler argues are tools that we use to adapt to a future as part of an effort to ―anticipate
and stave off death.‖228 In short, technics situate humans in time.
Through this ability to connect participants to their pasts and futures, technics
give rise to the concept of the human.229 They serve as an externalized mnemonic organ,
providing the enhanced command of memory that Stiegler argues constitutes what we
take to be human.230 To explain the role of technics in creating humanity, Stiegler turns to
fire as an example of the first technic. Not only did Prometheus‘ gift separate humans
from other animals, but in the process, it externalized the functionalities of survival
outside the human body.231 Prior to fire, each human survived only through instinct and
embodied action. However, once given this technic, participants instilled social memories
in the tool – memories of how to make and use fire. Because technics are part of the
nature of humanity, understandings of the human animal are always ―constituted in
historical, contingent combinations.‖232 If the tools that we use produce our identities, the
historical epoch capable of creating those technics define our very humanness.
Because technics are inherently related to the processes that generate
subjectivities, Stiegler contends that technics are inherently political and aesthetic (which

228. Ibid.
229. Ibid.
230. This is why Stiegler‘s conception of human can be said to apply to not only the human
animal but also anything with the capacity to create and pass on a sense of collectivity via technics. Gerald
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Stiegler sees as intimately related).233 By aesthetics, Stiegler is not referring simply to
―the regional science of ‗works of art‘,‖ but rather to the range of processes engaged in
the production of the ―modalities of sensation.‖234 It is at this level of sensation that
aesthetics become political. By attuning participants to particular rhythms of existence,
technics create the capacity to experience the aesthetic.235 Moreover, the ways that these
rhythms of sensation repeat through difference defines particular modalities of time.236
Consequently, aesthetic attunement is political because identifications with this
attunement are the foundation of community: ―The extent of our adoption of technics,
namely our access to the technologies through which society operates, is what determines
our ability to participate in the constitution of the institutions and values on which our
artificial environment consists.‖237 In short, technics are how participants ―make sense‖
of the world.
As they fashion the possibility of human action (without placing concrete
boundaries upon it), technics function modally. As modes, technics serve as connecting
nodes that combine individuals into the assemblages that we call communities.238 This
technical constitution of communities is political because it sets the conditions of
constituting social identity. Beyond this, because particular technics afford certain actions
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while discouraging others, they shape the ways that individuals affect judgment.239
However, under control the politicization of the sensible has intensified, turning these
modes towards the service of capitalism. As capitalism subsumes all forms of technology,
including communication itself, the drives and flow of capital increasingly define the
sensible – both in terms of our capability to sense things and to judge what makes sense.
Consequently, Stiegler‘s conception of technics enables an understanding of memes that
focuses not on what they mean but rather on what memories are invested in them, what
these memories make sensible, and the communities produced by this sensibility.
Recognizing the social force of technical memory, Stiegler is most interested in
the capacity of technics to function as ―mnemotechnics.‖ A focus on mnemotechnics
draws attention to the ―objects and techniques able to preserve and make accessible
experiences that I have not myself lived.‖240 Traditional communicative media are the
most obvious examples of mnemotechnics; however, this potential exists in any technic,
e.g. memes allow participants to experience the narrative and affects of diverse
networked participants. Distinguishing the inherent memory within all technics with
those that are explicitly engaged in mnemotechnic practices, Stiegler turns to the term
hypomnemata. Hypomnemata are the mechanically created modes of symbolic
production that enter most aspects of social interaction.241 Because of this, Stiegler argues
hypomnemata are central to the contemporary functioning of control society. For
example, Facebook encourages participants to commit their free time to generating
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marketing information and viewing advertisements. Hypomnemata are not necessarily
tools of control, but that is the dominant mode of their contemporary usage. However, it
is only in recognizing this linkage between technics and political control that, Stiegler
concludes, ―the struggle can begin.‖242
The Process of Individuation
For hypomnemata such as memes to engage in this struggle, it is not enough to
recognize the relation between technics and control. Rather, we must understand the ways
that technics function to reproduce control through their constitution of the contemporary
political subject. To explain this phenomenon, Stiegler draws on Simondon‘s concept of
individuation. Since technics individuate in much the same manner as subjects,
understanding this process is key to understanding the emergence, circulation, and force
of memes.
While not subscribing to enlightenment notions of the unitary individual,
Simondon notes that the individual is part of humans‘ experienced reality and thus has
force. However, if the individual is not a prima facie being but a relational effect, then
the question becomes where does this individual come from?243 To answer this question,
Simondon argues that if individuals are an effect, they must emerge (individuate) out of
some preexisting condition:
In order to think individuation, it is necessary to consider being neither as
substance, nor as matter, nor as form, but as a tight, supersaturated system,
above the level of unity, inconsistent solely in itself and not adequately
thinkable by means of the excluded middle; the concrete and complete
being – that is, the preindividual being – is a being that is more than a
242. Stiegler, The Re-Enchantment, 6.
243. Gilbert Simondon, ―The Genesis of the Individual,‖ in Incorporations ed. Jonathan Crary and
Sanford Kwinter (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 297.
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unity. Unity, characteristic of the individuated being, and identity, which
authorizes the use of the principle of the excluded middle, do not apply to
preindividual being […]; unity and identity apply only to one of the phases
of the being, posterior to the operation of individuation.244
For Simondon, the individual is not a static state but is, rather, always engaged in the
process of individuation. Similarly, the preindividual does not overdetermine the process
of individuation, but is the condition of possibility from which the orthogenesis of
individuation can emerge.245 Because neither the individual nor preindividual takes
primacy; this preindividual state does not initiate individuation. Rather, some entity
embraces those conditions of possibility to begin the process of individuation.246
However, as the preindividual is the condition from which individuation can
begin, it is also necessarily the starting point of understanding individuation as a process
– to begin analysis with the individual is to enter far too late in the game.247 Stiegler
argues, ―if you want to understand the individual, you need to inscribe the individual in a
process of which he (sic) is only a phase. As such, the individual has no interests. The
individual is only an aspect, or phase of a process, but the process is what is
important.‖248 The individual is neither completed nor exhausted in the process of
individuation. Each act by an individual, as it draws upon the preindividual, begins the
process anew. This cyclical nature leads Virno to conclude that individuation ―makes a
244. Gilbert Simondon, L’individuation psychique et collective (Paris: Aubier, 2007), 13-14; in
Virno, ―Angels,‖ 63.
245. Because I am wary of the term individual, when I use the term, I am referring to the specific
product of individuation. The individual is a singularity in a constantly renegotiating relation with both
technics and a preindividual condition.
246.Simondon, ―Genesis,‖ 305.
247. Ibid., 311.
248. Bernard Stiegler and Irit Rogoff, ―Transindividuation,‖ E-flux 14 (2010): http://www.eflux.com/journal/14/61314/transindividuation/.
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human animal an unrepeatable singularity, [it] is always circumscribed and partial –
indeed, unfinishable by definition.‖249
Noting that it is a process whereby individual utterances uniquely emerge from
the conditions of a larger sense of language, the process of individuation both explains –
and is a concrete example of – the human use of language. Virno expands the relationship
between individuation and language, noting,
The capacity for articulating signifying sounds – biological prerequisite of
the species Homo sapiens – cannot manifest itself other than by being
individuated in a plurality of speakers; inversely, such a plurality of
speakers would be inconceivable without the preliminary participation of
each and every one of them in that preindividual reality which is,
precisely, the capacity for articulating signifying sounds.250
For an individual to make an utterance, they must already exist within the preindividual
state of language. This is not language in an actualized form; the toddler does not
command any specific language before they first speak. Rather, they exist within the
capacity for language. The process of individuation occurs when the toddler engages in
the act of uttering a specific word or phrase. In this moment, language ceases to be a
preindividual possibility. Instead, that utterance is entirely singular to the toddler and the
situation in which it is uttered. The toddler has begun to individuate in language.
However, that toddler‘s individual command of language does not stop with that first
utterance, rather each successive utterance draws once again from the potentiality of
language. Each time it speaks, the child makes anew itself and its relationship to the
language.

249. Virno, ―Angels‖: 64.
250. Ibid., 58.
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However, our understanding of individuation would be vastly incomplete if we
only attuned ourselves to the ways in which the preindividual acts on the individual.
Wary of this focus, Simondon warns,
It is therefore incorrect to speak of the group‘s influence over the
individual; in fact, the group is not composed of individuals joined
together by certain ties, but of grouped individuals: group individuals.
Individuals are group individuals, just as the group is a group of
individuals. […] the group is no longer an inter-individual reality, but a
complement of individuation on a vast scale joining together a plurality of
individuals.251
In uttering the word for the first time, the toddler not only draws from the potentiality of
language, connecting itself to the community of individuating individuals that engages in
that language, but also changes both the community and the language itself. The unique
features of the utterance open new possibilities for future utterances, functionally
changing the potential force of the words and the community that forms around them.
This interrelation between user, tool, and community leads Stiegler to argue that
individuation is always triple in nature: psychic, collective, and technical.252 As I write
these words for you to read, I am redefining myself (psychic), changing the community
of English speakers and academics (collective), and redefining the potential of the
English language and printed text as tools (technical). Each of these individuations acts
upon the others in a ―three pronged transductive relationship.‖253 Stiegler unifies this
interrelation of coinciding processes of individuation under the term ―transindividuation.‖

251. Simondon, Le principe d’individuation, 172.
252. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery vol. 1, 70.
253. Ibid.
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In doing so, Stiegler argues that one can never individuate an ―I‖ without also
individuating a ―we‖ through the mediation of individuating technics.254
Not only do memes function as a technic that enables the individuation of
participants within the communities of networked publics, but memes themselves (as is
true of all other technics) also individuate as humans deploy them. Individuated iterations
of memes emerge from the preindividual form of the meme. Any one iteration of PTSD
Kid only makes sense as an iteration because it emerges from the preindividual form of
the meme. However, that iteration also redefines the form of the meme, changing the
conditions by which each future iteration of the meme can individuate. Thus, as PTSD
Kid is deployed, the poster of the meme positions themselves within the community of all
participants of the meme, while simultaneously redefining the conditions by which both
participants in the meme and future iterations of the meme might individuate.
Because technics both enable individuation and function as the externalization of
memory, there is a significant link between mnemotechnics and individuation. Stiegler
clarifies this relationship through the concept of retentions.255 Stiegler offers three
retentions, with each referring to different potential temporal states of memory. A
primary retention is that which consciousness holds in the now. It is this very word you
are reading, related to but independent of the rest of the context. A secondary retention is
a primary retention held as the memory of experience. It is the memory of reading, the
254. Stiegler, The Re-Enchantment, 82. It is this ability of words themselves to individuate that is
also recognized by Derrida in the theorization of iterability. Derrida notes that language only functions
because of the capacity of a word to be repeated in the absence of its very referent. There is no single
meaning of words, but rather each iteration individuates the larger contextual meaning. This iterable logic
has applied to symbol systems across languages, times, and even media (including the visual). Jacques
Derrida, ―Signature, Event, Context,‖ Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago; University of
Chicago Press 1982), 315-21.
255. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol. 1, 52.
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memory of the word you just read. Finally, a tertiary retention is a technical apparatus
that stores memories external to the individual. It is the word processor, computer,
database, or digital archive that allows these words to exist beyond my utterances or our
personal memories.256
These tertiary retentions, with the ability to exist outside of the individual, enable
transindividuation as collectivization of secondary retentions.257 However, it is also the
centrality of these tertiary retentions that undergirds the power of control. Stiegler argues,
Tertiary retentions such as the alphabet are those things that undergird
every collective and psychic individuation‘s access to pre-individual
funds. They exist in all human societies. They condition individuation as
symbolic sharing, which is made possible by the externalization of the
individual experience in traces. When they become industrial, tertiary
retentions constitute the technologies of control that alter symbolic
exchange fundamentally. Resting on the opposing of producers to
consumers, they allow for the hyper-synchronization of the time of
consciousness.258
Tertiary retentions establish the potential for collective social coordination. However, it is
important to note that each of these retentions are selections, with no single one retaining
everything they engage.259 Therefore, what is included within the retention establishes the
possibilities of individuation. The memories retained in memes are the conditions of their
participants‘ individuation. Conversely, the technocratic control of retentions by capital
not only allows for the reconstitution of the self in the service of capital but also gives

256. While tertiary retentions often exist in the form of media, Stiegler notes that, ―Tertiary
retention is not mediation because it does not come afterwards: it is not what gives mediated access to the
immediate, by that which constitutes its very possibility;‖ Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol. 2, 114.
257. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol. 1, 88.
258. Stiegler, ―Suffocated Desire,‖ 57.
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capital the ability to manage the very possibility of collective action.260 Memes in service
of capital frame memories only in service of capital, not individuation.
In functioning through the redeployment of tertiary retentions, individuation
works through a logic of repetition and difference. As Stiegler notes, ―in order to see, you
have to see again.‖261 Not only is the individuational process carried out through
repetition – the toddler says the word as a repetition of a previously heard iteration – but
comparison of the similarities and differences of its past uses are necessary for
understanding the word. In operating through a logic of repetition, individuation
functions as a sort of apprenticeship: we learn to do by repeating the externalized
retentions of others.262 Conversely, if we are always encountering the new and the novel,
there is little capacity to form consequential retentions. 263 There is no collective
individuation that the novel can be tied to; a single iteration of a photo with top and
bottom lines cannot function as a meme. It is only through the repetition of different
iterations of a meme that the larger condition of possibility that is a meme emerges. As
long as individuation happens, transformation is inevitable. If a word is always

260. On the question of tertiary retentions, it is important to draw a distinction between Virno‘s
and Stiegler‘s conceptions of individuation. For Virno, it is the ―general intellect‖ of Marx that is the
preindividual grounds of individuation, as well as the target for informational production. Virno, ―Angels,‖
60-61. The general intellect is an ideational potential created by the relations of singularities. When the
preindividual is placed within industrial capacities, the possibility of action by an individuated collection of
singularities ceases to be possible. However, for Stiegler the general intellect cannot exist but within
technics. This relationality only can come into being and exert force in tandem with the individuation of
particular technics. While this difference is minute, for Stiegler, without including technics in an
understanding of the general intellect, Virno is already selling short the process of individuation and
missing the location of struggle
261. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol. 2, 82.
262. Ibid., 86.
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individuating, can it have stable or binding force?264 However, as this transformation is a
threat to forces of domination, particularly as the fluidity of subjectivities, words, and
technics wield ever more potential power, efforts to bind or stop individuation lie at the
heart of control.
Grammatization, Proletarianization, and the Loss of Spirit
In the Phaedrus, Plato famously warns of the dangers of the externalization of
memory. Stiegler re-interprets this warning, arguing that as hypomnemata emerge, the
individuating potential of internalized organs is lost to external ones.265 While this does
not preclude the productive force of individuation, it does create a tension between the
potential rigidity of the technic and the subjectivity‘s need for flexibility in
individuation.266 This technical rigidity is characterized by a process Stiegler calls
grammatization, which speaks to the process whereby the continuous flux of
individuation ―becomes broken down into a system of discrete elements.‖267 Any process
of individuation can grammatize; however, Stiegler is most interested in the codification
of symbolic exchange.268 Although this process begins with the alphabet itself (codifying
the very sound of language), the communicative revolution engendered by control has
intensified this practice.269 Through the force of technocratic rhetorics, globalizing
economies have worked to level symbolic idioms across the globe – the iPhone is
264. Ibid., 165.
265. Ibid., 136.
266. Ibid., 116.
267. John Tinnell, ―Grammatization: Bernard Stiegler‘s Theory of Writing and Technology,‖
Computers and Composition 37 (2015), 136.
268. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery vol. 1, 57.
269. Ibid., 54.
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internationally recognizable, and English is increasingly the language of international
business, tourism, and the internet. Because of this symbolic homogenization, Stiegler
contends that grammatization has emerged as the ―technical infrastructure of control
society.‖270
As grammatization intensifies, Stiegler warns of the loss of individuation—a
process Stiegler calls proletarianization. Within proletarianization, grammatization
repositions the participant – not as a worker but as a consumer, ―now accessible and
mobilized twenty-four hours a day, and whose memory, habits and preferences are
entirely retained and stored forever in the digital traces he (sic) leaves at every stage of
the consumption process.‖271 Although ubiquitous under control, Stiegler notes that the
loss of individuation is not new:
The concept of the loss of individuation introduced by Gilbert Simondon
describes what happened in the nineteenth century to the worker subjected
to the service of the machine tool: he lost his (sic) know-how and thus his
very individuality, eventually finding himself reduced to the condition of a
proletarian. These days it is the consumer whose behavior is standardized
through the formatting and artificial manufacturing of his desires. Here he
loses his life knowledge (savoir-vivre), that is, his possibilities of living.
Norms are substituted by the latest fashionable brands as considered by
Mallarmé in La Dernière Mode (―The Latest Fashion‖). ―Rationally‖
promoted through marketing, these brands are like those ―bibles‖ that
govern the functioning of fast-food franchises, which the franchisee must
follow to the letter under the threat of contract breach or even a lawsuit.272
Proletarianization occurs because the ―worker‖ is divorced from any technical
participation in production. Under control, participants are not simply divorced from the
product of their labor, their very existence is both the labor and the product.
270. Ibid., viii.
271. Miguel de Beustegui, ―The New Critique of Political Economy,‖ in Stiegler and Technics, ed.
Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 183.
272. Stiegler, ―Suffocated Desire,‖ 54-5.
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Consequently, proletarianization divorces participants from participation in
symbolic construction and instead asks them only to passively consume symbols. Stiegler
turns to the example of music to explain this process. Prior to technologies of mass
musical circulation, the gramophone, record, MP3 etc., to enjoy music more than once an
individual had to be able to reproduce it themselves. Participating in this personal
reproduction enabled individuation for the music, as well as participants and the listening
collective.273 Conversely, when music can be purchased and consumed, each user has the
capacity to consume the melody without reproduction or individuation. Although there is
a lesser possibility for individuation by redeploying the music in new times and spaces,
the symbolic content is now only industrially, rather than socially produced, limiting the
space for the invention of new communicative possibilities.274 This is not to say that
individuation cannot happen within particular media forms, but when technocratic
bureaucratization promotes consumption over participation, these media lose their
individuating function – denying the creation of active subjects and politically affective
publics.
The Politics of Spirit
Theorizing control, Deleuze implies there is a potential of political agency in the
human actor, asserting ―Men‘s (sic) only hope lies in a revolutionary becoming: the only
way of casting off their shame or responding to what is intolerable.‖275 In recognizing the
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conditions of proletarianization enabled by control as the root of this intolerability,
Stiegler turns to questions of spirit and care as the model of future politics.
For Stiegler, resistance to control must align with questions of spirit, as this is the
capacity denied by proletarianization. Stiegler defines spirit as the capability of the mind
to freely individuate. Specifically, Stiegler argues that
the ‗life of spirit (the mind),‘ to speak in the words of Hannah Arendt, has
become entirely subjected to the imperatives of the market economy and
to the imperatives of returns upon the investments of enterprises that
promote the technologies of what is called the culture industry, the
program industry, media, telecommunications, and finally technologies of
knowledge, or cognitive technologies.276
Recognizing that there is not an outside to capitalism, Stiegler does not call for a
wholesale abandonment or destruction of current modes of production. Instead, Stiegler
argues for the adoption of an economic system that does not focus on profit but rather for
the care of the collective and its spirit.277 Stiegler argues,
These systems must be grounded in the representation of differing
perspectives, polemics and controversies, as well as convergences of
interest or perspective enabling re-groupings, that is, ultimately,
transindividuations that recognize themselves in meanings, thereby
constituting collective individuations, and establishing, at the heart of
digitalized public life, argued and analyzable critique that counters the
murmurings that abound in a falsely consensual digital world lacking
instruments for enhancing collective singularities.278
Through participation in digital technologies that allow a variety of individuations – such
as memes – ―we are [able] to love things together‖ and in the process both love ourselves

276. Stiegler, The Re-Enchantment, 11.
277. Bernard Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2013), 97. Stiegler argues that care of the collective ―is the only worthwhile definition of genuine
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and engage in collective action.279 In this call to love things together, the very relations
denied by technocratic synchronization create this new spirit. Specifically, Stiegler calls
for a capitalism that creates a space for individuation and spirit under the auspices of
care, a byproduct of individuation. Specifically, care is a process ―whereby knowledge
and skills are imparted from an older to a younger generation‖ in a way that allows
individuation.280 In order to engage in care, participants must mobilize the third degree
retentions created by past individuations in the present and in a way that they may be
used for the future. If the economy places care at its heart, Stiegler argues, education,
science, and industry will all gain a more productive capacity.281
Because the loss of spirit is directly tied to the industrialization of the symbolic,
the ethos of a society of care is built around amateurism. For Stiegler, an amateur is more
than a person without professional credentials, although that is central. Amateurs must
also engage in production not out of a monetary motive, but for the love of the art.282 The
amateur sings the song to learn its nuance, enjoy it, and share with friends, not to record
the perfect track and sell it. However, Stiegler argues that the focus on synchronization of
mass production discourages the amateur.283 Stiegler therefore argues for a revitalization
of amateurism because it encourages the repetition through difference that allows
individuation. Networked media ecologies are particularly suited to this amateurism,
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because while they certainly have the ability to function as tools of the programming
industry (Netflix lets us synchronize binge watching at a level beyond that of network
TV), the contributive logic of networked ecologies invites participation, creation, and
recirculation, on the amateur scale.284 In this capacity, memes have the potential to
function as technics of amateur production par excellence. Not only do their aesthetics
derive from amateur modes of production, but their creation of participatory narratives
and publics enables them to function as modes of amateur cultural and rhetorical critics.
Despite the potential of networked media to simply drive consumption, Stiegler‘s
veneration of digital technologies emerges from the capability of these technics to enable
a return of spirit. Recognizing a return of spirit as key to productive human action,
Stiegler views contemporary hypomnemata as pharmakon – both a poison and a cure.285
The curative functions of networked technologies begin with their capacities as parts of
an economy of contribution. In inviting all participants within networked ecologies to
participate, networked technologies invite each participant to contribute to the
construction of the modes that define these digital environments.286 This curative
potential has manifested in technologies like freeware and open source software, both of
which drive the production of memes and break the cycle of synchronization.
However, participants should not embrace the potential of networked ecologies
without caution. Stiegler notes that all too often control turns this contributive nature
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back towards synchronizing consumptive practices. Crowdsourcing, while potentially
mobilizing the common for the creation of the social good, is also frequently used by
corporations to make products more desirable for popular consumption.287 Similarly,
control can re-mobilize many memes to reify dominant ideologies and promote
consumptive drives in networked publics. Because of this dual nature, Stiegler warns that
pharmaka are indifferent towards participants; it is up to us to ensure they work in the
service of care.288 Consequently, resisting control centers on turning technologies towards
the manufacture of spirit. Participants must utilize networked technologies in ways that
help them struggle against proletarianization, which means embracing the individuating
processes built around the symbolic capacities of the new, networked media ecology.
Because control functions primarily through the synchronization of individuals,
political struggle exists at the intersection of technics, subjectivities, and collectivities.
However, as collectives are preindividual, and technics are exteriorizations of the
collective, the political space of the struggle becomes subjectivity itself. In quashing
individuation, control prevents the process of subjectification.289 Following this concern
with the politics of subjectification, Stiegler asserts that ―to trans-form oneself, or to
make of oneself, is just as much the theatre as the forge of the struggle.‖290 This is not a
battle over the nature of some sort of unified subject – this notion is something Deleuze
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and Stiegler explicitly reject. Rather a struggle over subjectification seeks to establish the
conditions under which the human animal may act.291
Rhetoric in the Regime of Control
As hypomnemata have the potential to both foster the most intense modes of
control as well as enable resistance, any contemporary political project is undoubtedly
tied to communication. However, it is not enough to simply attend to generic
communication-oriented technics. Rather, I contend a rhetorical orientation can best
foster the return of spirit via restored individuation. Therefore, I dedicate the remainder
of this chapter towards explicating how the rhetorical tradition can offer illuminating
insights into resisting proletarianization.
Considering Deleuze‘s admonishment of an abundance of communication as the
foundation of control – he claims that ―speech and communication have been corrupted‖
and calls for ―vacuoles of noncommunication‖ – it would be easy to dismiss the rhetorical
in the efforts to resist the dominant forces of control.292 This dismissal would seem
particularly appropriate for networked rhetorical technics as they expand the
opportunities for communication. Critics like Jodi Dean argue that these technologies
encourage participation in control at the cost of the more consequential politics that
operate on the level of money and collective ―real world‖ action.293 However, if, as
Damien Smith Pfister notes, control society is communicatively ―justified, extended, and
maintained‖ – particularly through networked rhetorical processes – then ―networked
291. Deleuze, ―Control and Becoming,‖ 175.
292. Ibid., 171. It is worth noting that in referring to communication, Deleuze seems to be
targeting the constant and instant force of marketing and other consumption based modes of
communication, rather than all forms of symbolic exchange.
293. Jodi Dean, ―Why the Net is not a Public Sphere,‖ Constellations 10 (2003), 96.
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rhetorical theory must focus its critical edge on [control society].‖294 This rhetorical focus
is particularly useful because, as Stiegler notes, symbolic resources – as the grounds for
individuation – ―are both theatre and weapon‖ in the current struggle over power.295
Moreover, a rhetorical focus is the necessary antidote to philosophy‘s poisonous
dismissal of technics. Stiegler asserts that in ignoring technics, Platonism and its resultant
philosophies are the grounds from which the oppressions of contemporary control stem.
Consequently, according to Stiegler, the resurgence of technics must be the project of
contemporary philosophy.296 If that is the case, the meta-technic that is rhetoric may be
the future of philosophical thought. Specifically, as an architectonic art, rhetoric is a
technic through which all other techne may be understood.297 A participant cannot simply
build an axe, it must be rhetorically framed as having utility to operate as a retentional
apparatus. Similarly, the alphabet is nothing more than a series of sounds without
rhetorical formation. In this sense, the rhetorical is the very condition of possibility from
which other technics individuate.
In the context of Stiegler, as soon as rhetoric is more than a simple tool for
creating action, it is already on the road to being a technic of individuation. In this sense
it demands a rethinking of the dominant tradition of rhetoric. Blumenberg famously notes
that rather than being a tool only for mono-directional persuasion, rhetoric centers around
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fostering agreement.298 However, in the milieu of Stiegler, this is not traditional
agreement. Instead, agreement is found in using tertiary retentions to recreate the
collective secondary retentions that constitute the ―we.‖ Further, Blumenberg argues that
because it is interested in agreement, rhetoric must delay other forms of action to make
time for this process.299 In the language of individuation, this delay is the renegotiation of
the preindividual. In seeking agreement through unifying individuations, the rhetorical
seeks to reshape the very individualities that constitute the we, taking the time to
constitute a different field of potential from which individuals may act (individuate).
If rhetoric is the negotiation of the conditions for individuation, it does so
particularly through its focus on form.300 While individual rhetorical iterations have
force, the form behind these iterations organizes ―our beings, our perceptions, and our
social realities.‖301 The individuating capacity of form relates to long-standing concepts
within the rhetorical tradition. Indeed, the Sophists argued that a flexible notion of form
creates the conditions of rhetorical possibility in a manner akin to what Simondon
envisions as the preindividual state. Nathan Crick praises this Sophistic legacy because,
Despite the attention paid to the Sophists‘ epistemology, their greatest
legacy is really their artistic commitment to form, or what Kenneth Burke
calls the ‗‗creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the
adequate satisfying of that appetite.‘‘ The Sophists understood that logos
is a means of giving form to collective human experience by bringing
298. Hans Blumenberg, ―An Anthropological Approach to the Contemporary Significance of
Rhetoric,‖ in After Philosophy: End or Transformation?, ed. Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas
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301. Brummet, ―Form,‖ 378.

101

forth outstanding qualities in their common situation and narrating
possibilities by which emotional tensions can be brought to
consummation.302
Crick‘s description of logos bringing forth human qualities through rhetorical form reads
as a paraphrase of Simondon explaining individuation. Rhetorical form shapes the
potential of symbolic action, and symbolic action shapes reality. Yet the analogs to
individuation in rhetorical studies extend beyond the centrality of form.
The same year that Deleuze wrote on control societies (1990), Michael Calvin
McGee wrote ―Text, Context, and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture,‖ an essay
that serves as a rhetorical parallel to Deleuze‘s theorization of control by opening
rhetorical studies to the question of individuation through three moves. First, in
theorizing interpretation as the task of the audience, rather than the critic, McGee
conceives of rhetoric not as a simple conveyer of static meaning but as a technic that
individuates in each context.303 If every act of rhetoric must be consumed in new contexts
that draw attention to different fragmented components and flows, these acts necessarily
transindividuate through their circulation and analysis. It individuates a new force of the
words, the interpreter is re-individuated, and it constitutes new social relations between
those who interpreted it. McGee‘s second tie to individuation is recognizing that ―rhetoric
is what rhetoricians do,‖ suggesting that ―focus is more on the performance of discourse
than the archeology of discourse.‖304 If rhetoric is a process of performance, it is never
complete. Rather, it is a moving force that re-individuates as it moves across contexts and
302. Nathan Crick, ―The Sophistical Attitude and The Invention of Rhetoric,‖ Quarterly Journal
of Speech 96, no. 1 (2010): 40.
303. McGee, ―Fragmentation,‖ 274.
304. Ibid., 275.
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through individuals. Finally, reconceiving texts as formations of fragments, McGee
disconnects the rhetorical performance from a particular rhetor.305 Instead, fragments,
both mobilized and excluded from the assembled performance, must preexist the text in
potentiality (form) but not in iteration. It is the combining of the fragments into an
assembled force that actualizes and individuates the rhetorical performance and its related
components. Consequently, both McGee and Deleuze recognize a fundamental shift in
the very nature of communication. They both argue that the conditions of contemporary
communication and politics demand a move away from understanding texts and forms
exclusively as boundaries/bounded. For Deleuze, this is the move away from molds, for
McGee it is the rejection of the discrete text. Instead, these concepts must be replaced
with more fluid understandings of communicative force/individuation – Deleuze‘s
modulation and McGee‘s fragments.306 It is only in embracing these shifts that critics can
understand the ways that rhetoric – as a technic of power – functions in the conditions of
control.
Memes as the Entelechial Individuating Text
Because McGee‘s fragmentation thesis is an effort to understand rhetoric at the
birth of control, it is not surprising that digital technologies have intensified the features
of McGee‘s arguments in the same way that they have Deleuze‘s. Memes operate almost
exclusively through a logic of form, as they are exceedingly fragmented and are symbolic

305. Ibid., 287.
306. Although fragmentation seems to imply a certain unity, in McGee‘s conception this unity
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technics in a state of constant individuation.307 Because of this fragmented and
participatory nature, memes are not simply another hypomnemata, but rather they are
representative of the potential of the capacities of rhetoric as pharmakon of control in a
networked rhetorical era.
Virno, while explaining the individuation of the multitude and the resultant
political capacities, also articulates the relation of rhetoric and control. Specifically,
Virno argues that the preindividual state known as the ―the general intellect‖ can also be
called ―common places.‖ Virno notes,
in today‘s world, the ―special places‖ of discourse and of argumentation
are perishing and dissolving, while immediate visibility is being gained by
the ―common places,‖ or by generic logical-linguistic forms which
establish the pattern for all forms of discourse. This means that in order to
get a sense of orientation in the world and to protect ourselves from its
dangers, we cannot rely on those forms of thought, of reasoning, or of
discourse which have their niche in one particular context or another.308
This use of commonplaces is a pun referring to both the classical concept of culturally
specific stories and the common as the place where publics are both produced and reside.
A wide range of human relations may share a variety of technics, and the common forms
of the symbolic are both the engine of capitalism and individuation of publics.
However, beyond saying that both usages of the pun are literal, this dual
movement also speaks to the fact that a language of commonplaces is the discourse of
post-Fordism. As the networked logic of control places ever more diverse subjectivities
into relation, symbols, such as memes, that distil the commonality between subjectivities
into a manner that is easy to deploy are the rhetorical resources that connect the widest
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range of participants. Virno argues that this shift is a result of the loss of home afforded
by control, noting,
the cognitive-linguistic habits of the species do not come to the forefront
because someone decides to make them come to the forefront; they do so
out of necessity, or because they constitute a form of protection in a
society devoid of substantial communities (or of ―special places‖).309
As control erodes spatial community, the form based logic of commonplaces and topoi,
which resonate across contexts, become the crux of rhetoric and the production of
collectivities. This loss of home and general language is the very basis of networked
media ecologies. As networked participants turn to the de-spatialized web for rhetorical
production and consumption, they must speak in the generalized language of the internet
– notably memes and emojis – to be intelligible. Joshua Gunn earlier recognized a similar
phenomenon, observing that the logics of late capitalism frequently reduce books and
movies to stock footage and other fragments, transforming their specialized knowledge
into generalized topoi/commonplaces.310 Under the logic of control, as well as that of
networked spaces, it is those rhetorical technics that are most open to the common that
have the greatest potential for use.
While a loss of specialized language does create a more shallow conception of
language, that shallowness may be a political resource. Specifically, shallow language
may also function under the logic of pharmakon. Certainly, if symbols are shallow they
are more easily synchronized and consumed. Hours spent reading memes, all the while
also being subjected to advertisements and producing metadata, certainly plays into the
hands of capitalistic control. However, this shallowness also affords a certain realistic
309. Ibid., 42.
310. Joshua Gunn, ―Prime-Time Satanism: Rumor-Panic and the Work of Iconic Topoi,‖ Visual
Communication 4, no. 1 (2005): 114.
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power. Drawing from Foucault, theorists such as Deleuze, Negri, and Virno all argue that
surface is all that there is. Technics are not impactful because of some deep or innate
nature but rather because of what they do and how they relate to individuation. In
attuning all participants to this surface nature, commonplaces function as tools of social
criticism. Virno notes,
Those who do not feel at home, in order to get a sense of orientation and
to protect themselves, must turn to the ―common places,‖ or to the most
general categories of the linguistic intellect; in this sense, strangers are
always thinkers. As you see, I am inverting the direction of the analogy: it
is not the thinkers who become strangers in the eyes of the community to
which the thinkers belong, but the strangers, the multitude of those ―with
no home,‖ who are absolutely obliged to attain the status of thinkers.
Those ―without a home‖ have no choice but to behave like thinkers: not in
order for them to learn something about biology or advanced mathematics,
but because they turn to the most essential categories of the abstract
intellect in order to protect themselves from the blows of random chance,
in order to take refuge from contingency and from the unforeseen.311
While memes and other fragmented digital texts may seem inane, their very lack of
deeper or specialized meaning allows them to become a reflection of contemporary
humanity. Memes are created and individuate out of the shared social context of internet
participants; they are the languages by which this collective knowledge individuates. It is
in this capacity, as the product of collective networked individuation, that memes emerge
as key to understanding the potential of contemporary rhetorical production.
Furthermore, as technics that are eminently individuational, memes demonstrate
the democratic potential of networked hypomnemata. Although this democratization may
have impacts on representative democracies, memes‘ central impact is in the enabling of
a more radical form of democracy – the constitution of the potential of humanity through
multitude itself. The ability to engage in this more radical democracy is key to resistance.
311. Virno, Grammar, 38.
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Under control, representative democracy more often than not functions as an institution
of bureaucratized biopower.312 However, just because traditional politics increasingly
operates in the interests of control does not imply that organized politics are not possible.
We must simply rethink what and how organizations are used.313
Because participants create and renegotiate memes through processes of social
invention, they are representative of this organized possibility of radical democracy.
Their participatory nature gives them the potential to work against proletarianization.
Davi Johnson notes
If, as Nietzsche famously suggests, so much of our thought is the product
of grammatical habit, then memetics offers a way to disrupt these
traditions of thought by providing a defamiliarizing theoretical vocabulary
capable of offering at least temporary reprieve from the causal
assumptions borne of grammatical necessity.314
The commonness of memes allows every participant the potential to break the symbolic
logic of a particular meme, as well as the other grammatical structures in relation to
which the memes individuate. When iterations of PTSD Kid moved the poles from
focusing on the horrors of Vietnam to the horrors of childhood, it is the grammatical
resistance of this new interpretation that allowed for a refiguring of the grammar of the
meme.

312. Speaking on the tradition of governance, Hardt and Negri note, ―Public space has been
privatized to such an extent that it no longer makes sense to understand social organization in terms of a
dialectic between private and public spaces, between inside and outside. The place of modern liberal
politics has disappeared, and from this perspective our postmodern and imperial society is characterized by
a deficit of the political.‖ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2000), 188.
313. Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 356.
314. Johnson, ―Mapping‖: 28.
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Moreover, as the memes operate on a common level, they allow the amateur
production that Stiegler sees as the key to re-individuation. Because memes are simple
and universal in content, any participant can deploy them. In the process, they also
participate in the active renegotiation of modes that drive the meme. Each deployment of
Scumbag Steve changes the form of the mode of ―scumbag,‖ redefining the potential of a
range of social individuations. Such memes, and other forms of cognitive labor, function
as non-representative democracy. The changes of the scumbag mode set the potentialities
of decorum because each new iteration helps to democratically renegotiate the boundaries
of decorum. Memes are democratically created symbol systems, and their relations to
other social modes allow for those modes to be democratically negotiated as well.
Technics like memes radicalize the process of individuation, challenging
proletarianization.315
In providing the rhetorical resources to challenge proletarianization, memes and
similar rhetorical technics also have the potential to help reshape traditional politics
towards care. Theorists of control are suspicious of representational democracy, not only
for its ties to capital but also because the very nature of representation is to reduce
individuating singularities to grammaticized representational classes.316 However, Zizi
Papacharissi, in studying participatory digital technics, notes that while expressive
technologies may not motivate individuals towards traditional political action, the
creation of particular structures of feelings reorient these individuals towards the civic by
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providing connections that allow people to ―feel‖ their way into politics.317 Tweets about
the Arab spring may have had little impact on global policy, but they disrupted the
synchronic isolated media consumption of web participants, prompting them to exist in
relation to politically engaged others around the world. It is these modes of relations that
Stiegler argues is the essence of care. The rhetorical creation of affective publics – that is,
modes of affectivity that connect people to one another – creates the potentiality for an
industrial political economy predicated on care rather than control.
Using Burke to Combat Symbolic Misery
The politics of control and individuation, particularly in a networked era, are
central to rhetorical processes. However, even as the rhetorical link to individuation has
been explicated, the specific rhetorical technics and processes entangled within these
politics remain unclear. To provide a rhetorical vocabulary for exploring the
individuating potential of networked technics against technocratic modes of control, I
turn to Kenneth Burke. This relationship has the potential to be fruitful because Burke
provides a more robust vocabulary to explore the role of the symbolic in individuation
but also because Stiegler provides the opportunity to update Burke both in terms of
technics and current technology.
At first, this pairing would seem unusual. Burke is often characterized as a total
Luddite, whereas Stiegler cautiously praises technology. Certainly, Burke was suspicious
of new technologies; however, this suspicion focused on technology‘s association with a
psychology of information.318 Burke‘s psychology of information parallels Stiegler‘s

317. Papacharissi, Affective Publics, 118.
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account of contemporary symbolic misery. Each focuses on the ways that the capitalistic
production of rigid symbolic systems limits the capacity for human action. In this way,
Stiegler and Burke share similar suspicions of technology. When unchecked, technology
stifles the capability of action and the spirit by reducing individuals to creatures of
motion/consumption. Yet, both also saw the potential cure in technology. The late
writings of Burke observe that the interplay between the principle of personality (akin to
psychic individuation) and the principle of technology (akin to technical individuation)
create subjectivity.319 Finally, to avoid the perils of technology, both Burke and Stiegler
turn to poetics. Stiegler argues that it is the nature of the poetic to be sensible, creating
spaces to play and manipulate with language.320 Burke again parallels Stiegler, framing
the poetic orientation – an orientation towards incongruity and play – as the solution to
the informationism that is driven by capitalist production.
The final ideational parallel between Burke and Stiegler is a commitment to a
return of the pre-Platonic. These corresponding sophistic returns are symptomatic of the
parallels between contemporary rhetorical conditions and those of pre-literate society.
Stiegler‘s theory is explicitly tied to the pre-Platonic Greeks, arguing that they were the
most recent prior philosophical movement interested in technics.321 Crick similarly
argues that Burke‘s focus on form, attitudes, and play all place Burkean rhetorical
theorization within the same sophistic tradition.322 As they share similar philosophical
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roots, their philosophies unsurprisingly mirror one another. This overlapping of a
sophistic orientation is particularly useful for unpacking the rhetorical affectivity of
memes. Indeed, their reliance on imitatio provides a rhetorical explanation for the
creation and function of repetition and difference central to Stiegler‘s concept of
individuation.323
However, if Burke and Stiegler demonstrate so many philosophical parallels, what
does Burke provide to understandings of the questions of technics and individuation?
Foremost, as iterated multiple times already, the Burkean notion of form is central to
unpacking modes and transindividuation. The negotiation of form is how these fields of
potentiality emerge and are recreated. Similarly, identification helps explain the potential
of collective secondary retentions; it is those rhetorics that create identification that allow
the sharing of experience across subjectivities. Moreover, if according to Stiegler
―retentions are selections,‖324 Burke asks us to also consider how they are reflections and
deflections, broadening our understanding of the force of these retentions. Therefore, I
now turn to examining memes situated in contemporary political controversies to
demonstrate the utility of this Burke-Stiegler hybridization. Ultimately, understanding the
rhetorical dimensions of technics provides the potential for restoring their individuating
capacities, and in the process the prospects of productive democratic politics.

323. Ibid., 35.
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Chapter 3
Old Economies and New Memes:
Enthymeme and Enchantment in Old Economy Steve
Signs of economic slowdown had begun to emerge across the United States as
early as 2006. However, two years later when Lehman Brothers, the then fourth largest
investment bank in the United States, collapsed many Americans were shocked.325 For
these Americans, the ―Great Recession‖ that followed Lehman‘s collapse seemed to
come out of nowhere.326 Although the bank‘s failure was the result of systematic lapses
in regulation and accountability that could be traced back as far as the seventies,
dominant economic rhetorics had largely convinced Americans that continued prosperity
and growth were the inevitable outcome of the neoliberal economy that had brought the
affluence of the 1990s. So great was the public shock at this seemingly unpredicted
disaster that both academics and the popular press proclaimed that the entire system of
global capitalism was under threat.327 However, this threat was never realized, and four
years later economists and politicians proclaimed that the US economy was well on the
path to recovery. Despite these messages of recovery, many Americans – particularly
Millennials – were not feeling any more economically secure.328
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In opposition to this angst, the Federal Reserve Bank (The Fed), led by Ben
Bernanke, promoted a rhetoric of market recovery that proletarianized individuals as
consumers in service of these markets. Drawing on rhetorical tropes traditional to the
Fed, namely protecting agentic markets and distrusting the irrational urges of consumers,
this rhetoric framed consumption as not only the key to recovery, but as the only rational
action for American consumers. Such a rhetoric demonstrates the profound
proletarianizing force of technocratic rhetorics, because it dissuades the amateur
participation key to productive individuations. Although larger populations are the most
impacted by economic shifts, and therefore could offer meaningful insight into the
diagnosis of economic concerns, individuating economic rhetorics would allow economic
policy to be built around common understandings of the issues and goals of economics.
However, in this case the proletarianizing force is all the more pronounced, as it literally
valorizes the politics of personal consumption that Stiegler sees as dis-enchanting
individuals and empowering contemporary politics of control.
In 2012, an unlikely symbol emerged to provide an individuating voice seeking to
challenge the official rhetorics of market recovery and prosperity: Old Economy Steve. A
stock image macro built around a seventies-era yearbook photo, this meme articulates the
emotional and ideological frustrations of a generation beset by economic anxiety. By
enthymematically creating a narrative that challenges the myth of the American dream,
the iterations of the meme combine to offer a narrative that the economy simply failed
younger generations. This narrative is less invested in conventional political divides

―Here is When Each Generation Begins and Ends, According to Facts,‖ The Atlantic (March 25, 2014),
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between conservatives and liberals, instead focusing on diagnosing problems with the
contemporary economy and building a coalition of the disaffected. Such a coalition has
the potential to resist proletarianizing rhetorics that seek to prioritize consumption over
collectivity.
Therefore, in this chapter I outline how technocratic rhetorics such as Bernanke‘s
work to proletarianize individuals in relation to economics. I then explore the ways that
Old Economy Steve generates breakages in these communicative structures of control.
Specifically, this meme provides unique insight into the ways that stock image macros
intersect with both dominant ideological discourses (neoliberal economics) as well as
particular social identities (Millennials).329 In this capacity, the Old Economy Steve
meme is demonstrative of Stiegler‘s vision of a positive political future. As I will argue,
the meme‘s networked practices show how the rhetorical forms of narrative, myth and
identification provide resources for individuational rhetorics which serve to unwind
control and promote a politic of care.
The Fed and the Infantilization of America
Political economy and economics have long had a turbulent relationship with
rhetoric. Adam Smith‘s academic career began with a focus on rhetoric; therefore, it
should not be surprising that Smith‘s framing of capitalism – which is largely responsible
for contemporary economic understandings – has both rhetorical and moralistic elements
within it.330 Additionally, as Deirdre McCloskey reminds us, the technical language and
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mathematics of economics have a persuasive purpose and function, largely rooted in
metaphor.331 However, contemporary economic theory and politics have largely denied
this rhetorical element. Instead they frame economics as a hard science, with predictable
and rational results. James Aune argues this is but one way the realist style manifests
itself in economics; these discourses – particularly free market economics – simplify
human nature and define efficiency as a norm.332 By adopting a realist style, economic
discourses shut down opposing viewpoints by dismissing them as lacking substance,
which maintains the privilege of economic elites through the prevention of alternative
individuations.
Existing at the nexus of objective and rhetorical understandings of economic
policy, the Chair of the US Federal Reserve Bank is one of the most influential actors in
shaping both the direction of the economy and public understandings of economics and
their impact. Although unelected, bureaucrats such as the Fed Chair have immense power
to influence national politics through their ability to enact their broad mission of
preventing economic and banking instability. Lowi argues such ―broad discretion makes
a politician out of a bureaucrat.‖333 Even as chairs of the Fed argue that they base their
decisions on numbers and models, they also recognize that their words are carefully
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dissected and interpreted – creating conditions where they carefully craft their messages
to try to promote the stability and growth of markets.334
The Fed‘s focus on markets and trade highlights their commitment to the
neoliberal ideologies that underpin control society. Specifically, the Fed‘s commitment to
market objectivity and market freedom aligns its political influence with the broader
marketization frequently identified with neoliberalism.335 These rhetorical moves further
politics of control and proletarianization because they transform the individual from a
citizen to a consumer. Nicholas Gane draws the link between consumer society and
control by arguing that consumer society ―passes ‗freedoms‘ down to individuals but at
the same time depoliticizes and disempowers them by closing down the agora as an
active space for political engagement, and by leaving consumers (who are not citizens) to
their own devices.‖336 When consumption becomes the primary action of publics, politics
is left to technocratic elites. To better understand the specific ways that the rhetoric of the
Fed enacts such political control, I examine their justifications of their response to the
2008 housing collapse and subsequent ―Great Recession.‖ Many saw the tumult of the
Great Recession as a moment where neoliberal capitalism was on the brink of failure.337
When a series of Fed-led interventions assisted in a recovery that was framed as
preventing this collapse, chair Ben Bernanke was able to use the crisis to justify the
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validity and importance of the Fed‘s vision of economics – reifying the consumerist
model of economics that prevents individuation.
To evaluate the proletarianizing rhetoric of the Fed, I examine a series of four
lectures delivered by Ben Bernanke at George Washington University in the spring of
2012. While these lectures were delivered to a class of graduate students, they were
viewed live by an online audience of over 40,000 and were watched an equal number of
times in the following week alone.338 In part, a response to the increasingly virulent antiFed rhetoric circulating across the 2012 election cycle, these lectures sought to justify the
Fed‘s response to the great recession. They established them as an actor key in preventing
economic collapse and thus legitimating the Fed as a necessary and visionary force in
American politics.339 My analysis primarily focuses on the third and fourth of Bernanke‘s
lectures because they specifically detailed the Fed‘s response to the crisis and outline
their vision for American economics.340 The rhetorical features of Bernanke‘s lectures
exemplify American political rhetorics that promote proletarianization as it relates to
economic discourses by creating an ordered hierarchy which valorizes the action of
markets, the rationality of banks, and the irrationality of the masses. Combined, these
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factors reduce the masses to consumers, negating amateur participation in politics and
promoting rhetorical and market action around consumption.
Before I delve into the specifics of Bernanke‘s framing of the Fed response to the
great recession, I will briefly outline the popular narratives explaining this economic
slowdown. Officially referring to the economic recession lasting from December 2007 to
June 2009, the Great Recession colloquially refers to the collapse of the US housing
market in 2007 and the economic slowdown that lasted well into the second decade of the
twenty first century.341 The most popular narrative explaining the causes of this recession
was that irresponsible mortgage practices created a bubble in housing prices and the
subsequent popping of that bubble triggered the recession.342 Specifically, in an effort to
expand the availability of mortgage backed securities, which had become a profitable
alternative to government bonds as a premier safe investment, American financiers
offered increasingly risky mortgages to US consumers. However, as consumers of
particularly risky mortgages were unable to make their payments, a series of banks –
including large firms such as AIG, Lehman Brothers, Bear Sterns, all of whom were
heavily invested in mortgage markets – lost a major revenue stream. The collapse of
Lehman under these pressures led to a rapid and profound reticence for future lending
across the financial industry. This quickly expanding liquidity crisis sent ripples across
the economy, expanding the impact of the housing collapse across economic sectors.
341.
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While the recession officially ended in 2009, it would be over five years before
unemployment, wages, markets, and other economic indicators would begin to approach
pre-2008 levels. Undoubtedly this narrative of the collapse is overly simplistic. Ryan
Avent notes that the growing gap between the rich and other Americans, deregulation,
governmental commitment to boom and bust cycles, and other structural factors all
contributed to the collapse.343 However, as the following section will make apparent, the
exclusion of these systematic factors in favor of blaming individual failings is part of the
larger proletarianizing force offered by Bernanke‘s rhetoric.
Agentic Markets and Proletarianized Masses
While Bernanke‘s lecture series focuses on the Fed‘s response to the great
recession, it emerges out of a larger framework of financial rhetoric built around
neoliberal discourses predicated on the centrality of market logics and growth.
Specifically, Christian Angelich argues that ―The prime directive of financial speak is to
protect the status quo image of capitalism as an economic system with infinite growth
potential.‖344 This focus on growth means that the movements of markets, rather than the
actions of individuals, is the driving force of economics. This stance is replicated in
Bernanke‘s lectures. Across the lectures, Bernanke explains the economy in terms that
focus on it as a system of liquidity and economic flows that is measured by total output,
rather than a system that is the product of amalgamated actions of individuals.345
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Bernanke‘s focus on markets all but erases the human cost of economic crisis. For
example, although much of the content of the lectures are dedicated to the impacts of the
recession on markets and industry, the third lecture only has a single paragraph on
unemployment and the topic is discussed only in two brief sections of the fourth. In these
rare cases where the economy might be measured in human cost, Bernanke pivots this
discussion back to the impact these factors have on markets. This focus is apparent in the
fourth lecture when Bernanke explicitly lays out the goals that motivate Fed action,
noting:
Now of course, always, we have a dual mandate. We always have two
objectives. One of them is maximum employment, which we interpret to
mean is trying to keep the economy growing and using its full capacity,
and low interest rates are a way of stimulating growth and trying to get
people back to work. But the other part of our mandate is price stability,
low inflation…And as a result, markets have been confident that the Fed
will keep inflation low.346
Although unemployment and prices both have profound impacts on all Americans,
Bernanke pivots each issue back to their effect on markets, employment only matters in
that it facilitates market growth and inflation is key to market – rather than consumer –
confidence. Because even the most human costs of the economy are reframed to focus on
their impact on markets, Bernanke‘s rhetoric clearly frames the strength and growth of
markets as the central concern of the Fed.
Markets can be understood as one of the most concise ways to reflect the
combined human action that drives economic movement.347 However, Bernanke‘s
346.
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rhetoric instead frames markets as independent agents. Benjamin Lee and Edward
LiPuma argue that popular frames tend to think of the public sphere and the state as
containing both first and third person elements, however the market is usually understood
as a third-person collective agent to which first-person agents respond. They note ―‗the
market‘ can act, indicate, warn, hesitate, climb, and fall,‖ and human regulators and
consumers can only react to these moves.348 Across Bernanke‘s lectures, markets are
attributed with this agency as they not only grow (healthily), but are frequently
―uncertain,‖ ―vulnerable, ―and ―stressed.‖ In the face of these basic actions the Fed is
positioned as a responsive actor.
So given how we currently see the economy, we tell the market something
about where we think the rates are going to go. To the extent that they-market is--better understands our plans, that's going to help reduce
uncertainty in financial markets. And to the extent that our plans are, in
some sense, more aggressive than the market anticipated, we'll also tend to
ease policy conditions. OK, so again, monetary policy has been used to try
to help get the economy back on its feet.349
For Bernanke, Fed policy can only function effectively insofar as it is understandable to
markets. Consequently, both the lectures – and Federal reserve rhetoric more largely –
rely heavily on economic jargon.350 This jargon laden explanation of economics suggest
that the actions of agentic markets can only be understood through technical expertise.
Because of this, Bernanke frames Fed rhetoric and policy as needing to respond to the
technical needs and demands of markets rather than be intelligible to larger publics.
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In framing human action as a response to markets as agentic actors, Bernanke‘s
rhetoric prevents most individuals from participating in the individuation of economic
rhetorics. Lee and LiPuma argue that by constructing markets as independent agents to
which investors and other individuals respond, non-experts are prevented from
identifying with markets.351 Furthermore, while banks and regulators respond to markets,
larger publics are simply consumed by them. When explaining how mortgages are turned
into investments, Bernanke mentions individual borrowers only insofar as they are
transformed into securities which may flow across markets.352 In the realm of Fed
rhetoric, most individuals are only related to markets through their consumptive
practices. Bernanke‘s rhetoric follows Aristotle‘s delineation between economics and
politics: ―For Aristotle, the administration of the oikos aimed toward the preservation of
natural life, while the activity of the polis aimed for the promotion of the good life.‖353
For Bernanke, people matter as those natural lives whose consumption fuels markets – it
is a non-political space. However in focusing only on markets, Bernanke‘s rhetoric is
proletarianizing as it prevents most individuals from participating in the identifications
that create politics and publics; the market is an agent that is fundamentally different than
―we the people‖ and thus people cannot individuate with it.354 Without this individuation,
markets are framed as outside of rhetorical space, and thus not subject to the democratic
will of the people.
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Even though the Fed‘s rhetoric frames markets as independent agents, for
Bernanke these agents are not responsible for the housing collapse and subsequent
recession. Instead, human actors are framed as a mass whose irrational panics created the
crash. This massification of the larger public begins with reducing individuals to faceless
aggregates. Outside of banking and financial elites, individuals are only referenced as
part of statistics or referencing a panic. Such rhetoric frames larger collectivities as
masses, which Hardt and Negri note is a frame that removes collective agency because
these irrational mobs are instead led by others.355 This view of non-agentic masses is
replicated in Bernanke‘s implication that consumers function through a Pavlovian-style
response to Fed policies and rhetoric. Commenting on the influence of Fed policies,
Bernanke argues:
By raising and lowering the short-term interest rate, the Fed can influence
a broader range of interest rates. That in turn affects consumer spending,
purchases of homes, capital investment by firms and the like, and that
provides demand for the output of the economy and can help stimulate a
return to growth.356
By suggesting the consuming masses uncritically respond to Fed policy, Bernanke‘s
rhetoric positions them as participating in what Goodnight and Green call ―mimetic
isomorphism.‖ 357 Goodnight and Green argue that economic rhetorics frequently ask
participants to simply imitate past successful behaviors. As a mass, the collective ―we‖ is
asked to consume a Bureaucrat‘s definitions of economic success, rather than politically
negotiate (individuate with) these rhetorical technics. In making mass economic action an
imitation without difference, this rhetoric forecloses individuations.
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Beyond limiting individuation, the massification of larger publics also functions
to create a scapegoat for the financial collapses that spurred the recession. The belief that
markets are objective and rational is central to the neoliberal rhetorics that justify control
– if markets are rational they are politically neutral and ethical.358 Yet if markets always
operate ethically, how could such a disastrous crash occur? The answer offered by
Bernanke is that the panic of the masses forced the market down a harmful path.
Although Bernanke argues that subprime mortgage lending was a catalyst of the collapse,
the lectures focus on mass panic as the mechanism that transformed a localized bubble
into a system wide failure. In addressing public responses to the earliest bank failures,
Bernanke explains,
A depositor would pull their money out of a bank that was thought to be
having trouble. So there was a whole series of runs which generated huge
pressures on key financial firms as they lost their funding and were forced
to sell their assets quickly and many important financial markets were
badly disrupted.359
In using the phrase ―thought to be,‖ Bernanke suggests that the troubles facing banks
existed in the irrational mind of the masses rather than in financial realities. This
irrationality then created a cascade that ―disrupted‖ the otherwise orderly and rational
operation of markets. Even after the crisis, Bernanke asserts that mass irrationality
continued to hamper markets. In the fourth lecture, Bernanke addresses the slow recovery
of the economy. Despite the fact that banks had been stabilized and liquidity restored,
Bernanke argues that the irrational perceptions held by consumers are preventing a full
recovery.
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And more broadly, existing home owners, when they see their house
prices down, it may mean they can't get a home equity line of credit. It
may mean that they just feel poorer. And so that affects not just their
housing behavior, but also their willingness and ability to buy other
business services. So that's one of the reasons, the declines in housing
prices, and to some extent also stock prices, are part of the reason why
consumers have been cautious and less willing to spend.360
In attributing the inability of stocks, housing prices, and consumer spending to recover to
masses ―just feeling poorer,‖ Bernanke pegs responsibility for the entirety of the
continued economic hardship on mass irrationality. It is ―just‖ a feeling, and thus not in
line with the factual rationality of economic conditions which Bernake would argue
create growth if freed from these fetters of human irrationality. By framing the masses as
irrationally harming markets, Bernanke argues that in those cases where larger publics
are allowed to participate in shaping economic rhetorical technics, the result is disaster.
This rhetorical frame implies that the exclusion of the masses from participation in these
economic technics is both necessary and desirable.
Across Bernanke‘s rhetoric, the masses are a threat to the rational operation of
markets. This irrationality justifies the imposition of increased control. Specifically,
Bernanke rationalizes this control by positioning the Fed as a benevolent parent who
must constrain the masses when they threaten the operation of markets. Megan Foley
argues that such family metaphors are central to the way that contemporary society
understands economics. Foley notes this metaphor places larger publics as children in the
familial relationship.
Although nowadays the word ‗economics‘ only rarely connotes parentchild relationships, a family metaphor nevertheless underwrites the history
of political economy. The term ‗economy,‘ once oeconomy, derives from
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the Greek roots oikos (household, home, or family) and nomos (law,
convention, or ordinance). While classical Greek thought maintained a
division between the economic management of the family and the political
government of citizens, the modern emergence of ‗‗political economy‘‘
appropriated the domestic administration of the oikos as a set of
techniques for governing civic life. Discourses of political economy
mapped the art of governing children onto the art of governing citizens,
ultimately resulting in the rhetorical infantilization of citizenship today.361
Bernanke‘s rhetoric follows this familial pattern. Bernake establishes the paternal
wisdom of the Fed by noting that they had warned the irrational public that their actions
would lead to a crisis. Demonstrating this passing on of paternal wisdom, Bernanke
argues
going back for at least a decade before the crisis, the Fed and many other
people, you know, said that the--Fannie and Freddie just didn't have
enough capital and that they were in fact a danger to the stability of the
financial system.362
By arguing that the Fed warned politicians that government programs like Fannie May
and Freddie Mac were putting markets at risk, Bernanke suggests that if the masses had
been rational (adult) – or at least listened to rational advice – they could have avoided
triggering the crisis. Despite this caution, the public acted as juveniles and ignored the
warnings of more mature minds, succumbing to panic that created the crisis.
Once the public failed to listen to the wisdom of the Fed, Bernanke argues that the
Central Bank was forced to step in and save the public from itself. Speaking about the
first meeting of heads of central banks after Lehman failed, Bernanke explains,
We essentially tore up the agenda and we sat down and we talked about
what are we going to do? How are we going to work together to stop this
crisis which was threatening the global financial system? And in the end,
we came up with a statement that was written from scratch based actually
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on some Fed proposals and was circulated, and there were a number of
principles and statements involved in that. But among those were first, that
we were going to work together to prevent the failure of anymore
systemically important financial institutions.363
Framed against the usual banality of such meetings, Bernanke‘s words position the
response of the Fed as a creative intervention in the face of a failing system. In the
familial metaphor, they are the parent who has to step in to save an unruly child. That is
not to say the Fed is without fault in the crisis. On repeated occasions Bernanke notes that
in allowing unregulated mortgages, the Fed ―did not do as good a job as it should have in
protecting consumers.‖ 364 However, the failure of the Fed is not one of ignorance about
markets or economics, but rather that it did not treat the masses as the juveniles that they
were within this proletarianizing frame. Had the Fed protected people from their
irrational impulses, the crisis could have been adverted.
Bernanke‘s framing of the masses as unruly children justifies both the expansion
of state power as well as a symbolic politics of proletarianizing control.365 Concluding the
lecture series, Bernanke contends that, ―financial crises will always be with us. That is
probably unavoidable.‖366 Implicitly, Bernanke‘s rhetoric argues this cycle of crisis exists
because the panics of irrational masses will continue to disrupt markets. Consequently,
Bernanke asserts that the Fed and other similar regulators must have the authority to
regulate (control) the masses as completely as possible. Bernanke posits, ―The only
solution in the end is for us regulators and our successors to continue to monitor the
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entire financial system and to try to identify problems and to respond to them using the
tools that we have.‖367 If the masses cannot be expected to listen to reason, the Fed must
have the full resources of control to impose that reason onto them. It is only under these
conditions that the Fed can ―put out the fire‖ that is the childish irrationality of the
masses.368
Combined, these rhetorical moves by Bernanke create a clear hierarchy of
economic actors, justifying the proletarianization of the masses. On the top of this
hierarchy is markets, who are positioned as necessary for creating the growth that leads to
prosperity. However, in equating markets with rationality, Bernanke‘s rhetoric negatively
implies that the irrationality of the masses must be symbolically excluded from markets.
In this order, Fed interventions (through the mediation of banks and other financial
institutions) are necessary for the market to reach its entelechial form. Specifically, the
Fed‘s role is to insulate markets from the inefficiencies of people and their
unpredictability. Moreover, because markets can function as a metonym for the
economically elite, the interest of the public – the majority of global citizens – are the last
concern of market capitalism.369 The technical language of these economic addresses
further relegates amateurs as hierarchically bellow these discourses.370 Because any
public action besides consumption is a potential threat to the continued growth of
markets, neoliberal economics must be conducted through technics that make alternative
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economic individuations as difficult as possible. If the public cannot understand the
discourse of experts, they may as well accept it.
Ultimately, this entire discourse works to foreclose mass participation, preventing
individuation. This lack of individuation precludes the economic sphere from being
regulated by collective politics. This lack of accountability to politics is clear in the
lectures. Only once does Bernanke suggest that the Fed is answerable to more than just
the stability of markets. Addressing the money spent on bailing out AIG, Bernanke notes
―we weren‘t taking chances with tax payer money.‖ 371 Although this does suggest some
public accountability, this responsibility exist only so far as the Fed is an ethical steward
of the interests of the public, which is defined as ―getting credit flows moving again.‖
Even when the Fed is accountable to the public, it is as a parent whose greatest interest is
the freedom of markets – the tax payer is never the Fed‘s primary concern. Moreover,
because the tax payer is only useful in terms of their input of money into the system; the
Fed not only validates itself as justified in ignoring the 45 percent of Americans who
functionally pay zero income tax372 – completely removing them from economic
rhetorics, but it also justifies the act of taxation as an investment in markets, rather than
collective interests. Each tax payer has an individual relation with their investment, rather
than a collective interest in the outcome of tax policy. By foreclosing a collective relation
to these economic rhetorics, Bernanke forecloses upon the possibility of collective
individuations, preventing non-consumptive economic practices from being valid
amateur action within this rhetorical grammar.
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Old Economy Steve as a Mode of Individuation
The rhetorical environment created by rhetorics like that of the Fed worked to
proletarianize any subjectivity that was not part of the financial elite. However, as a
collective that felt particularly excluded from economic discourses, Millennials were
particularly alienated from narratives of returning economic prosperity. Economic data
both suggests that Millennials were disproportionally left behind in the recovery,373 and
that the prospects for economic prosperity for the middle and working classes of America
have been declining for the better part of four decades.374 Beyond the harsh economic
reality facing this generation, rhetorical frames further excluded them from participation.
For example, when Bernanke established that the Fed was nominally accountable to
taxpayers, this accountability largely excluded Millennials because most lack the income
required to pay into the federal income tax system.375 Combined, these economic and
rhetorical factors led many Millennials to feel excluded from the possibility of
participation in the politics of political economy. In the face of this alienation and
frustration, the meme Old Economy Steve emerged as a technic that afforded increased
opportunities for individuation in relation to issues of contemporary political economy
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Characterized as a meme for frustrated Millennials, Old Economy Steve (also
called Steven) emerged as a web phenomenon in 2012.376 Although the picture circulated
around the internet as early as 2010 as a stock photo in anti-acne articles, it developed
into the Old Economy Steve image macro in a Reddit thread in May of 2012.377 The
image is a high school yearbook photo of Kenneth Kiser, which was available on the web
because Kiser uploaded it to a free use photo repository.378 The popularity of the meme
spiked when BuzzFeed posted an article in May 2013 proclaiming it ―a new meme that
will enrage Millennials.‖379 A Google trends search of the phrase ―Old Economy Steve‖
reveals that after this initial burst of activity, a steady stream of web attention has
continued in the years since, with spikes appearing when new web outlets report on the
meme.380 The ability to generate thousands of views and sustain a consistent web
presence suggests that Steve offers a unique opportunity for participants to
transindividuate with the meme.381 Through an analysis of the corpus of the meme
available on the Quick Meme and Know Your Meme websites, I explore the defining
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features and forces of the Old Economy Steve meme. Aside from outlining the ways that
participants mobilize the meme for political purposes, in focusing on this one meme, this
chapter also seeks to illustrate how the process of transindividuation shapes and redirects
the form of memes.

Figure 3.1: Original iteration of the meme
The Individuating Form of Steve
As the most consistent element of Old Economy Steve, the visual form of the
meme is an ideal location to begin evaluation.382 Since the Reddit post that introduced the
meme included the phrase of ―old economy‖ in the title, one clear function of the visual
is to create a sense of opposition between Steve as a representative of the ―old economy‖
and Millennials as members of the ―new economy.‖ Aesthetically, the picture distances
itself from contemporary America (Figure 3.1). Both Steve‘s shirt and the background are
a shade of blue reminiscent of the ―powder blue‖ tuxedo stereotypically associated with
the sixties and seventies. Moreover, the faded contrast of the photo suggests that the
image is genuinely old, rather than a contemporary reiteration of a past aesthetic. The
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embodied presentation of Steve himself further dates the photo. The feathered haircut and
wide-collared shirt place the image firmly within the fashion of the 1970s. These
aesthetic features position Steve as a member of the Baby Boomer generation, as even the
oldest members of Generation X would not have been old enough to be in high school
when these fashions were popular. Combined, these elements create an affect akin to that
of a yearbook or similar window into the past, setting the conditions where any
individuation of the meme will already be connected to this frame of temporal opposition.
As Colin Brooke argues, participants in digital rhetorics not only develop the
visual form of technics to look a particular way, but also to be looked at from a particular
vantage point.383 When mediated through a screen, with its bright contrast and
contemporary aesthetics, the image of Steve – with its soft focus and faded elements – is
positioned as an old and out of touch other. This faded past must be contrasted with the
vivid, lived experience of participants in digital culture. Additionally, Steve is looking
directly into the camera, maintaining a direct gaze with viewers. This perspective further
situates Steve and memetic participants oppositionally. Participants cannot assume the
perspective of Steve because they are directly engaging his visage.384 By positioning the
Boomers as oppositional to memetic participants, the components of the meme situate
members of Gen X and Y as ideal participants. They are the members of American
culture who stand apart and therefore across, from Steve‘s generation.
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While the aesthetics and perspective of the meme create temporal distance and
opposition, the image of Steve himself bolsters the force of the photo. Close-up shots on
the face cut out mediating factors such as body and context, allowing the disembodied
face to become a focal point for affect.385 This focus is particularly salient in the case of
Steve, where the photo-session background obfuscates context beyond powder blue –
making temporal distance the only scenic context. This encourages participants to focus
on Steve‘s face. With his youth, light tan, and easy-going smirk, Steve embodies an
attitude suggesting the ease and happiness of youth in the seventies. Intertextually, he
reads analogously to Matthew McConaughey‘s character in the film Dazed and
Confused, replete with a ―dazed‖ facial expression.386 Steve‘s life is not only easy, he
enjoys the excess and leisure – unavailable to contemporary youth – often nostalgically
romanticized onto reminiscences of the seventies. Moreover, because the photo features
what is likely interpreted by participants as a white male body, it evokes this nostalgia in
regards to the subject position that most enjoyed the prosperity of the old economy. Akin
to a visual ideograph, these images serve to concretize and anchor text.387 Therefore, by
positioning this image at the center of the meme, Old Economy Steve invites participants
to read the meme through a frame of generational difference that romanticizes the past.
These visual associations dictate the formal functions of the topline and
bottomline. While the tone of textual elements varies across stock character macros,
participants that create Old Economy Steve memes create ironic affect through the
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juxtaposition of the two lines of text with the visual form. Once juxtaposed, these two
lines create a perspective by incongruity whereby the bottomline calls on participants to
reevaluate the assumptions written on the topline.388 In the earliest iterations of the
meme, the topline continues the gesture of the visual, reifying the easy life embodied by
Steve. These toplines imbue him with traits that would be unacceptable for contemporary
economic success – e.g. ―fails out of high school.‖ The bottomlines then provide
information that complicates efforts to read these failings through contemporary
standards, instead telling of his success, e.g.―gets job, buys house, retires happy.‖ This
contrast draws upon the nostalgia evoked by the visual style of the image, suggesting that
Steve‘s life under conditions of the ―old economy‖ was easier than that faced by younger
generations in the new.
However, as technics individuate along with the individuals who participate in
their circulation, an alternative modality of Steve emerged through transindividuation.
Later iterations of the meme flip the form of relation between the toplines and
bottomlines, drawing force from the class division created by the photo‘s perspective. In
this second individuated strain of the meme, the topline displays a viewpoint – usually
conservative – that demonstrates participants‘ interpretations of Baby Boomer‘s current
economic views or their criticism of contemporary youth: e.g. ―I didn‘t have a computer
at my desk like you kids.‖ The bottom line then repositions Steve‘s generation as socially
antiquated, ―had scotch and an ashtray instead.‖ This bifurcation of the poles
demonstrates how the individuation of textual elements constantly repositions modal
poles of a meme. While this inversion stays within the larger form of generational
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contrast, it expands the scope of the meme beyond nostalgia for the past, allowing more
explicit criticism of contemporary economics.
Finding Ourselves in Steve‘s Past
Bernanke‘s rhetoric framed the entelechial goal of economic action as the growth
of markets. As this rhetoric positioned agentic markets as hierarchically superior to
human actors, it foreclosed identification between individuals and the economy. At best,
people – particularly Millennials – could only respond to the actions of markets, ideally
by consuming as homogenous singularities (Stiegler‘s very definition of
proletarianization). Although blaming generational difference for this difficulties could
be dismissed as simple youthful discontent, Stiegler points out that reconsidering the
nature of economics is fundamentally the task of these younger generations. Speaking on
the loss of care in contemporary economics, Stiegler argues:
The great question of the twenty-first century will be finding the way to
abandon [contemporary economics] and to invent new modalities of noninhuman existence within societies that have become thoroughly
technological-modalities that are less toxic, more useful to a noninhumanity that has become a global community in which isolation is
impossible…, and more desirable for the world‘s population as a whole
(particularly younger generations who will themselves have to invent and
solidify these new ways of life: this will be their work since we, having
left them such a heavy heritage, will have to discover both how to have
confidence in them and give way to them).389
If it is up to younger generations to invent the conditions that create care, a frame of
generational opposition creates the conditions that allow this innovation. Millennials need
rhetorical distance from the Baby Boomers and their proletarianizing rhetorics if they
wish to develop alternative economic orders predicated on care.
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As a technic grounded in such opposition, Steve provides the conditions for
collective individuation that set the foundations for Millennials to promote care.
Specifically, the formal expectations of Old Economy Steve afford increased
opportunities for individuals to identify with the stance of the meme – creating a focal
point for the establishment of collective unity. Each iteration of an image macro is the
enactment of a particular individual‘s identification with the meme – often taking the
form of a textual reference to particular struggles.390 However, beyond their connection to
the frustrations constructed by the meme‘s formal elements, little unifies the participants
that individuate via particular iterations. In this way, the meme allows for collectivization
through the constitution of an identifiable ―we‖, without the eradication of the ―I‖ into a
mass subjectivity. Consequently, the way that participants identify with the narratives and
structures of feeling that organize a text helps to determine the way they use the text to
engage in a process of individuation. In the case of Steve, this individuation translates the
proletarianizing discourses of markets into a participatory space for the discussion of the
human side of contemporary economics.
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Figure 3.2: Steve on the job market.
While the form of Old Economy Steve suggests a crisis in contemporary
American capitalism, individual iterations convey varied experiences of the crisis. For
many participants, the meme allows the ability to express the that fact that younger
Americans are experiencing unemployment in ways unknown to Steve‘s generation.
Multiple iterations suggest that finding employment in Steve‘s era was easy – ―Loses job
// finds another one on the way home‖ and ―finds ‗entry level‘ job // requires zero years
experience‖ (Figure 3.2). These iterations highlight the difficulty of Millennials in
finding employment after the great recession. Other iterations of the meme tackle issues
ranging from outsourcing and the decline of industrial labor, to political issues like the
minimum wage, unions, and social security (Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.3: Steve comments on political issues
However, the ability of users to place their personal narrative within the larger
form of the meme is most apparent in the plethora of iterations criticizing the current
state of higher education, thus aligning the meme with Millennials for whom this is a
particularly salient concern. Some instances highlight the problems of employment that
face particular fields of study in the new economy, such as ―got journalism degree //
works at daily newspaper‖ or ―liberal arts degree // gets job.‖ Others indict the
contemporary failure of college to live up to its past promise more generally, ―when I was
in college my summer job paid the tuition // Tuition was $400,‖ ―graduated college // saw
difference in his paycheck,‖ and ―graduates college // doesn‘t move back in with his
parents.‖ Each of these iterations allows Millennials to express and identify their
individual struggles within a larger sense of generational unity. The ability to express a
feeling of collective identification in the face of economic uncertainty encourages
participation in, and reproduction of, the meme.
Yet it is not only the ability to write oneself into the meme that encourages
identification. Old Economy Steve also allows participants to evoke nostalgic memories
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that situate them within the economic crisis. Greg Dickenson posits that the construction
of memory is a performative act used to constitute a particular sense of identity.391 This
identity work is particularly prominent in times of crisis, where nostalgic recreations of
the past are used to judge contemporary events in light of a reconstructed historical view
of community identity.392 Steve‘s evocation of a nostalgic frame is empowered by the
juxtaposition of generations created between the visual and the textual. Many iterations
of the meme use Steve‘s construction as a slacker to further nostalgize the past. One
popular iteration starts with the topline ―2.0 GPA, abuses alcohol and cocaine, can‘t hold
a job,‖ all believable life outcomes for Steve within the form of the meme. This litany of
poor life choices is then contrasted with the bottomline, ―elected president of the United
States.‖ Aside from serving as an unflattering commentary on the complicity of George
W. Bush in the failures of the new economy as well as the president‘s personal character
flaws, this text suggests that the old economy offered more opportunities, as well as a
greater capacity for second chances, for all types of individuals, not just the exceptional.
The Old Economy Steve meme, with its romantic reimagining of the seventies,
allows users to pass judgment on the failings of the contemporary economy. Yet, this is
not a simple disparagement of the status quo; rather the meme uses a narrative built
through transindividuation to use the past as proof that a preferable alternative to the ills
of the present is possible. On face, the construction of a nostalgic memory is a
conservative act, implicitly calling for a return to the late industrial economics of the
1970s that allowed Old Economy Steve to flourish. However, when juxtaposed with the
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undesirability of the present, the meme opens up alternative narrative spaces. While this
narrative may come in the form of a return to the past, it is not limited to this logic of
return. Stiegler notes that such juxtaposition of current ills with a better future is the only
mode of individuation that can combat those who in the face of proletarianization do not
―give a damn‖: the possibility of an alternative preferable to the present creates an
impetus to challenge the structures creating contemporary dissatisfaction.393 Moreover,
because the lines of text speak as a contemporary voice commenting on past events, they
create a juxtapositional logic that reorients memory. This reorientation allows users to
embrace a nostalgia that functions as a roadmap to the future, suggesting the possibility
of a political alternative that is both materially and affectively preferable to the present. 394
Such a focus on alternative temporalities imbues the Steve meme with resistive potential.
Deleuze notes that while disruptive surprises are a primary mode of unsettling power in
control society, the creation of new ―space-times,‖ such as a hyperbolically idealized
1970s, creates opportunities to resist inclusion into the narratives that justify control.395
Ultimately, these varied narratives which allow identification between
participants and with economic politics allows these memes to afford participants
opportunities for individuation. This individuation is enabled not simply through the form
of this meme, but also through the larger proairetic logics of networked media. Because
of their social construction, memes encourage the revitalization of invention built around
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imitatio, furthering the proliferation of their underlying communicative force.396
Participants use the intersections of their unique experiences to create common force
across the network. Under this interpretation, a meme that allows identification will better
induce proairesis, creating an evolving democratic narrative that can provide spaces
where memetic expressions articulate a collective individuation in opposition to dominant
structures of power. Stock character macros are particularly suited to enabling
participants to identify with the formal constraints of the meme. The narrative and
affective content of visual elements allow participants to share common experiences or
social positions, although the textual overlays enable the participants to articulate their
particular subject position within this common community.397
Modular Construction of an Enthymematic Meta-narrative
While each instance of the meme functions as its own enthymeme, they are
textual fragments that invite participants to critically construct a broader message when
combined.398 Such reconstructions, with as many permutations as fragments, foster
rhetorical technics particularly suited to individuation. As evidenced in discussions of the
ways that participants can articulate their personal struggles within the meme, each
iteration of Old Economy Steve enthymematically tells a singular story about the
economy and the political/economic differences and divisions between generations.
However, as the meme proaireticly expanded, a larger enthymematic meta-narrative
emerged across iterations of the meme. As repetitions of the meme with unique content,
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these iterations coalesce into a larger enthymeme built around the form of the meme. This
enthymeme gestures towards a meta-narrative that participants may adopt. Stiegler argues
that the provision of such narratives is politically potent, as individuals do not decide
their identity, but rather adopt it through the technics they transindividuate with.399
Consequently, the construction of alternative identities within the technics of Steve
allows alternative individuations through which individuals may enter into political life.
Across the two primary threads of the meme, particular iterations highlight
specific ideological inconsistencies of Steve‘s generation, or specific ways that capitalism
has failed the millennial generation. More broadly, the collective construction of the Old
Economy Steve enthymematically argues that contemporary articulations and practices of
capitalism preclude the American Dream – challenging the virtue of Bernanke‘s
hierarchical valorization of markets. As Aaron Duncan argues, the myth of the American
Dream is central to Americans‘ understandings of their social and economic character.400
Duncan posits that the most basic form of the myth centers on the trope of the ―self-made
man.‖401 The narrative of this man is as follows: work hard, follow basic social
expectations, and be rewarded with moderate success in the form of a suburban home, 2.4
kids, and financial security. In the language of Bernanke, be a good consumer who does
not panic in a way that will disturb markets. The myth further posits that anyone with
enough grit and good fortune has the potential to realize the dream. The myth frames
individuals as having total economic agency and self-determination but not to question
399.
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capitalism; if the system allows prosperity, what incentive is there to question it – let
alone push for change? This myth has played a central role in the justification of
American capitalism,402 making Steve appealing to those that capitalism has failed. This
latter part of the myth disrupts the hierarchy of Bernanke, by suggesting that individuals
need to be more than passive consumers regulated by parental technocrats.
Although this myth is central to American cultural character, the meta-narrative
constructed across Old Economy Steve offers a counter-narrative by arguing the current
impossibility of the myth – and by extension Bernanke‘s hierarchy. To begin, the
embodied presence of Steve uses modes of hypersignification to draw attention to the fact
that non-white, non-male bodies have been traditionally – and continue to be – excluded
from the dream. Beyond this, iterations indict the myth in a general sense. The iteration
―receives entry level position after high school // works up the ladder to CEO‖ – uses the
expected comic form of the meme to suggest that while Boomers lived the dream to
achieve high paying white color positions, that type of advancement is now impossible
for Millennials. Other iterations deconstruct specific elements of the dream‘s vision of
the idyllic American life – ―didn‘t graduate high school // still made enough money to
support a family of four.‖ Across the meme, participants suggest that for Millennials
home ownership is unlikely, pay is lower, benefits are disappearing, possibilities for
advancement are dim, and generally, they will be less well off than their parents.
Combined, these enthymematically argue that while banks may have recovered
from the Great Recession, for everyone unable to fit the mold of Steve, the Fed‘s claims
of economic recovery are far from true. A form of the meme featuring no topline and the
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bottomline ―retires‖ summarizes the meme‘s vision of the prospects for Millennials. By
breaking the form of the meme, this iteration suggests that regardless of the content of the
topline, for non-Boomers the hope of retirement – and by extension the American Dream
– is a punchline. By suggesting the incongruity between any expression of contemporary
life and the American dream, this iteration argues the two are incommensurate.
Moreover, by expressly linking the prospects of the American dream to the faded image
of Steve, the meme enthymematically asserts that the idea of achieving the dream is as
outdated as the picture of Steve, long lasting consumer products, and other bottomlines of
the meme. The American dream is living through reminiscences of the past in the same
way that a Baby Boomer may use a high school photo to relive their glory days. In this
way, the meme uses identifications with the American dream to disrupt the order of the
hierarchy presented by Bernanke, disrupting its proletarianizing force. If the rationality of
markets supported by citizens as consumers cannot provide the dream, then the control
advocated by Bernanke‘s rhetoric may not be as productive as individuations which
foreground the human cost of the economy.
This rejection of contemporary capitalism also serves to indict the neoliberal
economics that underlie much of Bernanke‘s rhetoric. Neoliberal ideology frames
contemporary economics as part of the natural development of capitalism;403 however,
Old Economy Steve rejects this evolutionary model. The combined force of the iterations
of the meme argue that the current economy is the direct result of the choices of Steve‘s
generation. This charge reframes Bernanke‘s wise paternalism as parental neglect. While
many iterations allude to these changes by blaming Boomers for economic trends such as
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outsourcing or the decline of industrial labor, the attitude is best summarized in one
iteration – ―grows up in one of the world's best economies // creates the worst global
economy the world has ever seen.‖ Subsequent iterations frame this wholesale
destruction of the economy as the result of the ignorance of the Boomers, ―‗at my first
job I only made $15k a year‘ // in 1979 that was the equivalent of $47k,‖ as well as active
generational conflict: ―says get a job // refuses to hire recent graduates.‖ These iterations
of the meme construct Steve‘s generation as initiating the economic shifts that deny
Millennials the American Dream and assert that they are actively maintaining an
economic status quo that is detrimental to Millennials.
Through this, the meta-narrative of the entire meme shifts the target for victimage
related to the economic crisis.404 The meme transfers blame for the great recession away
from concerns of mass panic, instead constructing Steve‘s generation as a scapegoat who
has undermined the economy that gave them prosperity. Across iterations, the meme
suggests that if the Baby Boomers –the generation of which most Fed officials are
members – were removed from economic power, an act of symbolic and material
sacrifice, the Millennial generation could use their alternative values to restore the virtues
of the old economy and by extension American prosperity. In this capacity, the meme
allows younger generations to reaffirm the myths of the American Dream and American
Exceptionalism despite their death in contemporary America.
The meme also frames Millennials as the upholders of these mythic virtues, as
their identification with the ideal (nostalgic) vision of the past allows them to
―understand‖ the potential for a humane vision of capitalism. Because the meme allows
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users to expunge personal culpability for the current state of capitalism, and offers a more
positive vision of the future, the meta-narrative uses identifiable narratives and myths to
further enhance the individuating force of the meme, further increasing its appeal with
Millennials and increasing its political potential. Moreover, through its ability to unify
participants without the traditional articulations of ―left‖ or ―right,‖ but rather through
their alienation from contemporary modes of political economy, the meme helps to foster
a political subjectivity with the possibility to consider care, rather than argue over
policies that – while defining of contemporary political debates – often are secondary to
the questions that are most defining of current political and economic struggle.405
Memes as Pharmakon for Control
Through its enthymematic meta-narrative, the modal assemblage constructed
around Old Economy Steve advances a stern criticism of contemporary capitalism by
romanticizing a particular memory of late-industrial capitalism. Although steeped in this
romantic nostalgia, by enabling a transindividuation with economic rhetorics, the meme
opens the potential for alternative economic rhetorics. Anglich argues for the importance
of such new rhetorics, positing:
An informed citizenry, empowered with a new understanding of language,
has the ability to shape political will toward sustainable reforms. Our
collective consciousness can find a path of wisdom where all economies
can grow freely and sustainably— beyond the shadows.406
By offering ways for individuals to move out of the proletarianizing rhetoric of
paternalism and markets, Old Economy Steve becomes a conduit through which an
alternative vocabulary – focused on the human cost of economics – can begin to emerge.
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This new vocabulary, developing from the participatory individuations of the meme is
demonstrative of Stiegler‘s observations that digital hypomnemata have the potential to
function as pharmakon. Specifically, as Steve draws attention to an economy that is no
longer predicated simply on ―stimulating consumption‖ but instead is built upon
economic growth that assumes that ―‗to economize‘ means ‗to take care,‘‖ it can work
towards the revitalization of human spirit and interrelatedness that creates a capitalism
focused on human development rather than market growth.407
Certainly, capitalist institutions have subsumed the physical content of memes,
the bits and bytes. However, these structures cannot fully contain their affective
dimensions. Stiegler notes that the pharmacological force of hypomnemata does not come
from the opposition of poison and cure, but rather in the composition of the two in such a
way that allows the technic to individuate. Such technical individuation is necessary for
alternative politics because ―individuation at the pharmacological level (technical
individuation) transductively intensifies the individuation of the other two levels (psychic
individuation and collective individuation).‖408 Across the textual variations of the meme,
participants in Old Economy Steve provide a comprehensive indictment of contemporary
neoliberal economics. The sustained attention of this criticism across the life of the meme
is particularly impressive, as neoliberal ideologies have embedded themselves within
American discourses of morality, individuation in the Old Economy Steve meme fulfills
pharmakon‘s potential as remedy and not just poison. Participants of the meme rupture
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forces of control through three primary tactics: uncoiling the logics of neoliberalism,
fighting disenchantment, and overtly promoting a politics of care.
Uncoiling Neoliberalism
Demystifying the workings of capitalism is often dismissed as a holdover of
vulgar Marxism. However, under the ubiquitous and multilayered forces that define
control, unraveling the machinations of dominant processes is imperative. Exploring
youth politics in France, Deleuze notes,
Many young people have a strange craving to be ‗motivated,‘ they‘re
always asking for special courses and continuing education; it's their job to
discover whose ends these serve, just as older people discovered, with
considerable difficulty, who was benefiting from discipline. A snake's
coils are even more intricate than a mole's burrow.409
The power in Steve is not to reveal that we are all cogs in the service of capitalism –
Bernanke‘s rhetoric proudly asserts as much while reifying individuals as consumers.
Instead, the modal assemblage surrounding Steve allows the articulation of multiple
narratives and structures of feeling that create a nostalgia that entreats a rolling back neoliberal globalized capital. Yet, the political potential afforded by exploring the depths of
control does not solely reside in fostering personal awareness of the maneuverings of
control. Stiegler argues control can only be challenged ―in a public space in the service of
a social organization always more and better equipped to discern, critique, improve,
create, transmit, and receive forms of knowledge and consciousness.‖410 The uncoiling of
the snake must unify personal experiences of control into a publicized discourse focused
on an alternative. Steve‘s existence as an image macro allows for this type of publicity,
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because these memes circulate across the internet, creating publics attuned to their
particular perspective.
Despite being the product of the fragmented experiences of partially anonymous
members of a diverse collective, the criticism offered through Old Economy Steve works
to deconstruct the naturalness neoliberalism attributes itself. The assumption that the
Fed‘s market centered economy is the result of the natural progression of human political
economy is central to the authority of neoliberalism.411 This not only implies that there
are no alternatives to neoliberalism, because this system is ―natural‖, but also that the
system is moral. In theorizing that the ―new‖ economy is an active choice of the Boomers
– rather than an inevitability of the evolution of markets – participants within the Old
Economy Steve meme suggest that neoliberal capitalism is a human creation, rather than
a certainty. By suggesting that a return to an economy prior to neoliberalism is possible,
Old Economy Steve creates rhetorical space outside the rigid confines of neoliberalism –
questioning its naturalism and telos of progress. It is only in creating an outside space that
alternatives to contemporary capitalism can be imagined, opening possibilities for
change.412 In this capacity, the meta-narrative created through the iterations of Steve
creates a common space that cannot be entirely subsumed by capitalism, and thus
provides a resource for future resistance.
The power of this meta-narrative is emboldened by the ironic/comedic orientation
engendered by the form of the meme. Burke has long attuned critics to the power of
ironic reinterpretation of events to offer perspective by incongruity. However, extending
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Baruch Spinoza‘s comments on the potential of the comic, Lars Tønder argues that each
comic interpretation of an event remediates it, transforming a dominant affect into plural
affective orientations.413 The collective meta-narrative offered by Old Economy Steve
highlights Millennial dissatisfaction with contemporary economics built around
capitalism‘s denaturalization. However, the humor generated across individual iterations
of the memes derives from differing emotions including despair, rage, and befuddlement.
This range of affective frames challenges the dominance of the neoliberal
narrative and the complicity through consumption that it demands. Such a move opens
democratic space. The proliferation of affective interpretations enabled by Steve invites
deliberation over the exact nature of contemporary dissatisfaction with capitalism.
Through their ability to allow multiple remediations, each participant can offer multiple
iterations of an event, memes such as Steve invite democratic individuations in
opposition to control, as the meta-narrative generated by the meme is a democratically
created sum of remediations. Because of their commitment to mass participation in the
collective construction of the comic, memes invite not just perspective by incongruity,
but perspectives by incongruities.

Re-enchanting Millennials
Beyond the ubiquity and opacity of power under control, Stiegler notes that,
―control runs through a dissociative logic.‖414 Specifically, by positioning individuals‘
primary task as consumption, Bernanke‘s rhetoric, which is emblematic of control, denies
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any sense of a productive individual. Instead, by presenting economic narratives as
information to be consumed, rather than knowledge to individuate with, Bernanke‘s
rhetoric leaves individual subjects proletarianized.415 Consequently, a central project of
resisting control is the re-enchantment of the political subject through the process of
individuation. It is not simply enough to highlight those forces that proletarianize the
subject, rather a resistive communication fosters individuation by enabling participants to
fashion a productive individuality attached to a collective identity. 416
The memetic form of Old Economy Steve assists the process of individuation.
Stiegler asserts that because structures of networked communication center on logics of
contribution, they are best suited to break the ―generalized proletarianization‖ of
control.417 Each individual who circulates Steve is contributing to the meme‘s larger
social force. It would be easy to dismiss this circulation as mere imitation. However, as
the words and images move into new contexts, they function through the logic of
imitatio, the revitalization of the ―spirit of the original‖ into new contexts.418 Through this
imitative recontextualization, even those who simply share the meme are productive
participants, using their identification with a preexisting iteration of the meme to generate
a new individuated force. Because the circulatory force of image macros is driven by
415.
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efforts for each new iteration to foster a more potent affective force, they invite
participants to produce new remediations of narrative. This remediation turns participants
into active commentators on politics, rather than passive proletarianized subjects.419
Beyond the productive elements common to the form of the image macro, the
Steve meme further individuates participants through its reliance on enthymematic
narrative and myth. In each of these cases, the form overrides the specific substance
promoting identification. Bernanke‘s rhetoric, built around static narratives of the ―laws‖
of economics, leaves little room to participate or identify. Conversely, as participants
read across the iterations of the meme, the openness of the form invites them to produce a
unifying meta-narrative through their connection to the affective and propositional
content. No single iteration offers a complete call to political action, yet the collectivity
of the iterations strongly implies one. In this way, each participant produces for
themselves the knowledge individuated within the iterations. Even for those users who do
not produce or circulate the meme, there is a potential for the meme to connect them to a
productive, rather than passive, political existence.420
In the process of constituting participants as productive individuals, Old Economy
Steve also orients them as a ―collective individual.‖ Bernanke reduces each individual to
a faceless consumer, precluding the posibility for large collective identifications.
However, by tapping into a larger sense of millennial angst, the meme functions as a
collective public statement.421 The power of this statement comes from the meme‘s
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ability to be demonstrative of the lived experience of participants. However, because
participants create the meme through individual biographical iterations, they are also able
to express their unique dissatisfaction, allowing them to ―feel‖ their own way into the
political based on personal experience.422 This balance of individual and collective
affective attunement creates a diverse and adaptable assemblage that invites mass
participation and eludes easy coopting of the narrative.423 The constitution of a collective
individual, the product of vernacular lived experience, lends an ethos of independence
from control. Steve‘s ability to balance the desires of individuals with an affiliation with
Millennial collectivity allows for the creation of a political subjectivity willing to struggle
against control.
Millennials‘ Politics of Care
Aside from motivating alternative political individuations through uncoiling
neoliberalism and creating an individuated collectivity, Steve also offers an articulation
of an alternative politics – one of care. Recognizing that the complete overthrow of
capitalism is unlikely under contemporary conditions, Stiegler suggests a politics of care
may be the best response to the current limitations of control.
The question of care must return to the heart of political economy, and
with it, clearly, a new cultural, educational, scientific, and industrial
politics capable of taking care of the world. This is why we propose as an
axiom of our reflections and our actions that – as the primary meaning of
the verb ―economize‖ tells us, and as each of us know deep down – to
economize means that first and before all else to take care.424
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Broadly, Stiegler theorizes care as the capacity of individuals to engage productive
knowledge to meet the needs of all life. Moreover, guaranteeing short-term needs of the
people and the planet, needs often ignored under neoliberalism, can set the stage for the
reversing of the proletarianization central to contemporary control.425 Specifically,
Stiegler argues that networked communication is central to this process of reorienting
political economy towards care.
The internet is the technical milieu, par excellence, which allows for the
implementation of an industrial model that no longer rest upon opposition
between dissociated producers and consumers, but upon association of
addressees and addressors, productive of a new form of sociality and a
new spirit of capitalism.426
It is through the creation of a public committed to cooperative industrial politics that
places care, rather than corporate profit, as the final goal of the system, that the reenchantment of spirit becomes possible.
Although the meta-narrative offered by the Steve meme primarily functions
through the rejection of contemporary capitalism, the specific ways that it nostalgizes the
past implicitly advocates for the Stieglerian ethic of care. Stiegler notes that while care is
driven by cultivating the values of the past, it is more than a simple nostalgia, instead it
must transmit the values of the past into a usable public vision for the future.427 Through
its glorification of goals including retirement, affordable tuition, and available entry-level
jobs, Steve‘s capitalism is implicitly one of unions, fair wages, and protectionism – the
forces which created the conditions Steve nostalgizes. Yet the meme does not reject
capitalism; participants still glorify home ownership, corporate hierarchies, and wage
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labor. Instead, Steve demands, just as Stiegler does, that the wealth generated from these
practices should engage care first, and profit second.
However, this care is not simply gained by a nostalgic return. Instead, by allowing
participants to write their contemporary struggles into the meme, many of which (such as
the decline of print journalism) were not concerns for Steve‘s generation, they are able to
use these values to cultivate a more desirable present. In this sense, the meme advocates
for the specific short-term guaranteed prosperity that prevents the long-term trend of
proletarianization. The individuated subject envisioned by Steve has the free time and
access to desirable jobs to engage in productive labor that prevents proletarianization.
None of the iterations of the meme challenge the goals of American industrial capitalism.
Nor does this advocacy remove the structures of control, if such a thing is even possible.
Rather the meme demonstrates the potential for politics where the collective uses the
freedoms afforded within control society to push for a more humane and equitable
distribution of care. In this sense, the narration offered by Steve does far more than just
allow new political individuations, it suggests that Stiegler‘s spirit of care may already be
alive within Millennials.
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Chapter 4
Can You Meme Me Now? Technics and Terministic Democracy
A year after Old Economy Steve gave networked publics a mode to compose a
narrative built around millennials‘ dissatisfaction with the American economy, memetic
technics tapped into another political controversy particularly salient with networked
publics: surveillance and privacy. These public‘s interest only increased as the use and
scope of networked and mobile technology expands, creating conditions where the
opportunity for privacy breaches and surveillance increasingly loom over all facets of
communication.428 The reality of these fears became particularly salient when in June of
2013 a series of reports by British newspaper The Guardian revealed that the National
Security Agency (NSA) was collecting a wide range of US data across mobile networks
and online communication. On June 5th The Guardian revealed that under the jurisdiction
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) the NSA had been collecting
metadata on all Verizon customers – the largest US cellphone provider.429 The next day
the newspaper revealed the existence of the PRISM program, software which gave the
NSA access to the servers of major online data holders including Apple, Google, and
Facebook.430
428.

Bob Sullivan, ―Online Privacy Fears are Real,‖ NBC News (December 9, 2015),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3078835/t/online-privacy-fears-are-real/#.V2WJCLgrLIU.
429.

Glenn Greenwald, ―NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily,‖
The Guardian (June 6, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizoncourt-order.
430.

Glenn Greenwald, ―NSA Prism program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others,‖ The
Guardian (June 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
Although the name of the program generally appears in all-caps, it is not an acronym or ―at least not one
that intelligence officials reveal publicly;‖ Brad Knickerbocker, ―PRISM: What‘s Behind This NSA
Surveillance Tool Lurking About Your Facebook Page?,‖ The Christian Science Monitor (June 8, 2013),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/DC-Decoder/2013/0608/PRISM-What-s-behind-this-NSAsurveillance-tool-lurking-about-your-Facebook-page.

157

News of these leaks quickly went viral. The Guardian story was shared more than
ten thousand times in the first 12 hours and accrued over two hundred and fifty thousand
Twitter mentions in 24 hours.431 In response to the spread of these revelations, both the
Obama Administration and the NSA issued press releases and gave interviews about the
surveillance program. Despite the continued efforts of government officials to control the
story, networked publics, particularly those in meme-centric communities, offered
reinterpretations of the official story. Within hours of the leak, parodies of Verizon‘s
slogans circulated around networked ecologies. Similarly, when The Guardian revealed
their source two days later, a range of popular memes were used to debate the heroism or
villainy of Edward Snowden.432 Across the controversy, memes served as a mode for
networked participants to share opinions, reactions, and feelings surrounding the
uncovering of the largest domestic intelligence operation in US history.
This chapter explores the interplay between NSA rhetorics that sought to limit the
symbolic responses to the controversy and memes which sought to proliferate them. I
begin with an analysis of the rhetoric of Deputy Director of the NSA Richard Ledgett in
defense of the NSA. Following Murray Edelman‘s observation that ―the largely
unpublicized decisions of hundreds of thousands of people working in administrative
organizations determine who gets what,‖ I focus on Ledgett because the figures at the
head of these bureaucracies function to constitute the ideal political subject as the human

431.

Brad, ―2013 NSA Surveillance Scandal,‖ Know Your Meme,
http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/events/2013-nsa-surveillance-scandal.
432.

Glenn Greenwald, ―Edward Snowden: the Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance
Revelations,‖ The Guardian (June 11, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-techgiants-nsa-data.

158

in service of these bureaucratically regulated structures.433 In opposition to the banal,
rational, expert style of these singular technocrats, networked memes emerged as
collectively constructed expressions of social narratives and affect. Therefore, I turn to an
analysis of the most popular memetic responses to the controversy. The constant addition
of new iterations to these memes created a variety of fractured narratives and affective
frames, preventing the official rhetoric‘s efforts at static informational and affective
force. Instead, by creating perspectives by incongruities, the memetic responses create
rhetorics with the potential to restore individuation through the collective renegotiation of
terms. Through their recirculation of memes, participants collectively redefine these
terms through a terministic democracy built around the individuations of the terms central
to the rhetoric of security.
The NSA and the Anti-Rhetoric of Security
Working as a contractor for the NSA, Edward Snowden grew increasingly
concerned about illegal and dangerous surveillance practices.434 After collecting
thousands of documents, Snowden arranged to meet with The Guardian reporter Glenn
Greenwald. Snowden disclosed to Greenwald evidence of surveillance by the US and UK
on allies, the collection of domestic surveillance and metadata, and other unsanctioned
intelligence gathering.435 These revelations quickly spurred international controversy
about the morality and legality of both US surveillance and Snowden‘s leaks. The US
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government was quick to label Snowden a traitor and charged the whistleblower with
espionage, arguing that there were ways to protect privacy without undermining US
security efforts.436 Conversely, networked publics and international governments praised
Snowden as a patriot and a hero. Snowden even received a range of awards for
contribution to international freedom, peace, and democracy.437 The debate about
Snowden‘s revelations revolved around the question of whether peace, freedom, and
democracy would be better protect by privileging security or privacy.
A year into this controversy, Edward Snowden made a surprise video appearance
at the TED 2014 conference (Snowden was a fugitive from US law enforcement).
Speaking on a platform that gave access to a wide range of networked publics, Snowden
was interviewed by Chris Anderson – the curator of the original TED series. Snowden
used this appearance not only to defend the leaks, but also to make a case for individual
and corporate resistance to surveillance.438 Specifically, after Anderson provided the
history of the leaks, Snowden outlined the nature and scope of PRISM program, framed
the program as a breach of privacy, and answered common arguments about the banality
of the surveillance by arguing it was a matter of rights and national culture. Snowden also
posited that the leaks were not a threat to security, as courts had found no proof of plots
thwarted. Instead, Snowden positions terrorism as a ―cover for action‖ used to hide the
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invasive policies of the NSA. At the end of Snowden‘s interview, Anderson invited a
response stating, ―if the NSA wants to respond, please do.‖
In response to this call, Deputy Director of the NSA Richard Ledgett took the
TED stage via video conference call. Ledgett, the top civilian authority at the NSA,
played an active role in the shaping of NSA polies and procedure as the Chief Operating
Officer.439 In the interview Ledgett systematically responds to Snowden‘s claims about
the surveillance program. First, Ledgett emphasizes the possibility of legal protest by
Snowden, as opposed to the leaks. Ledgett then pivots to a series of arguments about the
lives put at risk by the leak, including an argument for the very real threat of terrorism.
Finally, Ledgett argues that the NSA takes careful steps to limit invasions of privacy to
only those necessary for maintaining security. These responses to Snowden‘s TED Talk
are representative of the larger NSA effort to justify their policies after they were made
public, offering an ideal case to study the rhetorical force of NSA rhetorics.
Although this interview took place nearly a year after Snowden‘s leak, I chose
this address for two reasons. First, this interview is one of the few public addresses made
by any senior official at the NSA. Further, the choice to address the TED audience is
particularly salient given my focus on networked publics. TED videos invite thousands of
viewers and are circulated across varied networked platforms. Consequently, TED
emerged as one of the premier avenues for elites to proliferate political and academic
ideas to networked publics.440 Even in Ledgett‘s interview, Anderson acknowledges the
439.

Chris Anderson, ―Richard Ledgett: The NSA Responds to Edward Snowden‘s TED Talk,‖
TED 2014 (March 2014),
https://www.ted.com/talks/richard_ledgett_the_nsa_responds_to_edward_snowden_s_ted_talk/transcript?la
nguage=en.
440.
Jon Kelly, ―The Cult of TED,‖ BBC News Magazine (June 21, 2012):
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-18511696.

161

relation of TED to networked publics. At the end of the interview Anderson exclaims,
―Rick, it took a certain amount of courage, I think, actually, to come and speak openly to
this group.‖441 Aside from drawing attention to the NSA‘s reticence to publicly respond
to its policies, Anderson‘s comment implicitly notes that participants in TED, as typical
netizens, are particularly attuned to pro-privacy political stances. Nonetheless, in
addressing networked publics, the Ledgett‘s rhetoric functioned as to deny individuation
through two rhetorical strategies which bolster a rhetoric of national (in)security: evoking
the NSA as an anti-rhetoric and establishing security as a god term/ideograph above all
other ideals.
The NSA as Anti-Rhetoric
While the bulk of Ledgett‘s statements deal with the NSA‘s role in maintaining
security, the interview begins with a move to establish these statements as ―antirhetorical.‖ In examining scientific rhetorics, Michael Calvin McGee and John Lyne note
that:
anti-rhetoric's appeal to objective knowledge and its accompanying
denunciation of rhetoric is one of the most effective rhetorical strategies
available. No one was a greater master of the strategy than Plato. In our
time, masters of the rhetoric of science command the most formidable
rhetorical ethos. Theirs is the chaste rhetoric that pretends not to be
rhetorical. Expert testimony in a legislative hearing, in interviews with the
press, and in trial proceedings typically parades the rhetoric of objectivity.
… The intense conviction of testifying experts that they are not acting
rhetorically casts an aura of authenticity over their performance.442
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While McGee and Lyne argue that the natural sciences are particularly adept at evoking
an anti-rhetorical frame, the sciences are by no means the only disciplines to do so. Antirhetorics exist across academic and public life. Edward M. Panetta and Marouf Hasian,
Jr., note that,
An anti-rhetorical stance is any foundational quest for truth that privileges
itself as the only or primary ‗rational,‘ ‗objective,‘ and ‗neutral‘ means of
acquiring epistemic knowledge. This posturing enables powerful rhetors to
exclude the boisterous voices of those groups who do not acquiesce in the
establishment or discovery of the a priori standard for certified
knowledge. Anti-rhetorics exist in both the arts and the sciences. Such a
privileging of information is constantly presented to us in forms that invite
the ‗universal affirmation from all rightminded people.‘443
Through their appeals to ―facts,‖ ―reason,‖ ―information,‖ and ―objectivity,‖ antirhetorics dissuade public participation in rhetorical individuation because ―technical
knowledge [has become the] basis for deciding ‗what ought to be.‘‖444 In appealing to
technical knowledge as fact, anti-rhetorics dissuade amateur participation. Instead, antirhetorics proletarianize non-expert participants as lacking the ethos to challenge the
technocratic authority of the anti-rhetoric. Without this ethos, any attempts by nonexperts to iterate a new individuation is deemed as illegitimate and disconnected from the
official evolution of that particular rhetoric.
Ledgett fosters the proletarianizing drive of anti-rhetorics from the onset of the
interview. Anderson begins by asking Ledgett to respond to the remarks Snowden had
made on the same stage days earlier. Rather than address the specific content of
Snowden, Ledgett instead frames the NSA‘s entire stance as anti-rhetorical:
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I think that, like a lot of the things that have come out since Mr.
Snowden started disclosing classified information, there were some
kernels of truth in there, but a lot of extrapolations and half-truths in
there, and I'm interested in helping to address those. I think this is a really
important conversation that we're having in the United States and
internationally, and I think it is important and of import, and so given that,
we need to have that be a fact-based conversation, and we want to help
make that happen.
Rather than address Snowden as conveying a valid perspective, Ledgett frames
Snowden‘s claims as containing ―kernels of truth‖ at best. By suggesting that Snowden,
and all participants in the publics who agree with the value of having the PRISM program
leaked, had a tenuous relation with the ―truth,‖ Ledgett identifies these rhetorics as
lacking sufficient expertise and validity to individuate with the ―objective‖ position of the
NSA.
Ledgett‘s anti-rhetorical appeal is reaffirmed at the end of the interview. When
asked for closing thoughts, Ledgett returns to an appeal to ―facts‖ as a justification for the
superiority of the NSA‘s position, arguing,
The issue of privacy and personal data is much bigger than just the
government, and so learn the facts. Don't rely on headlines, don't rely on
sound bites, don't rely on one-sided conversations. So that's the idea, I
think, worth spreading….So that's the idea worth spreading. Look at the
data.
This statement reaffirms the supposed anti-rhetoricity of the NSA by aligning them with
―facts‖ and ―data.‖ Conversely, anti-NSA positions are denied the same legitimacy within
this anti-rhetorical frame because comments such as Snowden‘s are framed as
―headlines‖ and ―sound bites,‖ implicitly suggesting they are tainted by sensationalism
and ―one-sided‖ partisanship that denies ―the data.‖ By using the opening and closing
statements to frame the entire interview as anti-rhetorical, Ledgett‘s rhetoric works to
foreclose the possibility of alternative legitimate rhetorics on the issue of national
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security. Because all other positions, including Snowden‘s, lack the facticity of the
NSA‘s perspective, they can never properly individuate with the NSA‘s rhetoric. Such
perspectives would corrupt the objectivity of the ―facts‖ that the NSA presents.
The Rhetoric of (In)Security
Once establishing an anti-rhetorical frame to limit objections to the NSA‘s
arguments, Ledgett‘s discourse focuses on framing Snowden‘s actions within a rhetoric
of (in)security. Robert Ivie and Oscar Giner note that since 9/11, (in)security emerged as
one of the dominant rhetorical frames in American political and social life. They explain:
American national security, considered from a rhetorical perspective,
defaults to a discourse of national insecurity—to a political ritual of
affirming national identity by articulating fear and loathing of a
demonized enemy. It invokes a hyperbolic discourse of exaggerated
danger, not unlike war propaganda, which Nicholas Jackson
O‘Shaughnessy astutely defines as ―a fantasy of enmity, where we seek
self-definition through constructing our antithesis.‖ Rhetoric, myth, and
symbolism—and thus metaphor, narrative, and ritual—are endemic to the
articulation of self-defining and affirming fear, especially in today‘s
hypersymbolic state of governing imagery, which positions both the
general public and political elites within its cultural circumference.445
The ability to include a wide range of issues within its circumference gives insecurity a
strong grammatizing force that enables proletarianizing politics to define the issue.446
Specifically, it demands that all discourse fit within the ridged forms of <security>. The
range of potential symbolic participation is limited and defined by the ways that these
discourses fit within the frame of insecurity, because ―what more compelling interest
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could one find than the defense of a nation that is trying to survive catastrophic
terrorism.‖447
This grammatizing force drifts towards proletarianizing because it empowers
technocrats as the dominant rhetorical actors and denies alternative participation.
Ledgett‘s argues, national security policy, due in large part to its heavy reliance on
classified information, is the near exclusive domain of technocrats with the necessary
security clearances.448 Under these conditions, amateur participation is discouraged
because such participation ―would distract the nation in a time of war, and compromise
sources and methods of intelligence collection.‖449 Because of this, rhetorics of insecurity
narrow issues and disqualify both topics and speakers from legitimacy within public
deliberation; participants are strongly encouraged to unquestioningly consume
technocrats‘ rhetoric, preventing any democratic individuation.450 A range of rhetorical
resources help to foster rhetorics of insecurity. However, in examining the
proletarianizing rhetoric of Ledgett, the deployment of the ideograph of <security> as a
god term creates a rigid terministic hierarchy that precludes symbolic participation from
alternative perspectives.
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Ledgett‘s opening analysis frames Snowden‘s actions as increasing insecurity.
Ledgett argued Snowden‘s actions were
were inappropriate because of the fact that he put people's lives at risk,
basically, in the long run, and I know there's been a lot of talk in public by
Mr. Snowden and some of the journalists that say that the things that have
been disclosed have not put national security and people at risk, and that is
categorically not true.
<Security> functions as a dominant ideograph within Ledgett‘s rhetoric. McGee defined
an ideograph as ―an ordinary language term found in political discourse‖ and ―a highorder abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular, but ill-defined,
normative goal.‖451 While the most potent of these terms are those that undergird wideheld social values such as <equality>, <freedom>, or <patriotism>, scholars have
demonstrated how a range of terms can function ideographically.452 Moreover, rather
than operating independently, ideographs are ―always understood in relation to
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another.‖453 For example, the ideograph of <security> is often related to other concepts
including <freedom> and <privacy>.
Ledgett‘s deployment of <security> continues the individuation traditional to the
ideograph – meaning that all other concerns must be placed as secondary. The link of
surveillance policy to <security> is strongly rooted in political and judicial debates in the
1970s. For example, the 1972 case United States v. United States District Court (often
referred to as the Keith case) set the norm that the goal of security policy was to protect
democracy by balancing appeals to <security> and <privacy>.454 Furthermore, FISA
allowed for surveillance without warrants as long as it was in the name of national
security, establishing security as a dominant term in relation to privacy.455 In this way,
traditional deployments of <security> justify unrestricted surveillance, and discourage
publics from challenging this particular individuation, as there is no space for political or
judicial review.
Ledgett draws from this traditional deployment of <security> by arguing that in
making their complaints public rather than using internal channels of review, Snowden
made Americans less secure. Ledgett argues:
So the unconstrained disclosure of those capabilities means that as
adversaries see them and recognize, ‗Hey, I might be vulnerable to
this,‘ they move away from that, and we have seen targets in terrorism, in
the nation-state area, in smugglers of various types, and other folks who
have, because of the disclosures, moved away from our ability to have
insight into what they're doing. The net effect of that is that our
people who are overseas in dangerous places, whether they're diplomats or
military, and our allies who are in similar situations, are at greater risk
453.
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because we don't see the threats that are coming their way.
While Ledgett does not explicitly evoke the term security, these criticisms fit within the
larger modal expression of <security>. Ledgett follows the ideographic understanding of
<security> that insists concerns of national security trump issues of privacy and therefore
are outside traditional spaces of due process. This deployment is consistent with the
ideograph‘s tendency to ―outflank those who seek to question or revise the form and
content of public good‖ through appeals to security456 This limits non-technocratic
individuations by precluding deliberation over matters of surveillance and security by
arguing that any dissent fosters insecurity.
Ledgett‘s use of <security> gains much of its proletarianizing force through
warranting a prohibition on dissent. Specifically, because dissenting individuations are
prohibited, consumers of political rhetoric are left only the option of accepting
(consuming) Ledgett‘s vision of <security>, lest they be framed as enabling insecurity.
However, the proletarianizing force is bolstered by the symbolic hierarchies created
through the synchronic deployment of this ideograph. Therefore, I turn to Kenneth
Burke‘s conceptions of god terms and terministic screens to examine the ways that the
symbolic order created by this deployment of <security> further enhances its
proletarianizing force.457 Burke argues that terministic screens motivate participants
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towards particular modes of ―symbolic perfection‖ by implying a telos intrinsic in
particular terministic relationships.458 This telos then sets the conditions for the
individuation and/or proletarianization enabled by a particular term as ―a given
terminology contains various implications, and there is a corresponding ‗perfectionist‘
tendency for men [sic] to attempt carrying out those implications.‖459 Central to these
implications is the evocation of ―god terms.‖ Burke noted ―the Romans knew that you
could get a god merely by taking an adjective and transforming it into an abstract
noun.‖460 Consequently, ideographs, which are particularly salient examples of such
terministic manipulation and deification via abstraction, are particularly suited to
functioning as god terms.
Ledgett evokes <security> as a god term in the discourse surrounding Snowden.
Although <privacy> and <security> traditionally function as opposing ideographs in
debates over surveillance, Ledgett removes <privacy> from consideration through
statements like
And I think that people have legitimate concerns about the balance
between transparency and secrecy. That's sort of been couched as a
balance between privacy and national security. I don't think that's the right
framing. I think it really is transparency and secrecy. And so that's the
national and international conversation that we're having, and we want to
participate in that, and want people to participate in it in an informed way.
In framing <privacy> as a red herring, Ledgett places that ideograph – and all associated
arguments, policies, and affective responses – as unwelcome in the debate. Furthermore,
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privacy‘s replacements, transparency and secrecy, are not hierarchically equivalent to
<security>. For example, in justifying previous surveillance, Ledgett argues,
What we don't need to be transparent about, because it's bad for the
U.S., it's bad for all those other countries that we work with and that we
help provide information that helps them secure themselves and their
people, it's bad to expose operations and capabilities in a way that allows
the people that we're all working against, the generally recognized bad
guys, to counter those.
Through comments such as these, Ledgett establishes <security> as the force that
mediates the decision between secrecy and transparency. It is the top of the terministic
hierarchy that determines the value of NSA and other intelligence policies.
Yet the proletarianizing force of <security> as a god term does not only come
from its ability to dictate the possible directions for policy independent of collective
participation. Rather as a god term, it creates rigid hierarchies of terms that preclude any
participatory individuation. For Burke, god terms – with their roots in a perfectionist telos
– utilize appeals to pure and evil motives to organize other terms.461 The resulting
hierarchies function as a ―system builder‖ that decides ―what properly goes with
what.‖462 For Ledgett and the NSA, if <security> is the god term, then terrorism is the
devil. When asked the threats the NSA engages, Ledgett response ―terrorism is still
number one‖ and that terrorist are empowered by a ―lack of governance.‖ This appeal to
governance places NSA policies – and the proletarianizing systems that justify them – as
the only way to access <security> and the order it promises.
Conversely, any action that opposes the NSA is then terministically equated to
terrorism. Describing varied networked communication systems, Ledgett notes that they
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are used both by ―people who are working against us and our allies.‖ The moralistic
binary of security-terrorism provides no middle ground, limiting the space of alternative
individuations. In framing security as the god term, all related symbolic action is forced
to either align itself with the ―purity‖ of security, or else be in league with the evils of
terrorism. Such rigid and binary hierarchies preclude possibilities of amateur symbolic
production. If participants in the publics around surveillance are not consuming the
NSA‘s symbolic order, in Ledgett‘s words they are ―working against us.‖ Consequently,
opposing viewpoints are entirely delegitimized and terministic orders that would emerge
through participatory individuation are framed as aiding terrorism. The symbolic technics
of the NSA must be consumed as is, otherwise participants violate the symbolic order and
empower the rhetorical devil. Because of this, ideographs as god terms are particularly
powerful technics of proletarianization because they work to both prevent the emergence
of alternative polices and to preclude the possibility of any symbolic order that does not
directly align with the interests of the technocrats charged with administering particular
realms of policy and discourse.
Networked Memes’ Reopening of Deliberative Spaces
Although the technocratic anti-rhetoric of the NSA created conditions that limited
the individuating potential of publics surrounding surveillance by preventing access to
terministic participation, participants within networked public spheres were not without
avenues of rhetorical recourse. The amateur participation afforded by networked memes
allowed these technics to serve as locations that re-energized the individuating and
deliberative potential that Ledgett‘s rhetoric sought to foreclose upon. The use of memes
as networked commonplaces allowed for contested affects to deliberate about the tone –
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if not the content – of the NSA‘s anti-rhetoric. Similarly, the ironic force of networked
memes fractured the sanctity of security as a god term, creating varied narratives of the
motives behind NSA policy and <security> itself.
Networked Commonplaces and Affective Framing
Anti-rhetorics, such as those deployed by Ledgett, seek to use expertise and the
façade of objectivity to prevent alternative individuations. However, the deployment of
popular image macros to comment on the Snowden leaks and the NSA response opens
deliberative space around these anti-rhetorics. Their deliberative potential, however,
stems less from the introduction of facts or authority that challenges the specialized ethos
of the NSA. Rather, through mobilizing the rhetorical force of memes to evoke shared
secondary retentions, memetic commonplaces use common understandings of the traces
of past affects to create new and varied structures of feelings around this expertise. To
explore this, I expand upon understandings of memes as commonplaces to evaluate the
ways that memes asked networked publics to feel about and respond to the NSA and the
Snowden leaks.463
Commonplaces were distanced from invention in the late classical and modern
eras when they were relegated to lists to be memorized.464 However, as part of the efforts
to revitalize theories of invention, Richard McKeon rejects the notion that commonplaces
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are simply catalogues of clichés or static wisdom. Instead, by bringing the familiar into
contact with the unfamiliar, they function as ―places for the perception, discovery,
explanation of the unknown.‖465 Commonplaces may be a container of wisdom, but it is
the ability of these places to move and be redeployed that allows them to be a ―cauldron
in which form and substance are brought together‖ to ―create material shaped for
argument and persuasion.‖ 466 Thus while commonplaces are a location for the storage of
wisdom and clichés, the mobility of this place allows them to be profoundly inventive.467
Such a move, McKeon argues, allows commonplaces to operate as ―sources of new
perceptions operative in new directions in the thought and culture and philosophy of the
twentieth century.‖468
The tension between this past rhetorical force and inventive iterations suggests
that commonplaces are a profoundly individuating technic. As Michael Leff notes, since
commonplaces are fundamentally tied to memory, they hold shared information and
demand the internalization of collective wisdom/views/affects.469 In this way,
commonplaces are a technic that enables the shared secondary retentions that are at the
heart of rhetoric. Paolo Virno expands commonplaces‘ relation to the rhetorico-political
by positioning the concept as the linguistic manifestation of Marx‘s ―general intellect.‖
Specifically, Virno draws on Aristotle‘s delineation between the ―special places‖ and
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―common places.‖ 470 Virno notes that special places are localized and applicable only in
particular situations. However, as conditions of political economy destabilize local
communities and rhetorics, ―the ‗special places‘ of discourse and of argumentation are
perishing and dissolving.‖471 Only those technocrats with dominion over particular
special places can define these discourses and set the conditions for their individuation.
For Ledgett, appeals to classified information and security expertise turn specific policy
disputes into special topics, which most publics lack the rhetorical purchase to challenge,
comment on, or more broadly participate with in an individuating manner.
Against this, Virno argues commonplaces are ―the most generally valid logical
and linguistic forms of all of our discourse (let us even say, the skeletal structure of it);
they allow for the existence of every individual expression we use and they give structure
to these expressions.‖472 Through their universality across contexts, commonplaces serve
as repositories of the wisdom and experience of larger publics – the ―general intellect.‖
Through enabling the broadest realm of shared secondary retentions, the commonplaces
as tertiary retentions offer ―a standard of orientation, and thus, some sort of refuge from
the direction in which the world is going.‖473 As long as commonplaces allow
participation by varied publics, they decrease the potential for proletarianization by forms
of control. When commonplaces individuate, they demand that the participants ―echo
back common sentiment‖ rather than try to dictate the conditions of individuations.474
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The ability of commonplaces to echo common sentiment allowed them to
challenge the anti-rhetorical frame of the NSA. Although there were technical debates
regarding the nature of programs like PRISM, networked memes – functioning as
commonplaces – focused on the broadest potential reactions, fostering a different mode
of deliberation. Following Zizi Papacharissi‘s recognition that participatory networked
media tends towards soft structures of feeling,475 these memes gave networked
participants a range of ways to feel about the NSA, surveillance, and <security>. Through
their ability to serve as common repositories for collective secondary retentions of
affects‘ traces, memes as networked commonplaces allowed for the emergence of varied
interpretations of how one should relate to NSA policies. To more fully understand the
way that these affective commonplaces enable this mode of deliberation around antirhetorics, I look at three of the most circulated memetic commonplaces around the NSA
controversy: Condescending Wonka, Annoyed Picard, and Overly Attached Girlfriend.476

475.

476.

Papacharissi, Affective Publics, 116.
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Figure 4.1 Initial iteration of Condescending Wonka (left) another popular iteration
(right)
As one of the most popular networked memes, Condescending Wonka offered
participants a range of targets for its circulation.477 Although the image of Gene Wilder as
Wonka originally circulated as ―Creepy Wonka,‖ in 2011 the meme exploded across
Reddit and the internet when it was tied to a feeling of condescension.478 The first
iteration of Condescending Wonka was part of a Reddit thread titled ―every time I speak
to a recent grad…‖ and featured the text ―oh, you just graduated // you must know
everything.‖ (Figure 4.1).479 This form of the topline taking a comment by an implied
interlocutor and the bottomline offering snide/condescending commentary quickly
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emerged as the dominant mode tied to the image of Wonka.480 The toplines tend to focus
on youthful arrogance. Other examples include ―you‘re only 18 and engaged // you must
be really mature for your age‖ and ―Oh, this is the first election cycle since you turned
old enough to vote // yes, please tell me more about your political wisdom.‖ However,
any belief can be subject to condescension as long as the iteration follows the form of the
topline as naive or overly simple and the bottomline as a condescending correction.
Because this condescension is created by common understandings and functions as a
general (non-contextual) mapping of shared understandings, the larger meme functions in
a commonplace manner.
Opening the interview‘s commentary on the leaks, Ledgett argues that Snowden
could have reported within the system. Within the symbolic order of <security>, this
frames Snowden‘s public leak as an act of treason that supported terrorism. Ledgett‘s
admonishment of Snowden is a direct response to the narrative, popular across the
networked public sphere, that Snowden was a hero for defending privacy.481 A range of
arguments about Snowden‘s heroism circulated around the internet; however, two
popular iterations of Condescending Wonka characterized the core of the debate (Figure
4.2). Although they offer opposing interpretations of the heroism of Snowden, they do so
without contradicting each other or the technocratic expertise of the NSA. The meme that
villainizes Snowden reaffirms the viewpoint of the NSA that Snowden‘s leak may have
aided terrorism. Conversely, the version that valorizes Snowden does not deny that
480.
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information may have reached to terrorist, rather it suggests that despite this, the risk of
making NSA procedures transparent is a heroic act. This meme also does not contradict
the NSA‘s practices, Ledgett notes that the NSA collects metadata on civilians and finds
itself trying to maintain a balance between demanded transparency and the needs of
secrecy. The evaluation offered by ether iteration of Condescending Wonka does not
challenge the anti-rhetorical stance of the NSA – they are experts and their ―factual‖
claims are not refuted.

Figure 4.2 Wonka Debates the Snowden Leaks.
From these two memes two potential publics emerge, each offering a differing
view of Snowden and the leaks. The point of stasis between these publics is not
necessarily about particular policies, but rather over what or towards whom to be
condescending. This condescension emerges as a site for deliberation over the NSA
leaks. The varied iterations of the meme mobilize differing individuations to offer
alternative readings for the ―proper‖ use of affect. This allows participants to deliberate
outside the circumference of the NSA‘s anti-rhetorics and their proletarianization through
―fact‖ based argument. Once outside this circumference, the meme allows participants to
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reintroduce privacy to the conversation over the NSA policies. Rather than positing
<security> as a god term that is in opposition to terrorism, by focusing on what
participants ought to condescend towards, privacy and security are both held up as
potential god terms. Support of Snowden – as the embodiment of a god or devil,
depending on the terministic frame participants support – becomes a proxy for this larger
struggle. Memetic participants may ―vote‖ via circulation to determine if Snowden was a
traitor or a hero – not based on specific arguments or propositions, but rather based on
broad feelings about the issue.

Figure 4.3: Some of the earliest iterations of the Annoyed Picard meme.
Condescension was not the only shared structure of feeling that networked
participants were invited to place the leak within: another meme invited them to feel
annoyed. Annoyed Picard is a popular networked meme for expressing excessive
frustration with the views or actions of implied interlocutors. The meme is a screen
capture of actor Patrick Stewart playing Jean-Luc Picard on the television show Star
Trek: The Next Generation (Figure 4.3). Prior to its emergence as a full-fledged image
macro, the image virally circulated with the static text ―WTF is this shit.‖482 Other
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captions emerged on the Advice Animals subreddit, opening the meme to comment on
specific actions worthy of Picard‘s visceral annoyed response. The modal form follows a
topline that is merely an exclamation of outrage (most often ―[question word] the fuck‖)
followed by a bottomline that describes the source of the annoyance.

Figure 4.4: Picard is annoyed with the NSA controversy
In the face of the Snowden leaks, Picard found plenty to be annoyed about.
Suprisingly, participants in this meme did not offer judgement about the NSA, Snowden,
or the potential positive or negative ramifications of the leaks. Instead they focused on
their annoyance with the people who seemed outraged to learn about the spying program
(Figure 4.4). In the two most popularly circulated responses, the Picard suggests his
annoyance that Americans were not already aware of domestic surveillance. The memes
suggest that it should be common knowledge that the NSA spies, considering that the
PATRIOT act authorized this surveillance twelve years prior. Similar to Condescending
Wonka, this meme invites participation outside the anti-rhetorical frame offered by the
NSA. Rather than debate the specific impacts of the PRISM program on security or
privacy, the Picard memes‘ expression of annoyance implicitly suggests that PRISM is
not unique. Participants who identify with the structure of feeling around the meme are
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invited to consider the leak as a continuation of existing policies of surveillance.
Ledgett‘s erasure of privacy sought to frame all surveillance as improving <security>.
However, the Picard meme, while not offering judgment on the policy, uses the
commonplace of annoyance to provide a larger historical perspective. This
contextualization contradicts the hierarchies established by the NSA‘s valorization of
<security> above all else.
Beyond historicizing the narrative, the Picard meme invites participants to
identify with a sense of superiority over the ―masses.‖483 In expressing annoyance with
those who are uneducated about surveillance, the meme positions participants something
akin to a wise vanguard. The meme implies that while the masses may accept official
rhetorics of security, it contends more enlightened members of the networked public
sphere resisted these narratives. By evoking the PATRIOT act, the meme suggests that
any participant who was not personally researching surveillance and participating in these
longstanding debates is complicit in the consequences of current surveillance policy.
Through this, the meme draws attention to the proletarianizing force of NSA rhetorics
and gestures towards the possibility of resistive individuations by pointing out the need
for critical scrutiny of the surveillance programs. This fractures the dominance of
<security> as a terministic screen by highlighting that the NSA is actively selecting a
particular (not universal) vision of politics. Such attention is important, because as
Stiegler suggests, when controlling forces gain sway over attention, resistive retentions
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and individuations becomes impotent – not because they do not exist, but because
participants do not know they are options.484
In the prior memes, the evocation of commonplaces was largely confined to
placing affective judgment onto the ways that publics interacted with the leak
controversy. Wonka was condescending towards those who thought Snowden was a hero
or traitor and Picard was annoyed with uneducated netizens. However, image macros as
commonplaces also offer the potential to reframe the participants in the controversy
itself. Most notably, the meme Overly Attached Girlfriend was used to recast the motives
(but not the policies) of the NSA.

Figure 4.5: Early Iteration of Overly Attached Girlfriend (left) the NSA iteration
(right).
A screen cap from a parody music video about clingy relationships, this picture of
a wide eyed young woman is one of the most popular image macros circulating around
the internet [Figure 4.5].485 The combination of the intense facial expression, series of
pictures in the background, and narrative of the video (which garnered over 1.3 million
484.
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views on YouTube) led participants to attach this image to the social narrative of a clingy
or attached teenage girlfriend. In contrast to Wonka and Picard, new iterations of Overly
Attached Girlfriend are used not to comment on specific conversations, instead new
iterations function to add new and funny examples to the narrative behind the meme. To
begin, the very name of the meme places all content within a affective frame. Every
iteration must demonstrate a stance that is ―overly attached,‖ just as the iterations of
Picard must be annoyed and Wonka condescending. Within this condensed structure of
feeling, particular iterations then circulate examples of this attachment. The toplines
typically feature a reasonable action by the implied boyfriend while the bottomlines
responsivity frame the girlfriend as unreasonably attached. Iterations create a story of
rampant jealousy ―I was looking through your texts earlier // who‘s mom?,‖ tricks to
prolong the relationship ―I poked holes in all the condoms // now you have to love me
forever,‖ and obsession bordering on stalking ―You forgot to tell me where you were
going on a trip with your friends // good thing I installed GPS on your car so I could tag
along.‖ Across the iterations, the meme develops a commonplace centered on narratives
about the intensities and excesses of youthful romantic relations.
The memetic Girlfriend‘s predilection towards stalking/surveillance made this
commonplace a fitting tool to parody the NSA [Figure 4.5]. In the most common iteration
commenting on the NSA controversy, the pictures on the girlfriend‘s wall are replaced
with the seal of the NSA and the meme features the text ―I stole your Facebook login,
cellphone records & email password // but its [sic] cool, you have nothing to hide right?‖
In framing the NSA as the girlfriend, the meme reframes the actions of the NSA as
juvenile and obsessive, rather than necessary for security. While not challenging any
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particular factual claims made by the NSA, the meme does challenge the motive of the
PRISM program. Instead of a reverence for security, the meme suggests the possibility
that the NSA acted out of its own selfish interests. Further, the bottomline reframes a
common argument made by the NSA, which was explicitly made by Ledgett, that law
abiding citizens should have no need for privacy. Ledgett uses this claim to suggest that
anyone who opposes surveillance must have something to hide. Moreover, couching the
argument in the commonplace of the attached girlfriend meme suggests that the civilian
openness demanded by the NSA is unreasonable and violates acceptable norms of
privacy. By suggesting an impurity of motives, this meme implies that <security> is not a
god that should be sanctified. Instead the meme returns privacy to the terministic mix,
suggesting that privacy is the only way to be protected from the irrational impulses of the
Overly Attached NSA.
Combined, these memes challenge the proletarianizing force of Ledgett‘s rhetoric.
The varied commonplaces destabilize <security> as a god term by re-introducing
<privacy> as a rival symbolic deity. Moreover, although the technical nature of security
policy allows an anti-rhetorical frame that discourages amateur participation, the
imposition of networked commonplaces enables networked participants to engage in the
construction of structures of feeling that circulate around that anti-rhetoric. Depending on
the meme, they negotiate the direction of common affects such as annoyance,
condescension, and emotional attachment as they apply to the leaks. As participants
position themselves in relation to these memetic publics, and expand on them through
circulatory practices, they spread these affective reframings of the controversy. This
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allows democratically created and directed frames to counter the technocratic force
offered by Ledgett.
Irony, Memes and Comic Remediation
While each of these image macros relies on varied commonplaces to challenge the
anti-rhetoricity of the NSA and the sanctity of <security>, irony is also central to the
ways that networked publics challenged the proletarianizing rhetoric of the NSA. A series
of memes built around the Verizon slogan ―can you hear me now‖ were used to ironically
deploy special topics to disrupt the NSA‘s technocratic valorization of security.
Therefore, this chapter now turns to discussion of the functioning of networked irony
before using the ―can you hear me now‖ meme to explore its individuating force.
At its most basic, Burke defines irony as a reversal where ―a returns as non-a.‖486
The juxtaposition of normative expectations with some indecorous element (funny or not)
provides an incongruity that Burke argues challenges informationist motion. Burke
argues perspective by incongruity is the engine that drives poetic action – and by
extension the possibilities of meaningful individuation. Because of this relation between
humor and incongruity, rhetoricians posit that humor can have serious political
consequences. Robert Hariman argues that parody opens up democratic space by deprivileging traditional institutions of power and creating alternative affects against
dominant structures.487 Tønder extends this potential to all forms of irony, arguing that
irony (as a series of reversals which need not be dialectical negations) always remediates
messages, undercutting their dominant force and refiguring them in such ways that they

486.

Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945), 517.

487.

Robert Hariman, ―Political Parody and Public Culture,‖ Quarterly Journal of Speech 94, no. 3

(2008): 249.

186

may be used in different in non-dominant forms.488 Through its reliance on juxtaposition
and remediation, irony tends towards democratic rhetorics. Ironic rhetorical techne open
multiple modes of individuation. Combined these individuations open new and diverse
rhetorical spaces that function in opposition to the consumptive proletarianization of
control.

Figure 4.6 Sample tweet parodying Verizon.
When The Guardian first made public the scope and reach of the PRISM program
on June 5, 2013, it did so with the headline ―NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions
of Verizon Customers Daily.‖489 While it would later be revealed that other cellphone
providers were also complicit in the PRISM program, this early disclosure, as well as
Verizon‘s status as the United States‘ largest cellular provider, made it central to the
memetic responses across networked publics. Within hours of the online posting of The
Guardian article, Twitter users were making jokes playing off the Orwellian undertones
of the Verizon slogan ―can you hear me now‖ and their ―share everything plan‖ (Figure
4.6). By 10 am that morning, these slogans had been translated into a variety of memes
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and drawn enough attention that Buzzfeed posted an article featuring a range of them.490
Rather than centering on a particular image, the modal conditions of the meme are
primarily defined by the ironic juxtaposition of Verizon‘s marketing rhetoric with a twist
gesturing towards the NSA leak. These memes provide different affective castings of the
controversy, providing an opportunity to explore the role the ironic plays in
individuation, especially to create a range of potentialities that subjectivities must then
negotiate.

Figure 4.7 Refigured Verizon advertisments
The most basic iterations of the meme make subtle alterations to already existing
Verizon advertisements (Figure 4.7). For example, one meme added an asterisk to a share
anything plan advertisement, adding the text ―with the NSA.‖ The ad valorized Verizon‘s
efforts to let you share communication resources with members of your cell plan.
However, the memetic addition reframes this virtue as a simultaneous vice because the
information also goes to the NSA. Similarly, at the time Verizon relied heavily on
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mapping their coverage of the US compared to AT&T. Using an image from this
campaign, participants substituted words to promise ―5 times more government
monitoring.‖ This iteration challenges Verizon‘s assumption that more reach and
coverage always benefits the consumer, enthymematically positing that if Verizon can
reach more of America than ever before then so can the NSA.
These memes use perspective by incongruity to disrupt the perfection demanded
by the NSA‘s valorization of security. A central component of irony as a trope, is that it
enhances the perspective by incongruity enabled by metaphor by creating a deliberate
misnomer through the pairing of antithetical terms.491 Our consumptive practices and
personal communication are supposed to be independent of security practices. However,
by juxtaposing the Verizon advertisements which are tied to everyday behaviors to
security, these memes create a new mode of seeing, inviting memetic participants to
reconsider the NSA‘s ties to their everyday lives. While this frame still valorizes security
as a motivating term, the juxtaposition prevents the closure that gives this god term its
proletarianizing force. Because perspective by incongruity foregrounds contradictions,
participants are asked to create alternative readings, rather than simply consuming
dominant ones.492 Although the NSA promotes <security> as noble, the ironic reframe in
these memes makes it more mundane, disrupting the deification that justifies the
proletarianizing hierarchies.
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Figure 4.8 “Can you hear me now?” parody memes.
Another strain of the meme specifically riffs on the ―can you hear me now?‖
advertisements that Verizon had run until 2010. Starting in 2002, these adds featured Paul
Marcarelli as the ―Test Man.‖ In these immensely popular commercials, Test Man is
featured going around the country to check the reliability of the Verizon system serving
as a stand-in for frustrated cell phone users.493 Recontextualized into the meme, the NSA
is positioned as answering the slogan‘s question (Figure 4.8). This positions consumers as
complicit in the surveillance, as though they are actively asking to be surveilled.
Moreover, by evoking the ads, these memes reaffirm the ubiquity of surveillance. This
refigured narrative disrupts the notion that the NSA is the heroic protector of passive
Americans. Instead it suggests that the NSA both works with and uses Americans to
expand its surveillance power. Following Burke, this move both destabilizes the piety of
established discourses and re-moralizes them by using juxtaposed narratives to offer a
more complete understanding of the controversy.494 By juxtaposition of consumer
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practice through Test Man with the NSA van, the second iteration complicates the
narrative of the NSA and reopens the closed by the terministic deification of <security>.
A third grouping of the memes introduces another actor into the drama of the
leak, president Barack Obama (Figure 4.9). One iteration of the meme shows Barack
Obama on a cell phone asking for Verizon‘s ―share everything plan.‖ This iteration
positions Obama as initiating the relationship between the NSA and Verizon. The second
iteration returns Test Guy, but rather than the NSA answering the slogan, Obama is
pictured responding ―yes we can.‖ Aside from repeating the assertion that Obama as
president is directly complicit in the surveillance programs, the second meme also
generates additional force through its use of Obama‘s 2008 campaign slogan as the
answer. This slogan was used in the election to position Obama as the political
manifestation of mass agency, hopes, and ideals. However, by recontextualizing it within
the NSA scandal, the meme suggests this idealism is incompatible with the realities of
politics.

Figure 4.9: Obama focused iterations of anti-NSA surveillance memes.
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These incongruities move the NSA‘s rhetoric into a thoroughly comic frame.495
Of Burke‘s three frames, the comic is most suited to democratic politics as it does not
assume an intrinsic morality to actors, but rather that social ills come from human
error.496 For example, the ―yes we can‖ slogan suggests that although NSA surveillance
seems to work against Obama‘s electoral mandate, the president supported the policy in
what seemed to be the best interests of the people. Robert Ivie argues comic reframes
such as this necessitate deliberation, noting,
Burke‘s notion of the comic corrective acknowledges that political
relations are agonistic and recognizes that social cohesion and tolerance
are promoted by people ‗acting rhetorically upon themselves and one
another.‘ It does not . . . assume that agonistic politics are inherently selfcorrecting or that their potential for realizing democratic ideals is easily
fulfilled.497
By positioning the NSA, Obama, Verizon, and the consuming public as all complicit,
imperfect, and effected by these policies, the translation of the hierarchies of the NSA
into this comic corrective begs participants to recognize and work through contradictions.
It is not Ledgett‘s limiting frame of security above all. It is the messy recognition that
security, privacy, democracy, and safety are all important, but no one policy can meet
these needs equally. By providing multiple incongruous perspectives, the grammars of
technocratic rhetorics are never allowed to stabilize. This allows each participant to place
themselves within competing, complex, and open narratives, rather than consuming a
hierarchical order which prevents individuation.
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Participatory Networked Technics and Terministic Democracy
Each of these memes that emerged around the Snowden leaks work in different
ways to disrupt the proletarianizing force of the NSA‘s deployment of <security>. This
terministic fracturing would seem to disrupt the potential for unified opposition to the
policies of the NSA. However, because they offer a variety of affective frames,
terministic relations, and narratives around the leaks, these memes open the democratic
space around the controversy. Memes create the space for multiple perspectives by
incongruities. This allows for the democratic transindividuation of a particular
preindividual state and the creation of multiple individuations related to a particular
controversy that then must be democratically reconciled. Because of this, memes – and
similar participatory technics – suggest the possibility of engendering terministic
democracy through the destabilization and public negotiation of controlling rhetorics.
Two features demonstrated in this case study contribute to this terministic democracy:
incongruous remediations and commonplace repetition and difference.
Democratic Remediations
As each of these memes provides a different affective casting of the controversy,
this case provides an opportunity to expand explorations of the role comic remediation
plays in individuation, especially to create a range of individuations that subjectivities
must then negotiate. Speaking on the organizing force of singular terministic screens,
Burke famously notes that ―even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its
very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must
function also as a deflection of reality.‖498 This power was highlighted as Ledgett‘s
rhetoric reflected the need for security, selected terrorism as the terministic devil term,
498.
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and deflected privacy concerns through reframing the issue into a secrecy/transparency
dialectic. While the varied memetic responses offered a range of ways to feel about
security, new actors to the narrative, and sought to re-introduce privacy as a terministic
foil, none of them explicitly reject the importance of security as an organizing term.
Rather through their (primarily ironic) remediations of the term, they each attach it to a
different set of selections, reflections and deflections. Ledgett‘s proletarianizing rhetoric,
with its seemingly stable and singular symbolic force, is transformed into a pluralism of
related symbolic orders, each commenting on the other and fighting for public
acceptance.
This terministic pluralism creates spaces for individuation in the face of the
proletarianizing rhetorics of the NSA. The memes provide a way for participants to
debate the meaning and feeling of <security> outside the policies and politics of
government institutions. As the process of individuation necessarily produces
transformation, the process is decisively political. This individuating potential is
democratic and grounded in the common use of terms. Barry Brummett argues one of the
most important tasks of rhetorical criticism is not to disprove the arguments around god
terms, but rather to disrupt the aura of perfection. 499 Once this aura is tainted, alternative
individuations can engage the symbolic order previously closed by god terms.
Furthermore, as the organizing force of god terms establishes technical grammars, their
disruption opens the processes of individuation related to the term. As long as
individuation happens, transformation is inevitable as new symbolic orders will
individuate through each iteration of a technic.
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Because individuation is accompanied by symbolic pluralism, it is a necessary
precondition for democratic action. This is not a representative democracy, which is
fraught with concerns regarding the reductive nature of (mis)representation.500 Instead,
individuation, enabled by technics like memes, enables a direct democracy where all
participants can engage in the creation of terministic conditions that define political
issues. This terministic democracy limits the direction that influential symbols may
individuate. Further, the comic remediations enabled by individuating technics creates
varied structures of feelings around any singular issue, providing multiple avenues for
individuals to not only engage the issue by feeling their way into relation with particular
clusters of terms, but also democratically restructure these feelings through their
participation in the memes. Each posting of a meme creates a new potential affective
public seeking the attention of networked participants. This attention, and the subsequent
expansion of the force of a particular affective public, gives each participant the
possibility to ―vote‖ on the rhetorical order they want to dominate rhetorical spaces. In
this light, terministic democracy functions to shape rhetorical order through participants‘
transindividuation with these rhetorical technics.
Repeating Differing Commonplaces
Beyond the comic remediation of proletarianizing technics, those memes which
function as networked commonplaces also enact democratizing force through their
performance of repetition and difference. For example, while the NSA version of Overly
Attached Girlfriend is a repetition of the form of the original meme, it is included in the
larger meme only because the repeated elements lead to a different iteration. Through this
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process, the commonplace knowledge stored within the meme is expanded to a new
context. Aside from highlighting the inventive power of commonplaces, this repetition
and difference also enhances the individuating potential of memes.501 In operating
through a logic of repetition, individuation functions as a sort of apprenticeship: we learn
to do by repeating the externalized retentions of others.502 Following this, a commonplace
can only be understood through comparison to the similarities and differences of its past
uses. It is the comparison of participants‘ own condescension with the NSA to the social
understanding of Wonka‘s condensations that gives this intersection of controversy and
commonplace meaning. Conversely, if participants are always encountering the novel,
there is little capacity to form meaningful retentions because there is no preexisting
technic to individuate from.503 Ultimately, if repetition becomes a process of sameness, or
if difference exists without repetition, the connection between the preindividual and the
singularity is severed, disrupting the possibility of individuation.
This process of commonplace individuation is transformative of social conditions.
Paolo Virno argues that it is the general (common) nature of commonplaces that enables
their political force. As technocrats detach individuals from special topics, publics
increasingly become nomadic. Under these conditions, Virno argues commonplaces
provide political strength:
Those who do not feel at home, in order to get a sense of orientation and
to protect themselves, must turn to the ‗common places,‘ or to the most
general categories of the linguistic intellect… not in order for them to
learn something about biology or advanced mathematics, but because they
turn to the most essential categories of the abstract intellect in order to
501.
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protect themselves from the blows of random chance, in order to take
refuge from contingency and from the unforeseen.504
As commonplaces emerge as the only technics that larger publics can individuate in
relation to, they become increasingly political. Other technics, with their ties to special
topics can always be directed by technocrats with expertise in that specialty. However,
the very commonness of commonplaces suggests that these rhetorical technics – above all
others – may be central to the establishment of a political voice less encumbered by the
influences of control.
Despite the controversies engendered by Snowden‘s leaks and the subsequent
memetic response, the PRISM program continues to surveil Americans – albeit in a more
transparent and limited fashion.505 Certainly, these memes are neither solely responsible
for these limited reforms nor inadequate because of a failure to enact larger change.
Instead, these memetic responses provided a larger range of symbolic technics with
which participants may individuate. Increasing this range is important because as Burke
notes the very quality and shape of our political world is tied to the quality and shape of
our symbols.506 Therefore, the common quality of these memes, as well as the competing
interpretations offered through their remediation increases the odds of a democratically
fostered individuation that enables a better quality of collective life.
Chapter 5
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Putting Putin on the Ritz: Memes Making Cosmopolitan Memories

Figure 5.1: One of many memes playing off the pun “Putin on the Ritz.”
The image of Russian president Vladimir Putin riding shirtless on a cracker is
remarkable in many ways: it is visually intriguing, it is a great visual pun, and circulating
it in Russia could land you in jail (Figure 5.1). In April of 2015, the internet was aghast
when news spread that Russia was taking steps to ban memes that disparage public
figures.507 Bradley Wiggens notes that although the Russian use of memes operates
similarly to western and global networked meme culture, within sectors of the ―Russian
Internet,‖ memes unique to Russian culture and politics circular dominate the rhetorical
landscape.508 Prior to the ban, Russian internet culture features rich memetic circulation
commenting on politics, current events, and popular culture. Popular memes lambasted
Putin, Russian driving, and the latest gossip with celebrities. However, as memes adopted
more aggressive political commentary, the Russian government used a lawsuit from
Russian singer Valeri Syutkin accusing a meme of defamation (figure 5.2) to justify a ban
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on any meme that specifically disparages a public figure.509 The willingness of the
Russian government to specifically target internet memes for censorship suggests a
growing recognition by political leaders of the rhetorical (and perhaps anti-authoritarian)
force of networked communication.510 Specifically, these memes operate in conversation
(and conflict) with official representations of public figures. For example, many memes
engage the public persona of Vladimir Putin, offering satirical commentary on the ethos
of masculinity and Russian tradition carefully crafted by government communication
experts.

Figure 5.2: The meme that launched the ban. Translates as “smack the bitch in the
face.”
As the face of Russia, Vladimir Putin, together with his public relations apparatus,
has carefully constructed a public image designed to reify Russia‘s ideological
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commitments to masculine, authority-driven politics.511 This cult of personality, and the
resulting policies, are rooted in allusions to a nostalgic memory of the Soviet Union as a
dominant authority in geopolitical affairs. In opposition to this carefully crafted memory
of Putin, memes built around his persona disrupt this well-manicured façade, and have
continued to do so even after the announcement of legal restrictions. These memes
highlight the particular power of the amateur creation of narratives. Specifically, these
memes are the re-articulation of a specific and focused control based narrative built upon
the authority of Vladimir Putin into a vernacular narrative open to varied individuations.
The interplay between these two discourses creates a space that makes apparent the
conflict between official efforts to craft proletarianizing memories of Russian leaders –
and by extension the nation – and the memes which function to open individuational
space through the construction of ironic counter-memory.512 Therefore, in this chapter, I
argue that with their capacity to externalize shared secondary retentions, internet memes
function to destabilize official rhetorics that mobilize memories to create static and
controlling national identities. Such clash over public memory is particularly significant
because, as Hannah Arendt notes, political identity comes directly from our capacity to
remember.513
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My analysis of the interplay between this official public memory and its memetic
counterparts proceeds in three sections. I first situate the official narrative of Putin within
the context of technics and their relationship to public memory. I next explore both
Russian and international Putin memes to evaluate the unique affordances digital technics
provides for the construction of counter-memory. I conclude by arguing that memetic
counter-memories are uniquely suited to negotiating the limitations of political
censorship. Further their potential to affectively reframe politics increases space for
public deliberation through fostering democratically created vernacular memories that
promote a networked cosmopolitan virtue.
Visual Technics and National Memories
Vladimir Putin is revered by his citizens to an extent that ought to makes other
democratically elected heads of state jealous. His approval ratings frequently hover in the
70 percent range and only dipped into the high 40s during economic contractions and
electoral scandals.514 Much of Putin‘s popularity results from presiding over economic
and political prosperity after the tumultuous Yeltsin years. However, the Russian leader
has been able to maintain this approval for fifteen years through the construction of a
carefully crafted persona that is equal parts protector, object of desire, and nostalgia for
the memory of Soviet Power.515 The resonance of this persona is such that Putin is
globally popular. He was the top recipient of votes in Time’s 2015 most influential person
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poll.516 As Russian officials carefully use varied rhetorical technics to craft Putin‘s image
through the management of public memory, this image functions as the official
embodiment of a public memory of what Russia once was and can be again.517 This
rhetoric transforms the memory of Putin into a consumable technic that is profoundly
proletarianizing.518 For Russians, not accepting the state vision of Putin can lead to both
social and political sanction. The centrality of Putin to Russian individuations of selfconcept and collective identity helps explain the restrictions on memes, as they enable
individuations that threaten to destabilize the ―postmodern cult of personality‖ built on
equal parts authority and commercial appeal that is central to the Kremlin‘s vision of
Russian politics.519 However, prior to examining this memetic destabilization, I first
expand on the relationship between technics and memory before exploring how the
Russian government uses these technics (particularly the visual) to develop official
memories constructed around the public persona of Putin.
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Technics and Memory
Because technics externalize human functionality, they are tied to memory. Fire is
only useful as a technic insofar as users also have the social memory of the ways that it
can be mobilized to cook, heat, etc. In this sense, technics are a connection to social
memories that create a sense of historical identity.520 Yet these memories are not simply
created through the repeated use of technics.521 Instead, recognizing the social force of
technical memory, Stiegler is most interested in the capacity of technics to function as
―mnemotechnics.‖ A focus on mnemotechnics draws attention to the ―objects and
techniques able to preserve and make accessible experiences which I have not myself
lived.‖522 Technics‘ transformations of secondary retentions into technical memories that
allow collative unity built around events one has not lived. These externalized memories,
are the foundation of collective identities, they ―authorize particular historical
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narratives... to serve the interests of particular groups.‖523 Because of this, even
contemporary events ought to be understood, in part, through the lens of memory. But
this memory is always mediated through technics. The grammars of participation in
particular mnemotechnics set the conditions by which participants can individuate current
events into prior tertiary retentions, generating their political force.524 A focus on
mnemotechnics orients the critic towards the way that technics are currently mobilizing
and authorizing new memories, rather than focusing only on the way that past memories
are mobilized and materialized.
In this capacity, mnemotechnics ―constitute an intergenerational support of
memory which, as material culture, overdetermines learning and mnesic activities.‖525 As
the material limits of public memory, mnemotechnics are subject to ritualization,
resignifying uses, and debate. Because of this, mnemotechnics that are publicly mobilized
are inherently rhetorical.526 As communities deploy technologies that evoke particular
memories, they bring a vision of historical events to bear upon contemporary action.527
Moreover, in connecting individuals to visions of past retentions, mnemotechnics also
authorize particular protentions based on the form of the mnemic collectivity. 528
Consequently, political conflict is often rooted not only in the struggle between contested
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public memories,529 but also in the very availability and form of the technics that allow
these memories to circulate and individuate.530 These different memories create the
collective identities that enable different individuations.
Accordingly, the collective secondary retentions enabled by technical memory
align strongly with the rhetorical concept of public memory. For memory scholars, public
memory resides in any location (read: technic) where the past becomes active by either its
literal enactment or its continuous presence, enforcing an authoritative rhetorical
narrative.531 The capacity to be active renders memory a public phenomenon constructed
between individuals and communities in a ―dialectic relationship‖ where ―public
memories influence collective identities and collective identities shape public
memories.‖532 This relationship, akin to transindividuation, creates a public memory as ―a
body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society understand both its
past, present, and by implication its future.‖533 Therefore, public memories are a political
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tool par excellence because they assist in constituting the definition of the citizen.534 The
deployment of mnemotechnics does not tell us what it means to be ―Russian‖ or
―American,‖ rather they function as a ―rhetorical vocabulary‖ that imbues these
subjectivities with political meaning.535 Once individuated into these subjectivities,
individual political action is limited because the memory leaves ―residues that construct
and confine how we understand the world and how past and present govern our
preconceptions and actions.‖536
Considering this political potential, it is hardly surprising that state actors are
heavily invested in the manipulation of public memory. Thomas Dunn contends,
Within the frame of public memory, the past operates not as historical fact
but as historical interpretation for the purposes of making public
argument. Through framing the past, we serve a present need. Those most
likely to do this memory work – nations, governments, institutions—
occupy a position of power in society. These ―official‖ memories are
powerful rhetorical forces that reproduce existing power relations and
minimize meanings of the past that run counter to currently accepted
grand narratives.537
Consequently, romantic visions of the past are central to political identity across
ideologies ranging from authoritarian nationalism to radical Marxism.538 State investment
in mnemotechnics such as monuments, memorials, and other mnemonic efforts
transfigure memories into a material form, injecting these memories into everyday
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experience.539 As the material form of memory, individuated with as part of regular social
interaction, mnemotechnics naturalize the ideological myths underlying the official
construction of public memory into the fabric of social interaction – limiting
individuations that vary from this normative memory.
Official Russian Visual Memory
Kremlin image-makers have positioned Putin as a living figure of memory that
embodies the Russian people. Insofar as the head of state functions in epideictic
discourses, such officials are largely concerned with the demarcation of national
values.540 Consequently, Shawn and Trevor Parry-Giles argue, ―collective memory works
as an interpretive strategy for the definition of political image, as political actors seek to
link their character to familiar and secure markers of collective identity drawn from the
community‘s shared past.‖541 Russian leaders are clearly aware of the need for a
controlled public persona rooted in national memory. The Kremlin has staged a variety of
events to further Putin‘s image and bolster his ego, ranging from shirtless photos to
singing American standards.542 Although Putin cultivates this image through myriad
technics, his mnemonic persona is primarily rooted in the visual.543 Mnemotechnics such
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as photos, videos, and press events construct him as the strong and virile father of Russia,
a visual orientation nostalgically drawing on memories from the Soviet era.544
Although official Soviet policy sought to deconstruct many of the patriarchal
legal structures that had existed under the Tzars, media and propaganda still relied
heavily on tropes of masculine strength and paternalism.545 Propaganda posters of
leaders, particularly Stalin, featured them as paternal figures looking caringly over
assembled groups of women and children.546 In these photos, Stalin is the proud father of
Russia, using his masculine presence to organize the Soviet Union to greater international
strength. Stalin, as the embodiment of a ―New Soviet Man‖ became the embodiment of
the strength and leadership that are nostalgically remembered as the pinnacle of Soviet
strength and leadership.547 This time period also saw an increase in the glorification of
male athletes, suggesting that masculine virility was central to model citizenship.548
Combined, these modes of visual communication set masculine authority as the frame
through which idealized Soviet politics should be understood.
Despite a democratic transition in the 1990s, Soviet rhetorical styles have
remained prominent because the Russian polity lacked a clearly articulated alternative.
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David Cratis Williams argues ―Russia‘s ‗instant democracy‘ lacked both engrained
social, cultural, or political traditions of deliberative public discourse and sufficient
human resources prepared by disposition or training to establish such traditions.‖549
Drawing on the traditions of the Tzars and Soviet Premiers, Russian civic rhetoric curtails
democratic participation, instead focusing on rhetorics that enable promulgation of
executive mandates.550 Despite claiming to be a defender of democratic principles, Putin
has continued this autocratic political rhetoric. While autocratic and democratic rhetorics
are seemingly at odds, for many Russians ―the very term ‗democracy‘ became conflated
with blue jeans, free market capitalism and prosperity through its presentation as a
‗democratic market system‘.‖551 In the process, concepts such as deliberation and
participation have become dissociated with ―democratic governance.‖ With democracy
tied to neoliberal values and consumptive practices, rather than participatory civics, Putin
has carefully constructed an image as a rugged individual – the model neoliberal subject
– to position himself as the embodiment of the ideal citizen and state. This idealization of
Putin is then naturalized through the circulation of varied technics that reify this memory
of masculine Russia as normal.552 Contemporary Russia exists as a near literal example of
Stiegler‘s definition of proletarianization – individuals are managed through the
consumption of products and narratives foreclose participation.
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Figure 5.3: Examples of publicity photos demonstrating Putin’s rugged Masculinity
Central to the connection of Putin to the memory of the USSR are visual technics
that highlight masculinity. Putin‘s symbolic masculinity was a strategic contrast to the
enfeebled Yeltsin and late Soviet leaders. The memory of these leaders as old and out of
shape became a visual representation of the decline of the Soviet Union and failings of
Russia in the immediate wake of the collapse of the USSR.553 Against this memory of
emasculation, Putin‘s public relations team took a relative unknown politician and
constructed an idealized persona for the president that described Putin through his
―sobriety, intelligence, competence, vigorous physical and psychological health, and,
above all, his manliness.‖554 Officially released shirtless vacation photos featuring him
fishing, riding a horse, and carrying a gun to hunt are the primary technics used to
translate Putin‘s masculine image into public memory (Figure 5.3).555 These images
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convey Putin as rugged, tough and virile, with a powerful physique – the ideal masculine
leader.

Figure 5.4: Putin: the strong but caring father of Russia
Aside from the shirtless photos, official photos consistently display Putin engaged
in feats of masculinity, codifying a rugged masculinity as the normative value of Russian
political culture.556 These images connect Putin to memories of Soviet strength and are
central to efforts to restore ―the image of the Leader as the Father of the Nation in the
post-Soviet condition.‖557 Even those images that show his softer side, posing with
animals or children, reify this paternal association by implying Putin is strong enough to
fight for Russia, but is willing to care for you (Figure 5.4).558 This totalizing ―muscle‖
memory of Putin has become a metaphor for the future of Russia; Putin‘s physical
presence will be replicated in domestic and international politics.
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These official images of Putin are widely circulated throughout Russia, appearing
in media ranging from billboards and TV screens, to playing cards and action figures.559
This commodification into technics of mass communication and consumption transforms
Putin‘s masculine visage into a memory consumed by the Russian public.560 In focusing
on consumable, rather than individuating technics, these rhetorics are controlling. Oleg
Riabov and Tatiana Riabova posit that such circulation of masculine memory is central to
the Russian assertion of government authority.561 As part of this remasculization of
Russian society, visual technics built around Putin allow his body to stand in for the
nation as a whole. Andrew Foxall contends,
The images of Putin serve as a cultural product that connects the viewer,
through the body of Putin, to the scale of the nation. This bridging of
scale, from the individual body to the body politic, is ‗necessary for the
construction of a territorially bounded state occupied by a cohesive
nation.‘ As well as demonstrating Putin‘s domination of space, the
photographs also illustrate his domination of technology, nature, his own
emotions (he is often pictured alone), and other bodies (both male and
female).562
Commandeering visual technics to laud the prowess of Russian leaders furthers nostalgic
ties to Soviet visual rhetorics.563 Putin‘s politics are the continuation of Soviet technics
and therefore force contemporary political individuations into this formal frame. By tying
his vision of masculinity to idealized technics tied to the Soviet Union, these
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mnemotechnics root Putin‘s authoritarian tendencies in community ties to a proud past.564
Through the nostalgic valorizing of his masculinity, Putin glorifies a system that
privileges authority, action, and domination, over democratic values such as equality,
deliberation and freedom.
The strength of this mnemotechnicnical frame is such that it is also replicated
outside official technics. Across ―the Russian Internet‖ many memes draw from this form
of leadership as masculine authority.565 Specifically, Bradley Wiggins notes that many of
these memes continue the hypermasculine framing of Putin, explaining that
Russian netizens recursively consume and produce memes either specific
to or related to Putin to further the personalization of politics as
spectacle... his virtue as a virile, masculine heterosexual is implied when
memes accuse Russia‘s opponents of homosexuality. Equally, Putin‘s
moral purity, love of animals, devotion to the Russian Orthodox Church,
and his tireless efforts at building a better Russia for Russians are implied
when memes associate urine and excrement with Ukrainian leadership and
the European Union.566
Even memes which do not explicitly draw on these tropes further the masculine authority
of Putin. For example, one meme features an image of Joffrey from the HBO show Game
of Thrones (Figure 5.5).567 This character, known for being petty and authoritarian, shouts
―Hey you! Get down from there.‖ The next frame shows, Putin sitting on Joffrey‘s
throne, showing the target of Joffrey‘s admonishment. The final frame shows an
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apologetic picture of Joffrey with the text ―Excuse me, Vladimir Vladimirovich. I thought
you were someone else.‖ This exchange positions Putin as a figure of such masculine
authority that he can bend the will of national leaders and displace their authority with his
own. This meme demonstrates that for many Russians, Putin is influential not because of
his policies or status as a democratically elected leader, but because he is a king above all
kings.

Figure 5.5: Putin takes the Iron Throne
The domestic and global popularity of Putin suggests this rhetorical framing is
decidedly successful, however, it has not been without detractors. Pro-democracy
advocates in Russia have used similarities between the visual styles of Putin and Stalin to
argue for the dictatorial tendencies of the current regime.568 Accordingly, the Russian
state has taken great pains to prevent efforts that undermine their romantic memory of
Putin as the rebirth of the strength of the Soviet Union in a ―democratic society.‖ Russia
frequently censors media that is critical even if only in a mild or humorous way.569 That
Russia clarified press restrictions also apply to memes suggests their potential to
challenge the official public memory of Putin. They use the force of the state to enhance
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the proletarianizing force of official technics, as those technics that might enable
individuation are prohibited. Despite this, the dominance of official mnemotechnics, the
range of ways that both the Russian Internet, and global participants in the networked
publics sphere, used memes to challenge this official memory demonstrates that memes
also may resist this control. Serving as a counter to official public memories, memes – as
a mode of individuational technics – provide an opportunity for participants to circulate
affective contrast to hegemonic constructions of memories. That is not to say that all
memes enable individuations that resist control. The presence of many pro-Putin memes
demonstrates that these technics may be used to simply expand the circulation of
proletarianizing rhetorics. However, across the global and Russian internets, a range of
memes challenge this proletarianizing force. Therefore, this chapter next explores the
potential democratic individuations afforded internet memes.
Memetic Challenges to Official Memory
While the rhetorical technics circulated by public figures such as Putin dominate
public memory, these are by no means the only way that memory manifests itself in
public discourse. Publics can be built around any technic. Therefore, a variety of socially
constructed memories exist, each with differing claims of authority and legitimacy in
larger rhetorical ecologies.570 A useful heuristic for understanding the tension between
official public memories and other mnemotechnics is ―counter-memory.‖ Broadly,
counter-memories refer to any force that has the potential to disrupt or displace dominant
memory.571 Counter-memories exist in many forms ranging from the official, e.g. Truth
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and Reconciliation Commissions, to ironic re-individuations of mnemonic texts.572 More
specifically, counter-memories are those perspectives ―in which metanarratives are
parodied, identities destabilized, and the impartiality of supposed historical knowledge is
exposed.‖ 573 Beyond that, ―counter-memory also evokes the multiple forms of
counterpublicity that clash, not just with official forms of public discourse, but also with
simultaneous, alternate, counterpublic discourses.‖574 Specific technics—museums,
statues, paintings, speeches—serve as spaces to make visible particular memories; their
multivocality can highlight the tensions in disputed or redirected memories.575
Counter-memories may occasionally emerge as discrete technics; however, in
many cases they are derivative of official memory. Specifically they are created as
amateur publics engage in individuating uses of these technics as either a re-performance
of, or conversation with, official texts. 576 Visual forms, particularly those of public
figures, can be prolific sites for the multivalent readings that enable counter-memories to
form. As differing iterations complicate individuations, variations on the image of a
figure function as a ―Prism for reflecting multiple versions of civic values and mythic
meanings.‖577 These reflected versions become spaces where amateur vernacular
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memories emerge. With localized interests that can disrupt with official public memories
at any number of intersections, these memories have rich potential to open
individuational space, creating the conditions for political action outside the boundaries
of official public memory.578
Non-digital memories tend to coalesce around static memories imbued in material
objects. Conversely, networked technics function as a ―malleable yet somewhat durable
surface‖ for memory.579 Although digital iterations allow for an interactivity that changes
the content, digital archiving and ease of access ensures that the majority of these
memories are publicly available for future invention (individuations).580 Johanna
Hartelius notes that key features have emerged as central to the digitization of memory:
The internet represents a different mode of publicity than physical and
geographical markers. In part, this difference is one of audience and scale.
But, importantly, differences can be traced to interactivity, and the
necessity of interactivity for public deliberation… [Digital
mnemotechnics] are living texts. While a statue or a paper archive is static,
any virtual discourse is radically live - moving, evolving, growing.581
The scope of the audience and the availability of storage space increases the size and
reach of these memories. However, these factors are mediated by attention; regardless of
the potential size and reach of a digital memory, its rhetorical force can only be measured
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by the degree to which it demands and organizes attention. The interactivity and
renegotiation enabled by online mnemotechnics produces the potential for digitally
mediated memories to continually grow and evolve, increasing their capacity for resistive
individuations.
Seemingly aware of this potential, Putin‘s government has demonstrated itself
wary of memes, prompting the further evaluation of the memeification of Vladimir Putin.
I analyze both English and Russian language memes, however, much of the focus is on
English memes.582 While many of the Russian language memes featured content unique
to the Russian Internet, because popular memes transcend language and boarders, the
form of many popular memes remains consistent across languages. Russian language
sites and threads often feature English memes interwoven with Russian ones. For
example, alongside unique references to the Orthodox Church, RUNetMemes included
references to popular English language memes like Bad Luck Brian, Go Home You‘re
Drunk, and cat pictures.583 Combined, the corpus of these memes exists at the intersection
of localized and international memes negotiating the public memory of Putin. This trend
is consistent with Andreas Huyssen‘s observations that while memories are still firmly
rooted in national identity, they increasingly act and are acted upon by global structures
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of memory.584 Putin memes take a variety of forms, suggesting it would be impossible to
address all the iterations in this chapter. Instead, I will analyze early forms of the
memeification of Putin and then move to how participants mobilized these memes to
enact counter-memories during a string of political controversies.
Early Putin Memes: ―Badassery‖ and Sex Appeal

Figure 5.6: Memes built on Putin’s dictatorial ethos
Shortly after Putin‘s accession to the presidency of Russia, participants in
networked publics took notice of the visual campaign creating a cult of Putin by using
modern mnemotechnics to remobilize Soviet collective memory. In an act of ironic
appreciation, these memes quickly extended the effort through the reinterpretation of
these mnemonic photographs. Specifically, participants created a variety of stock
character macros and single-issue blogs that accelerated the circulation of official
Russian images of Putin into an ironic commentary regarding the official memory of his,
and by extension Russia‘s, masculinity.
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Although the topline/bottom lime form can be imposed onto specific images to
respond to the context of that image, most stock image macros are circulated in a way
that transcends the context in which the photo was taken.585 As image macros of Putin
originally emerged, they quickly moved outside the context of Russian politics and
culture. To date, Putin is the subject of at least 15 image macros.586 These macros feature
images of Putin that tend to frame him as either cunning or powerful (Figure 5.6). One
popular meme features Putin sitting in a throne-like chair with a commanding gaze. It is
often used to issue humorous threats such as ―you break in // I break you.‖587 Another
titled ―Cunning Putin‖ features Putin sporting a coy smile and texts like ―illegal to be
president again // change the law.‖588 These memes, often circulated as part of trivial
internet disputes, serve to translate the fatherly authority of Putin into a form so
exaggerated that it seems frivolous – casting him more as a parody of a dictator that a
powerful father. The only popular Putin meme that does not rely on mocking of Putin‘s
authority is ―give that man a cookie‖ (Figure 5.7).589 This image focuses on a picture of
Putin pointing a pen at something behind the camera. Participants use it as an
representative image of the affective experience of seeing something so phenomenal that
it demands immediate praise, hence giving them a cookie.
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Figure 5.7: The Give that Man a Cookie meme
While the stock character macros tend to parody the authority of Putin, the
collections of single-issue blogs hyperbolically glorify the official memory. These blogs
select an element of the Putin persona – him being shirtless, the preponderance of official
photos that are action shots, the general masculinity of his photos – and situates them in
collections that ironically praise these traits.590 Early forms of these blogs simply
collected alike photos with little commentary. Viewers could see collections of Putin
posing with animals, or ―50 pictures of Vladimir Putin looking like a complete
badass.‖591 Although these collections do not overtly challenge the official memory of
Putin, by collecting the accumulation of similar photos in one place, they de-naturalize
the individual photos, instead positioning them as part of a concerted campaign. Later
single-issue blogs enhance this evaluative move. The blog ―Vladimir Putin Doing
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Things‖ circulated images of Putin in active poses.592 However, the titles of each post
provided an ironic commentary. A picture of Putin at a ballot box circulates with the title
―scoring zillion votes,‖ and a picture of Putin shirtless with a horse includes the title
―Bringing Brokeback Mountain Back.‖ These titles linguistically unsettle the authority,
legitimacy, and masculinity of Putin; images of action become political theater,
democratic leadership translates into authoritarianism, and Putin‘s masculinity takes on a
homoerotic tone.593 By accelerating and refocusing the circulation of the official memory,
these blogs undermine the authenticity and authority of that memory by translating it into
a parody of itself.
Putin Memes during Times of Political Crisis
As a mockery of official efforts to memorialize Putin as the paragon of fatherly
masculinity, the memetic recirculation of ―official‖ photos has been a constant countermnemonic act during Putin‘s 15 years in power. However, in times of crisis not only are
Putin‘s hyper-masculine and authoritarian tendencies highlighted, but external memes,
functioning as topoi for networked argument, enter the rhetorical fray to re-interpret
Putin‘s public memory.
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Figure 5.8: Popular memes comment on the 2011 election controversy
Although existing for over a decade, Putin memes coalesced into a common
argumentative force as part of protests over Russian elections in 2011. During these
elections, Putin‘s United Russia party eked out victories in a series of local elections.
Protests emerged because official results varied from exit polls and had voter turnout as
high as 140 percent.594 Sharing in the outrage, memes joined the protest, focusing
primarily on the absurdity of 140% turnout.595 Many intertextually juxtaposed Putin with
established memes. For example, his face was placed on the ―Most Interesting Man in the
World‖ – a meme dedicated to parodically highlighting masculinity and decadence – with
the text ―I don‘t always rig elections // but when I do more than 140% of people come out
to vote‖ (figure 5.8).596 This juxtaposition transforms Putin into a caricature of his official
image, a man who will openly and proudly flaunt democracy.
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Other popular memes offered commentary from their narrative and affective
perspectives. ―The rent is too damn high,‖ the meme form of New York politician Jimmy
McMillian, paraphrased his popular slogan to show his exacerbation at the results ―Putin
140% // is too damn high‖ (Figure 5.8). McMillian, whose image circulates as a
demonstration of frustration, allowed users to demonstrate the incredulity felt upon
seeing the results. Another meme featured a picture of Chuck Norris proclaiming, ―I
voted for Putin // that‘s why the results are over 140%‖(figure 5.8).597 This image played
off the ―Chuck Norris Facts‖ meme, where the hyper-masculinity of Norris is
demonstrated by his ability to accomplish otherwise impossible feats.598 By filtering the
election results through Norris, the meme demonstrates a sense of ironic amazement: it
would take the pseudo-divinity of Norris to make the results plausible. Through their
force as mnemotechnics they limit the boundaries of what is an acceptable understanding
of the election outcome. In each of these cases, participants‘ interactions with wellknown memes placed particular affective overlays onto Russian efforts to proclaim the
elections legitimate, creating a tension between the official memory and individual
experience.
Memes protesting Putin as authoritarian did not just appear in English. A series of
popular Russian memes also circulated, undermining the ―democratic‖ ethos of official
mnemotechnics.599 One meme features a screenshot of a Russian official asking readers
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to vote for a profile picture and features the caption ―The only honest election‖ (Figure
5.9).600 This meme argues that the marketing of visual technics is the only participation
that is officially sanctioned. Beyond this overt observation, many of these memes
generate their commentary by merging the image of Putin with western icons of popular
culture. One image features a picture of Dora the Explorer and her sidekick monkey
Boots. However, their faces are replaced with those of Putin and Dimitri Medvedev. This
image is accompanied with the text ―Help Vova and Dima [Putin and Medvedev‘s
nicknames] put together the USSR‖ (Figure 5.9).601 This meme magnifies the official
memory‘s nostalgia for the USSR, removing the romanticism and demanding the viewer
reflect on the reality such a return would bring. Another meme features Putin‘s face
imposed onto Gollum from Lord of the Rings, with the text ―I will never give you to
anyone // my Russia‖ (Figure 5.9), transforming Putin‘s pro-Russia politics into a
destructive compulsion.602 Aside from casting a negative structure of feeling onto Putin‘s
policies, both of these memes challenge his masculinity by transforming him into a young
girl or a decrepit monster respectively. Because these memes insert Putin into new
narratives, they disrupt his relationship with the narrative offered by the official memory.
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Figure 5.9: Russian language memes respond to the election
While the circulation of these memes challenged official public memories tied to
Putin, the Russian censorship apparatus largely ignored them. However, as memes began
to more dramatically, and publicly, respond to political controversies, they drew the
attention of the Russian state – becoming part of the (unofficial) impetus for the
restrictions on memes.603 Specifically, two memes are understood as initiating the
Russian restriction: the internet‘s responses to Russian involvement in Crimea/Ukraine,
as well as the ―#wheresputin‖ response to Putin‘s mysterious absence from politics in
2015.
In late 2013, crowds amassed in Kiev, Ukraine to protest President Viktor
Yanukovych‘s decision to focus on relations with Russia rather than the West.604 By
February of 2014, they had ousted the president. In response to the protesters‘ antiRussian rhetoric, Putin supported Russian separatists throughout Ukraine and annexed
Crimea after a questionably legitimate election where the region voted to join Russia.605
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Although international leaders condemned Russia, they tempered their rhetoric and
policies for fear of escalating tensions beyond Ukraine.606

Figure 5.10: Memes respond to the Ukraine crisis
Memes, however, were not nearly as tempered in their responses. Putin-based
stock character macros, previously used primarily outside of Russian politics, reemerged
to condemn the actions of Russia. A photo of Putin donning sunglasses, often used to
demonstrate an affect of nonchalance, was redeployed with the text ―Spends 7 years and
50 billion dollars on the Olympics to improve Russian relations // ruins it in one day‖
(Figure 5.10).607 The bottom line clearly delineates that Putin‘s ambition has moved
beyond protecting Russian interests, questioning the adequacy of his fatherhood.
Similarly, multiple images of Putin pointing two fingers at the camera centered on the

referendum/#24c8df837f63. The primary indictment of the vote, with its 96.77% pro-Russian result, is that
anti-Russian voters stayed home due to military and mob intimidation.
606.

Simon Tisdall, ―West‘s Puny Response to Ukraine Crisis Will Not Deter Vladimir Putin,‖ The
Guardian (March 2, 2014): https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/02/west-responseukraine-vladimir-putin-russia.
607.

http://f.tqn.com/y/politicalhumor/1/W/Q/F/6/putin-ruins-reputation.jpg.

227

pun ―Crimea River‖ (Figure 5.10).608 Both the carefree pose and the levity of the pun cast
Putin as a B-movie villain, a megalomaniac bent on world domination. The parodic tone
dictated by the form of the macros opened a space where the official memories could be
individuated into more anti-Russian directions.

Figure 5.11: Challenges to masculinity with youthful text (left) and lolcat speak
(right)
Beyond redeploying existing Putin memes to challenge the crisis, visuals of Putin
were also deployed to directly challenge Putin‘s masculinity. One features the image of
shirtless Putin carrying a rifle, with the text ―BRB [be right back] // Got to take care of
some sh*t in Ukraine‖ (censorship in original) (Figure 5.11).609 By using youth oriented
speech patterns, the meme takes Putin at his most masculine, hunting shirtless with a
large rifle/phallic symbol, and recasts him (and by extension Russia‘s involvement in
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Ukraine) as juvenile hyper-masculine posturing. Similarly, a Russian language meme
borrowed from the popular grammatical forms of LOLcats to caption a picture of Putin at
a podium with the text ―Can I haz already sent troops?‖ (Figure 5.11).610 The stately
authority of Putin is reframed as the language of a kitten, translating Russian threats into
adorable and playful pleas. The memes that emerged as compartmentalization of the
affective dimensions of the official memory returned to it, using their affective judgment
to problematize the central premises of that memory.

Figure 5.12: Shirtless Putin makes the front page
The association between the memetic parody of Putin‘s masculinity and the
Crimean annexation was so pronounced that The Economist magazine used shirtless
Putin in its coverage of Crimea. Its cover on March 22, 2014 featured the headline ―The
new world order‖ with a photoshopped image of shirtless Putin driving a Russian tank
past a stop sign (presumably into Crimea) (Figure 5.12).611 The usage of a shirtless Putin
placed the annexation of Crimea as part of the discourse of his hyper-masculine
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performance, complete with the barrel of the tank serving as a hyperbolic phallic
extension. Contextualizing the Crimean crisis through the formal expectations of these
anti-Putin memes, The Economist framed the conflict as an effort for Putin to
demonstrate his personal masculine prowess, rather than as reasoned foreign policy. The
grammar of the meme operated as a topos, directing participants to the suggestion that
Putin‘s virile image may be a façade that will imperil, rather than protect, Russia‘s future.
Although Crimea allowed the networked opposition of Putin and the international
press to coopt Putin memes as an inventional resource, the hashtag #wheresputin
demonstrated the ability of memes to mobilize the press to foment chaos. In the period
between March 7th and 17th of 2015, Putin did not make any public appearances.
Recognizing that such a prolonged absence was unusual for such a publicly oriented
leader, the hashtag quickly spread around Twitter and Facebook.612 Many of the memetic
posts were humorous in nature, one posited that Putin was ―practicing for a surprise entry
into Eurovision‖ and another featured an image of European leaders looking around as
though they were searching for Putin.613 The popularity of the hashtag led the press,
including both online outlets like Mashable and Bustle, as well as mainstream press
including The Guardian and BBC News, to ask the same question.614 Aside from drawing
attention to his absence, the press coverage also led to wild speculation, ranging from
612.
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romantic interests and medical concerns to a coup. Upon his return, Putin dismissed the
absence proclaiming, ―It would be boring without gossip.‖615 The meme was able to set
the media agenda by highlighting how contemporary events were a stark deviation from
Putin‘s carefully managed public persona. It is ultimately disruptions such as those
enabled by this meme and the affective revaluing afforded by the Crimea memes that
prompted the new restrictions.
Making Memes Illegal… but the Memes Strike Back
Against the backdrop of rising criticism, as well as the destabilization of Putin as
the re-embodiment of the memory of Soviet power and masculinity, the Russian
government decided to take action. In April of 2015,
The Roskomnadzor, Russia‘s federal executive body responsible for
overseeing the media, … posted the following announcement on social
network Vkontakte (essentially Russia‘s version of Facebook): ‗Violation
of legislation on personal data in relation to public figures includes use of
the photo of a public person to impersonate popular Internet memes,
unrelated to the identity of the ‗celebrity.‖616
A few days later press outlets clarified that the Roskomandor had not issued a new
prohibition on internet memes, but rather a clarification of existing law that gives the
government the ability to censor offending texts and sue the creator.617 Officially, the
ruling was the result of a defamation lawsuit by Russian singer Valeri Syutkin.618
However, analysts argue that the Roskomnadzor was willing to make the ruling, and
ruling party elites supported the ban, because it gave them an avenue to respond to
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threatening memes such as those critical of recent Russian involvement in Ukraine and
those that created rumors of a coup during Putin‘s 10-day absence.619

Figure 5.13: The Russian Internet responds to the ban
Immediately after the publicizing of the so-called ―ban,‖ the internet quickly
made memes commenting on this turn of events. Russians responded primarily through
memes that tangentially referred to the ban without targeting any one figure (Figure
5.13). Most prominent was a screen capture from Back to the Future II where Marty tells
Doc Brown they must return to the past. Brown replies that this is impossible because
―The past has been blocked by @roscomnadzor.‖620 @RUNetMEmes also reposted a
Reddit thread which listed a series of Russian theme puns, accompanied by the line ―this
post is illegal in Russia.‖ Both these memes avoid the use of images or names of current
figures to avoid the specific provisions of the ban. Instead, they use global media and
English language puns to draw attention to the ridiculous nature of the ban. The ironic
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expectations these mnemotechnics create the conditions where even a purported ban on
memes can be individuated into memetic logics.

Figure 5.14: International memes respond to the ban
Not under the threat of Russian sanction, the global networked public sphere was
much more overt in their criticism of Putin. The majority of these memes intertextually
linked Putin to more popular internet memes (Figure 5.14). One meme put the backward
hat of ―Scum Bag Steve,‖ with the text ―I Don‘t Like Meme // So I outlaw them.‖
Another showed ―Rare Pepe,‖ an image of a frog used to mock the claims of ―rare‖ web
images, distributing memes from inside a trench coat.621 These memes argue an effort to
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regulate discourse on the internet is fruitless as the restrictions will anger users, who
would view Putin as a ―scumbag‖ and promote further circulation – evidenced by Pepe
promising a new black-market. Even the Putin-based meme ―Give that Man a Cookie‖
joined the commentary, proclaiming, ―Give that meme-maker life imprisonment.‖ This
iteration highlights that Putin‘s very nature is authoritarian, as his first response to
criticism is imprisonment, framing the anti-meme clarification as another example of the
non-democratic reality of Russian life.
Once these critical individuations of memes began to emerge, the English
language press joined in the memeification of the controversy. Many of the articles
describing the alleged ban used memes of Putin to explain the controversy. The
Washington Post’s Intersect Blog, their chief location for reporting about the internet,
published a story explaining the restrictions that opened with a meme as the first
symbolic content after the headline (Figure 5.15). The meme featured a picture of Putin
sitting at a desk, looking to explain something.622 Imposed over the photo is the text ―all
your memes are belong to me.‖ The textual content alludes to the classic meme ―all your
base are belong to us,‖ an example of broken English from the 1989 video game Zero
Wing.623 The meme commemorates a victory or dominance, usually by a megalomaniacal
character, and is a deeply ingrained part of internet vernacular. This allusion allows the
Washington Post to frame the policy as out of touch with the realities of the internet.
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Figure 5.15: Putin and the “All your base” meme
Marketwatch’s coverage of the law similarly tapped into the individuational
potential afforded by anti-ban memes. Rather than using them to explain the story, the
author simply added them to the end, proclaiming, ―if you are reading this story from a
computer in Russia, you probably won‘t see these.‖624 This epilogue features a series of
memes that mock the hyper-masculinity of Putin (Figure 5.16). The memes include him
shirtless and riding a kitten (instead of the horse) as well as a Ritz cracker (Putin on the
Ritz) (Figure 5.1). The final meme is a picture of Putin with a big smile that says
―Ukraine? // No. Mykraine.‖ While these articles themselves present an ―objective‖
narration of the facts, English language media used the restrictions as an occasion to
increase the circulation of those memes that hyperbolically deconstructed the masculinity
and imperialist rhetoric of Putin. The memes, presented as a triviality, provided the onus
for the mainstream press to circulate commentaries of Putin usually reserved for internet
forums – allowing a wider range of audiences to participate in the individuation of this
anti-Russian stance. In total, the memeification of the anti-meme statement functions as
an ironic comment on official memories of authority. The restrictions read more like a
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Yaakov Smirnoff joke about Soviet censorship, rather than a return of the memory of
Soviet power.

Figure 5.16: The English language press joins the anti-masculine memes
Memes as International Resistance to Control
Aside from being a demonstration of the inability of technocrats to control the
production and force of networked mnemotechnics, these memes highlight the particular
power of the amateur creation of narratives. While each of these cases feature amateur
meme production, these Russian memes are the re-articulation of specific and focused
control based narratives regarding the authority of Vladimir Putin. In this context, they
are not simply memes that emerge from collective (rather than technical) expertise, but
rather they are indicative of direct transformation of a proletarianizing hypomnemata into
a participatory amateur form. The political force of these Russian memes highlights three
ways that mnemotechnics resist controlling rhetorics. First the individuational form of
memes resists censorship and other impediments to the circulation of networked technics.
Second memes are particularly suited for promoting mnemotechnics that enable counter-
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memories. Finally, networked hypomnemata are uniquely suited to promote
individuations that promote a cosmopolitan ethic of care.
Networked Individuations as a Response to Censorship
The proliferation of memes in response to a restriction on memes demonstrates
the restive orientation that networked technics – and memes in particular – have towards
efforts at censorship. The tendency of online censorship to result in an increase of
circulation of censored information is so abundant that it has gained its own term in
online vernaculars, ―the Streisand Effect.‖ The term, coined by blogger Mike Masnick,
began as an allusion to a legal battle where Barbra Streisand's attempts to stop the digital
circulation of a picture of her beachfront mansion only prompted increased circulation.625
In networked rhetorics, which are premised on the freedom of information flow and
amateur participation, censorship itself becomes a kairotic moment where individuations
that circulate the silenced speech are situated as the only ethical response. The
recognition of the Streisand effect in Russia even manifested itself in meme form. One
iteration had Putin‘s face over ―Bad Luck Brian,‖ a meme dedicated to explaining
seemingly ―good‖ ideas that inevitably go wrong (Figure 5.17).626 The text reads ―Bans
Memes // Victim of Streisand Effect.‖ By using the Brian meme, this iteration suggests
that Putin ought to have known that the ban would backfire as it violates the ethos of an
internet that demands openness in the face of censorship, particularly of online content.
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Figure 5.17: Initial, and typical, Bad Luck Brian meme (left), Putin ban iteration
(right)
This movement of memes is demonstrative of Richard Lanham‘s observation that
―Electronic information seems to resist ownership."627 While Lanham was referring
primarily to monetary ownership, this elusive nature also potentially frees such
information from the bounds of censorship. As technics that demand individuation and
circulation, memes‘ participatory form pushes them to resist the limitations of censorship.
Further, because memes are, almost by definition, unsigned texts where form obfuscates
the subjectivity of the creator, and because they are created and hosted on external sites
that often do not demand identification, they afford an anonymity not available in other
networked texts. Because of this they are an ideal mnemotechnic to resist efforts at
official control.
Further, because memes often take the form of trivialities with a pop and often
ironic sensibility, they are easy to ignore in their early stages. However, as
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mnemotechnics that connect the present to an evaluative form, they can grow to carry
populist political sensibilities.628 #Wheresputin did not draw media attention until it had
circulated well beyond the control of any network or government. Similarly, the protests
of Crimea took Putin memes, which had been relatively benign, and mobilized them to
offer stark commentary on Russian aggression in Ukraine. Individual utterances of a
meme are easy to ignore, and thus hard to censor, but as they emerge as individuations
that include numerous participants, they provide a profound tool for the evasion of
censorship. In the face of Russian policy that includes international conflict, questionable
democratic practices, and a hit or miss economy, the Russian and international memescape has commented on dominant ideologies, questioning and inverting them.
In a state full of press censorship, memes replicate what Michael Gurevtich and
Jay Blumer recognize as the expected functions of a free press.629 By commenting on
Putin‘s absence these memes demonstrate the capacity to monitor politics and set the
public agenda. In protesting Crimea, they gave voice to the interests of non-state groups.
As memes also support Putin, they also gave voice to individuals who support the state,
promoting an open dialogue. Further, their participatory form invites networked users to
join politics. In sum, although memes may lack the analytical depth of long form articles,
at their least they work to open the same democratic ruptures as is traditionally expected
of a free press.
Memes as Deliberative Counter-Memory
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Considering their potential to reorient official public memories, memetic
mnemotechnics have the capacity to foster rhetorical conditions favorable to the
individuation of counter-memories. However, memes perform this role in a unique
fashion. Counter-memories, particularly in digital spaces, often function through the
provision of information to contradict official public memory.630 However, none of the
memetic representations around Putin challenged the factual accuracy of the official
public memory. Instead, the individuations enabled by memetic counter-memory operate
through a logic of increased participation, cooperative construction, and affective
recasting through vernacular experience.631 Combined these factors utilize the formal
expectations of memes to recast ―facts‖ into individuations that challenge proletarianizing
memories proliferated through bureaucratically controlled technics.
As noted, the unsigned form of memetic texts affords them freedom from
ownership. While this works to evade the censorship and control of official public
memories, the separation from the memetic creator is equally important. Because the
rapid circulation and recontextualization of memes quickly dissociates the authors of
memes from the rhetorical force of the text, the content and form of the meme end up
belonging only to the meme itself – increasing the ease of individuation and circulation.
This ease is promoted because when these individuating technics are unencumbered by
past participants, mnemotechnics function in a method akin to prosthetic memory.
Allison Landsburg explains that prosthetic memories
circulate publicly, and although they are not organically based, they are
nevertheless experienced with a person‘s body as a result of an
630.
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engagement with a wide range of cultural technologies. Prosthetic
memories thus become part of one‘s personal archive of experience,
informing one‘s subjectivity as well as one‘s relationship to present and
future tenses. Made possible by advanced capitalism and emergent
commoditized mass culture capable of widely disseminating images and
narratives about the past, the memories are not ―natural‖ or ―authentic‖
and yet they organize and energize the bodies and subjectivities that take
them on.632
As memes allow individuals to add their unsigned memories into technics that circulate
as public counter-memories, they function as a prosthesis detached from a singular
participant in the individuation. The formal elements of memes, such as shirtless Putin,
are rooted in the narratives of the official public memory – in this case is representative
power and masculinity. However, the re-articulation of these memories enabled by
memes allows individual participants to deposit their narrative experience into the
affective form of the meme. Following Stiegler‘s theorization of memory and technics,
digital memes – as a mnemonic prosthetic – serve as a species of affective archive.
However because these affects are not attached to individuals, this ―choir of orphaned
utterances‖ becomes an inventional resource for deliberation.633 As official memories
often rely on an affective connection to a nostalgic past, the ability to deploy alternative
affective readings, in the form of memes, allows for the destabilization of dominant
memories through affective contrasts that are afforded by networked mnemotechnics.
Beyond the anonymity afforded by networked rhetorics enabling affective
memetic prosthesis, memetic counter-memories also generate collaborative unfinished
texts. While official memories often function as closed texts immune to discussion, the
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juxtaposition created by memes re-opens them to deliberative individuation. A single
iteration does not make a meme; rather they are the byproduct of negotiating social
expectations. Because of this, memes – like many digital mnemotechnics – almost
demand interactivity, as ―each new digital expression extends opportunities to participate
in the discussion and ‗share‘ (repeat, rewrite, reinterpret, represent) experience within and
beyond users‘ personal networks.‖634 The collaborative form of memes allows each
participant, content creator or circulator, to alter the form of the counter-memory. This
transforms a mnemotechnical space, such as an image of Putin, from a hegemonic source
of argument – to a space that revolves around multiple competing arguments.635 These
competing affective interpretations foster a contrast that prevents the dominant memory
from stabilizing, disrupting the displaying boundaries imposed by official memory.636
Yet, it is not simply collective authorship, and the diverse opinions/structures of
feeling this invites, that generates the deliberative potential of counter-memories.
Because memes are socially individuated, they demand interaction between individuals.
In this sense, memes are ―unfinalizable.‖637 Because there is always a new context to
deploy a meme, or a new iteration that can be made, the official memory cannot be
finalized, turning static sites of memory into active sites of individuated deliberation. The
memeification of these images prevents the consistent circulation of a dominant memory.
Instead, memes subject official memories to an alternative read that circulates ever faster.
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This reread disrupts the ideological interpellation afforded by the repetition of official
public memory. If Putin‘s authority as a father is ever changing, it is harder to trust the
selflessness of his actions.
Finally, memes help engender deliberation by translating official public myths,
which are rooted in exclusionary cultural norms, into a participatory vernacular form.
Peter Dahlgren notes ―For democracy to happen, citizens must be able to encounter and
talk to each other. They need access to each other to develop their collective political
efforts, and contexts in which they can act together.‖638 While the press in Russia is
largely restricted from criticizing Putin or official narratives, memes circulated across the
Russian internet translate political controversies into the experiences of everyday
Russians. In commenting on Crimea, these memes bolstered Russian patriotism,
highlighted the human costs of enlistment in a time of crisis and both celebrated and
vilified Ukrainian pro-democracy protests.639 Such understanding demystifies official
public memories by rooting them in everyday language and experience. Moreover, as
memetic counter-memories can be constructed and edited by anyone with an internet
connection, they have the capacity to function as democratic online memories capable of
critiquing the traditional modes of mnemonic production that privilege academics and
historical institutions.640 By allowing individuations that included everyday
understandings of the conflict and allowed participation by Russians on both sides, these
memetic mnmeotechnics function as one of the few truly democratic media in Russia.
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Internationalizing Networked Values
Although the memes of the Russian internet served as a conduit for everyday
Russians to meme politics at one another, they also invited global response to the
assorted Putin-related political controversies. Despite being rooted in Russian political
context, many of the memes around this controversy were composed in English and
circulated by global participants. Because of this, the individuations enabled by the
memes were able to transcend national boundaries, languages, and values. Consequently,
I conclude by arguing that these international individuations of memes suggest a capacity
of networked hypomnemata to promote an ethic of cosmopolitism rooted in care.
The internationalism of the memes in responding to varied Russian crises is
partially enabled by their function as an internationalizing discourse. Part of this is
enabled by the fact that the English language constitutes over 50% of internet content,
with Russian being the next largest at 6.3%.641 While the predominance of English is
declining, Zazulak notes that when participants in the networked public sphere want to
speak to international audiences they almost exclusively communicate in English.642
Because of this, many memes that originally circulated in English are familiar to
networked participants regardless of their nationality or language.
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Figure 5.18: Popular meme forms Disaster Girl mocks Dmytro Yarosh (left) and
Rage Comics comment on Russian involvement in Ukraine (right)
Moreover, because memes only minimally rely on linguistic content, they are
particularly suited to function as an internationalizing hypomnemata. Ryan Milner notes
that with their focus on form and visual content ―memes can become a lingua franca for
mediated cultural participation.‖643 Anyone familiar with Jimmy McMillian and seeing
the number 140 would be able to conclude that the subject of the meme is ―too damn
high.‖ Similarly, Russian memes‘ use Bad Luck Brian, Disaster Girl, and Rage Faces
combined with Cyrillic text to translate Russian politics into these international
networked forms (Figure 5.18).644 While they require translation to be understood by
outside audiences, the form of the memes provides a context that allows the affect
surrounding the mnemotechnic to be interpreted by any networked user. When networked
hypomnemata are used to foster global understanding, the values of networked publics –
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particularly an orientation towards irony – becomes the dominant frame available to
participate in this internationalized memetic discourse.
Similarly, although I do not read Cyrillic, the imposition of Putin into the form of
Gollum (Figure 5.8), allowed me to read the meme as criticizing Putin as selfish without
any textual evaluation. The proliferation of global mass media culture provides a referent
for cross cultural memetic understanding. As international markets such as China and
Russia expand, much of Hollywood production has shifted with a focus towards these
global audiences.645 The result of this is that larger budget films ―have fairly universal
ideas and themes, they‘re not really culturally specific.‖646 This move has widely been
criticized as lessening the quality of major studio films, decreasing the individuational
depth of these movies as technics. However, this same shallow universality ensures that
these texts are widely accessible to international audiences. Understanding the
childishness of Dora or the exasperation of Doc Brown allows audiences around the
world to interpret these controversies even if they are not conversant in the typical uses of
network native image macros.
That is not to say that all memes participate in this internationalizing trend. In
studying @RUNetMeme‘s response to Crimea, Wiggins notes that memes that tended
towards support of Russia used national symbols and culturally grounded jokes –
frequently evoking homophobic, sexual, and excretory references associated with hyper
masculine humor.647 Conversely, directionally Ukrainian memes, a position which tends
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to ideologically align with more pro-western/internationalist ideologies, featured a wider
range of intertextual references, pop culture, and adherence to memetic formal norms.648
My own surveys of international memes and @RUNetMemes corroborates this
observation across controversies. Memes that draw on networked conventions or global
pop culture tended to be overwhelmingly critical of Putin, while supportive memes were
more likely to draw on the same masculinity and cultural references as the official
discourse.
Although networked memes may often rely on intertextuality and irony, when
circulated in the service of more proletarianizing rhetorics, such as masculine
nationalism, the memes can only individuate within the narrow confines of these
discourses. Some memes only individuate within the confines of particular cultural
identities, such as the Russian internet. However, because the form of memes opens them
to proairetic modes of invention, even these will tend towards individuations that
permeate across the networked public sphere. Because of this, these Russian memes
suggests that networked hypomnemata – particularly memes – are especially suited
towards promoting a cosmopolitan ethic that enables a politics of care.649
As was briefly considered in chapter 2, care is central to Stiegler‘s vision of the
future of politics. Because the proletarianizing force of technics in the service of control
tends to distance individuals from one another, care is first and foremost about

648.

649.

Ibid., 472.

When I refer to cosmopolitanism I am not interested in structural cosmopolitism such as the
international federalism of Kant. Instead, here I conceive of cosmopolitanism following the views of
Jeremy Waldron, where cosmopolitism is ―a way of being in the world‖ and ―a way of constructing an
identity.‖ Jeremy Waldron, ―What is Cosmopolitan,‖ The Journal of Political Philosophy 8 no. 2 (2000):
227. Therefore, I am not contending neither that memes explicitly erode national systems of governance,
nor promote international governance, but rather they orient participants towards a networked ethic built
around international/intersubjective deliberation and identification.

247

individuations and the role they play in ―constituting the social.‖650 Even though care is at
its base level about preventing conditions of inhumanity, Stiegler argues it is more than
this:
Care cannot be seen as the basic conditions for survival, as subsistence.
Care, ‗strictly speaking,‘ always works through the care one takes of
oneself through the care one takes of others, in that they are constituent
elements of that ‗self‘ as the transformation of individuation.651
For Stiegler, care is rooted in the ways that technics, as the materialization of retentions,
facilitate individuations that force an awareness of others with similar retentions.652
While this may begin with an awareness only of those who are close to us, as technics
draw this attention to these others they force attention onto ―the world we share with
others‖ in a way that gestures towards more universal issues and concerns.653 As the
tendencies enabled by particular techniques enable the frameworks that constitutes
systems of care, the potential for a politics of care can only be understood through the
particular technics used to promote it. 654
Memes‘ ability to refigure localized political controversies through the lens of
networked affective frames suggests that their ability to foster care resides in their
capacity to evoke a sense of ironic cosmopolitanism. Seeking to establish a system of
virtues for cosmopolitanism that are neither culturally imperialist nor politically impotent
(read: proletarianizing), Bryan Turner turns to Socratic irony as the ideal driving force of
cosmopolitanism. Turner explains:
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Cosmopolitan virtue requires Socratic irony, by which one can achieve
some distance from the polity. The principal component of cosmopolitan
virtue is irony, because the understanding of other cultures is assisted by
an intellectual distance from one‘s own national or local culture. If
Nussbaum‘s plea for global civic education can work, then understanding
other cultures presupposes that we could treat our own culture
disinterestedly as an object of inquiry. As such, cosmopolitan virtue also
requires self-reflexivity with respect to both our own cultural context and
other cultural values. Such an orientation of irony and reflexivity produces
a humanistic skepticism towards the grand narratives of modern
ideologies. As a result, cosmopolitan irony would share much in common
with the pragmatism of Dewey and Rorty in that tolerance of others must
start from a position of some uncertainty as to the ultimate authority of
one‘s own culture.655
Turner‘s call for detachment and ironic perspective mirrors Burke‘s perspective by
incongruity. Memes, as products of a globalized networked public sphere have the
capacity to transcend particular cultural grounding, destabilize localized narratives – such
as Russian masculinity – asking participants to reevaluate this frame from outside their
narrow (officially sanctioned) subjectivity. This comic orientation then demands
tolerance because no single orientation can claim ―truth.‖ Instead, different orientations
are fostered through competing individuations.
Despite promoting an internationalized distance, this cosmopolitanism demands
neither a forsaking of national identity nor localized conflicts. Stiegler is wary of national
identity as a technic because homogenization precludes individuation.656 Instead, such
collectivities must be built around identifications, where the individuation of national
technics allows a unity that does not deny the process of individuation. Memes‘
cosmopolitanism works to strike this balance. Turner notes, ―Cosmopolitanism does not
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mean that one does not have a country or a homeland, but one has to have a certain
reflexive distance from that homeland.‖657 This distance is the space of individuation.
Many of the memes that are critical of Russia do not call for individuals to reject
identifications with Russianness. Such simple rejections only breed conflict.
Consequently, Turner contends that ―The cosmopolitan intellectual does not argue that
fundamentalism is, in some simple sense, wrong or dangerous. The cosmopolite joins,
rather, with local voices to probe and if necessary to problematize debate.‖ 658 Through
their ironic recasting of troubling memories and technics, Russian memes ask that
participants demand that Russianness is refigured in a more virtuous form. Even as
international voices joined the conflict, they mocked the faux-masculinity of Putin,
poking at the validity of mobilizing this particular memory, rather than simply
antagonizing Putin or Russia writ large. Turner argues that if oriented towards this
Socratic Irony (comic orientation), these distanced perspectives will promote an
international ethic predicated around care for the other.659 By adopting the
internationalizing identifications of cosmopolitanism, memes enable Socratic Irony in a
way that fosters attention to collective care.
To expand the appeal of Socratic Irony, William Smith turns to Hannah Arendt
(who is also influential in Stiegler‘s theorization of spirit and care) to further elucidate
ways to manifest a cosmopolitan ideal. Specifically, Smith turns to Arendt‘s concept of
―worldliness‖ to argue ―why citizens should be motivated to act on their cosmopolitan
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obligations.‖660 For Arendt, the world is not the same as the earth, rather it is the product
of human action created in common.661 In the language of Stiegler, the world is those
technics that are produced through broad social individuations (in common).
Consequently, localized interests undermine worldliness by undermining common ties,
and in doing so undermine the capacity for non-violent politics; if we cannot appreciate
and care for the works of others, humans are doomed to the singularity that Stiegler
warns is at the heart of proletarianization. Arendt notes ―without being talked about by
men [sic] and without housing them, the world would not be a human artifice but a heap
of unrelated things to which each isolated individual was at liberty to add one more
object.‖662 Arendt‘s focus on the ways that talk and housing (both as individuating uses
of a technic) that organize the world and worldliness gesture to the idea that such an ethic
resides only in transindividuation.
Yet if cosmopolitanism at its heart promotes care, and in the process resists
proletarianization, this is largely achieved through its mobilization of competing
opinions. Stiegler argues that opinion is ―like that fire that must be maintained in the
hearth, and at the same time monitored, since it can either heat the house or burn it down,
and, beyond the house, the city itself.‖663 Similarly, Smith argues that competitive
discourse lies at the heart of a cosmopolitanism. Commenting on Arendt‘s comparison of
politics to performing arts, Smith notes:
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This line of thought highlights the discursiveness of the political realm,
indicating that being worldly involves talking with others, seeing things
from alternative points of view, formulating an opinion on the matter at
hand and seeking to persuade others of the soundness of one‘s view.664
Both political individuation and cosmopolitanism function through the circulation of
technics that allow free individuation of opinion, proletarianizing rhetorics function
through ―diverting the energy that is doxa.‖665 To participate in Russian memes, one has
to both understand the Russian conflict, have a critical/ironic distance from it, and care
about the outcome. Because memes – via their form – encourage the incorporation and
competition of singular opinions into larger social individuations that will clash through
competing individuations, they ask participants to be worldly.
Yet worldliness need not always be the civil persuasion suggested by Smith.
Many of the Russian memes that challenge the masculinity of Soviet memory and Putin
function through their incivility. Not only does the incongruity promoted by this incivility
further promote the plurality of discourses at the heart of worldliness, but their polemical
functions may be key to using memetic cosmopolitanism to promote care. Writing on the
possibility of politics in the face of proletarianized doxa, Stiegler argues that social
critique must be grounded in polemics ―struggling for the life of the spirit.‖666 As memes
that mock Putin as a tyrant that relies on an unnatural masculinity, the energy of this
discourse has the potential to mobilize collective passions. Moreover, because these
polemics are rooted in incongruity, this fire is not a grounded in destruction or sacrifice,
but rather a competition seeking the higher understanding and care of comic
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cosmopolitanism. In this sense, networked hypomnemata may be an ideal tool for the
implementation of a cosmopolitan virtue of care. When we joke with the world, we are
more likely to care for it.
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Chapter 6
The Potential of Memetic Criticism
Across the course of this dissertation, I have made the case that although the
primary use of memes may be to function as networked entertainment, when deployed
within larger political conversations, memes are far more than trivial cultural phenomena
or diversions from more ‗productive‘ politics. Memes continue the long practice of
participatory visual rhetorics challenging more traditional and elite controlled political
rhetorics. In continuing this tradition, networked memes commenting on economics,
security, and national memory demonstrate this digital technic‘s capacity to live up to the
rhetorical force of its classical namesake – mimesis. Goodnight and Green illustrate the
power of mimesis in the classical tradition, noting that,
when deployed rhetorically, mimetic influence may cultivate ritualistic
participation, call out common sense observation, affirm virtuous conduct
as the link to just reward, distill desire through moments of compelling
display, oppose dialectically shared opinion and refined knowledge,
authorize expert models, justify actions that fulfill situated best practices
for a recognized craft, and engage or extend media-blended, reputationrisking cultural performances.
667

In their ability to create new enthymematic narratives, destabilize antirhetorical
ideographs, and affectedly recast collective memory, networked memes demonstrate how
networked repetition and difference engenders a politics that resists technocratic control.
That is not to say that these are monumental political victories; dominant forces often
react to critical theorization through social regulation via competing forms of controlling
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affect.668 Despite this fleeting, and often-unrealized potential, such ruptures represent one
of the few resistive opportunities in the face of ubiquitous control. Consequently, I
conclude by considering that the potential of memes lay not just in their ability to
illustrate Stiegler‘s political ethic, but in their capacity to function as collective rhetorical
critics.
From the onset, the proairetic construction of memes positions the modal
assemblage built around a particular meme as a rhetorical critic. None of the individual
iterations may contain the elements of effective criticism. However, once they emerge as
a modal assemblage – the formal stance of the meme created through its varied
individuations – this larger collection of fragments combine to enact criticism
independent of particular human agents. Michael McGee asserts that it is impossible to
consider any particular act of communication as a complete text. The interplay between
text, context, and audiences, renders discursive acts as fragmented parts of larger, not
fully knowable, texts.669 Consequently, McGee argues the role of the critic is first the
construction of a meaningful text out of these fragments, and then using this constructed
text to examine ideological forces and material affects of particular rhetorical contexts.
As a group of fragments that participants cannot understand outside their memetic
assemblage, individual iterations of a meme – especially stock character macros –
exemplify this concept of fragments. They derive their force only from the juxtaposition
of formal context, textual particulars, participants‘ experience and affect, and their
interrelation with socially negotiated understandings of stock character archetypes.
668.
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However, as participants use the proairetic forces within the initial form of a meme to
explore varied iterations, they individuate those fragments into a unified sense of form,
content, and perspective. It is only across the repetitions of politically enacted memes that
the criticism of neoliberalism, securitization, and official national memories emerge.
From the enthymemes, terministic deliberation, and counter-mnemonic iterations, a
critical reading of controlling technocratic discourses comes out of the communal reading
and production of the meme. In this sense, the modal assemblage of these memes
functions as a collective cultural/ideological critic.670
Moreover, the vernacular nature of memetic theorization bolsters the force of
memetically generated social criticism. Specifically, because it is generated from the
lived experiences of collective participants in politics, rather than from technical or
academic elites, memetic criticism has the potential to be particularly impactful. Antonio
Gramsci argues that any theorization of oppressive forces that does not originate from the
lived experience of the oppressed ought to be suspect, as it likely originates in – and
supports, intentionally or not – hegemonic ideologies.671 Memetic criticism evolves
organically, apart from traditional structures of criticism, because it is generated across
the individuations of networked participants. If memetic criticisms were not
representative of identifiable collective experience, participants would not propagate the
meme – individuating within the publics connected with these technics. Because they are
670.
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rooted in aggregated vernacular experience, the narratives, terms, and memories
constructed around memes provide alternatives to the dominant technocratic rhetorics
that justify control. Moreover, since memes often rely on ironic modes of commentary,
they pluralize this form – increasing the number of individuations and in the process the
space for democratic deliberation.672 However, as I will explore further in this chapter,
this is a deliberation of the composition and interrelation of subjectivities, rather than a
Habermasiean deliberation seeking consensus of policy and polity.
Through their capacity to use broad affective frames to reconstruct individual
textual fragments into a collective comic meta-narrative, terministic dispute, or
countermemory, the stock image macro has the potential to serve as a powerful venue for
generating social criticism from the lived experience of internet users. The power of
collective theorization led Deleuze to argue that it would be ―user groups‖ not ―wise men
[sic]‖ who would give voice to revolutionary politics in the era of control.673 The
emergence of user groups as a defining term of digital culture – one that easily defines
participants who individuate through networked memes – makes this gesture towards
memetic criticism all the more prophetic. Memes are not just a subject for rhetorical
critics to engage, they may very well function as a premier public intellectual for
networked rhetorical ecologies.

Form, Irony, and Identification: Rhetoric as the Entelechial Individuating Technic
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Central to understanding the critical power of digital memes is an awareness of
their capacity to function as an individuating technic. If participants could not engage in
evolving individuations through memetic participation, there would be little capability for
memes to comment on, let alone resist the proletarianizing rhetorics of technocrats. While
this relationship was posited from the onset of this dissertation, form, irony, and
identification, have emerged through my analysis as central rhetorical concepts for
understanding the individuating force of rhetorics. Yet, it is not enough to simply glue
these ideas onto Stiegler‘s theorization of individuation, as these Burkean concepts must
also be rethought in relation to technics and individuation. Therefore, I will explore each
in turn to make the case that a clear grasp of the evolution of these rhetorical concepts
into an ecology of networked technics is key to understanding rhetoric as the central
individuational technic in politics.
To begin, as networked technics push rhetoric to become increasingly proaretic
and remixable, form emerges as dominant in driving understandings of both rhetorical
force and individuation. While proletarianizing rhetorics function through establishing
strict grammars centered around terministic features such as meaning and definition, the
rapidly individuating movement of memes hold latent critical political potential that
eschews these rigid grammars for force exerted primarily through form. Memes‘
participatory form enables a productive orientation that ruptures otherwise
proletarianized existence because memetic technics are particularly oppositional to
terministic stability. Their drive for circulation via imitatio transforms traditionally
consumptive acts, such as the perusing of information on the internet, into the production
of collective knowledge.
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In transforming static information into individuating knowledge, particularly
through enthymematic narratives, terministic destabilizations and countermemories that
exist across a particular modal assemblage, memes encourage productive collectivities be
formed by participants.674 Participants cannot understand a meme if they do not
understand its context, therefore they must engage the form not only to produce new
memes, but even to circulate or consume them. As they do so, participants are afforded
the resources to engage in the positive production of alternative affective theorization. In
this sense, to understand the scope and potential directions of particular individuations, a
critic must begin by understanding their formalistic expectations.
Beyond providing a tool for understanding individuation, a formalistic orientation
also demands a refiguring of the terministic focus central to Burkean understandings of
rhetoric. Because it is predicated on form, rather than meaning, networked rhetoric may
be more driven by ―formulistic screens‖ than terministic ones. Memes draw their force
through the formal expectations that have individuated across their repeated iterations.
The expectation that Steve will be out of touch, a meme will twist a Verizon slogan, or
that Putin‘s masculine memory is a joke, is more important than the specific propositional
content of any single iteration of these memes. Therefore, while memes‘ formal elements
are relatively stable, their terministic content is open and unstable; any terministic
iteration that fits the form can individuate with the meme. Because of this, the organizing
power of the form overrides that of any particular term. The outraged annoyance of
Picard becomes a meta-frame through which security must be read. Such formal
preeminence demands a degree of leveling and incongruity. Any concept can be leveled

674.

Stiegler, Taking Care, 184.

259

into the same affective frame through its incorporation into the form of a particular
meme. As the formal expectations of the mode supersedes the content of a particular
iteration, the modal assemblage becomes a formal screen through which varied terms
(and their resultant screens) are mediated. In this way, memetic formulistic screens are
antagonistic to the stability of god terms and ideographs, which often function in support
of proletarianizing rhetorics, as their openness prevents the terministic stability that gives
these technics their rhetorical force.
A focus on formulistic screens does not deny the continued power or utility of
terministic screens. Burke rightly notes that, ―we must use terministic screens, since we
can‘t say anything without the use of terms; whatever terms we use, they necessarily
constitute a corresponding kind of screen; and any such screen necessarily directs the
attention to one field rather than another.‖675 Certainly, the efforts of memes to
reintroduce privacy to the security debate, or unemployment to discourses of markets,
demonstrate the continued reliance on terministic screens. However, modal expectations
are built from more than terministic expectations. Anticipations of affective consistency
with the formal assemblage – both in terms of matching the embodied emotion of a
particular advice animal or just the broader memetic demands for irony – will
undoubtedly tint whatever term is enfolded into the mode. In this way, formalistic screens
organize terministic screens within particular affective and technical frames, creating a
mosaic whereby each term has its own force and form, but, given their inclusion in the
larger form, these terms cannot be read outside the larger modal context.
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While formulistic screens are the lens through which individuation may be
rhetorically understood, the politics of these individuating rhetorical technics are
mediated through a strong reliance on irony. This is not necessarily an irony of humor,
but rather a Burkean irony predicated on a movement of reversal where ―what goes forth
as A returns as non-A.‖676 Stock image macros intensify this ironic imitatio grounded in
repetition through difference. Thus, through their reliance on amateur recreation, by
definition memes only exist as ironically re-iterated texts (otherwise they would be
classified as virals). Therefore, when memes intervene in a specific context, by bringing
new forms – and their embedded affects – to comment on a particular controversy, these
new individuations return that controversy to public use through different structures of
feeling, memories, and narratives: returning it as non-A.
Conversely, proletarianizing rhetorics demand a non-ironic finality. Certainly,
their formal elements do allow a degree of personalization. After all, the same appetite
may be fulfilled through a variety of technical options. Stiegler notes that
proletarianization functions through the ability to appeal to niche interest of consumers in
a manner that is so singular that it prevents collective individuations.677 An individual is
free to engage the new economy in myriad singular ways and Russian national identity
can be expressed through a variety of rhetorical performances. However, these individual
iterations built around proletarianizing technocratic forms demand that these different
iterations return to the order of the key terms. The varied manifestations of privacy one
could express are acceptable as long as they are still subservient to <security>, iterations
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of Russian identity must not challenge the memory of masculinity, performances of the
new economy will be dismissed if they interfere with the rationality of the market. For
proletarianizing rhetorics, while A might be iterated through a variety of performances, it
always returns as A. Stiegler refers to this movement as ―idiomatic exhaustion,‖ as
communication is no longer function as individuating symbols but rather as ―digital
pheromones,‖ that demand a specific response.678 Because of this, the foreclosure of
ironic symbolic action becomes the foundation for a symbolic politics of control.
If an anti-ironic orientation is at the heart of proletarianization, irony may be the
central trope for rhetorical technics that promote individuated resistance. Irony may not
be just one of the master tropes, but instead a master among masters. Because
individuation can only function through a repetition that also allows difference (returning
as non-A), if a technic lacks the capacity for ironic use it is non-individuating.
Conversely, technics, such as memes, which draw on the networked affordances of
remix, proairesis, and imitatio, not only allow ironic deployment, but through their
remediations of narratives, memories, affects, and other collective modes of sense
making, they create a variety of perspectives, all at least partially incongruous with stable
and proletarianizing rhetorics. In this sense, irony is more than a trope that rhetors can
draw on; rather, it must be reconfigured as a technical property – pre-existing particular
rhetorical deployments. The individuated pre-individual form of a technic must be such
that it affords irony. If affording irony, these technical properties allow rhetors to deploy
them to manifest particular incongruities. Further, it is only through these ironic technical
forms that amateurs can participate in creation. If A must return as A, there is no space

678.

Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol.1, 70.

262

for an amateur to remake the technic, they can only consume it. Conversely if a technic
allows a different return, each user is now a co-participant in the collective
transidividuated renegotiation via imitatio.
This reliance on ironic technics for enabling transindividuation suggests that there
is a greater space of amateur participation than Stiegler originally allowed for. In
explaining symbolic misery, Stiegler argues that the transference of music to recordings
removed their individuational capacity because the songs are replayed without
difference.679 However, if we take seriously the conclusions of this dissertation that
individuation relies more on form than on specific iterated content, there may be
individuational potential even if the propositional content never changes – suggesting that
even virals may individuate. For many memes, the visual form never changes –
analogous to the music on a record. However, as the picture is moved into different
contexts and controversies, it allows new individuations, just as a record played in
different audiences, temporalities, and cultures, may individuate through cultural
resignification.680 Such potential for resignification is particularly pronounced in digital
spaces because networked logics encourage remix.681 This individuating, ironic
resignification, through contextual resignification opens even the seemingly most static
technics to potential new individuations. As long as there is a space for some kind of
formal or contextual irony, proletarianization can never be complete. New incongruities
and perspectives will emerge through any range of resignifying performances.
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These varied perspectives gesture towards the deliberative/democratic potential of
memes and similar networked technics. Specifically, as ironic variations create a range of
technical perspectives, participants engage in a mode of deliberation through their ability
to foster identification.682 Specifically, identifications with particular technics enable the
creation of democratically constructed subjectivities. Again this is neither a politics of
traditional subjects nor of deliberation, but rather examining ―the various ways
individuals and groups constitute themselves as subjects through processes of
subjectification‖ and the ways that these processes both elude established and create new
modes of power.683 Because each meme – or other individuating technic – allows the
creation of a different collective we, each technic must also be considered as affording a
unique mode of subjectification. Consequently, as participants move to individuate with
one technic instead of another – e.g. a memetic narrative over a technocratic one – they
are implicitly endorsing the mode of subjectivity that transindividuates with that
particular form or iteration of a technic.
Through this process of negotiating varied technics and their differing processes
of subjectification, the deliberative and democratic tendency of individuational politics
becomes apparent. In negotiating varied individuations and their varied perspectives,
networked participants do not come to agreement over the ideal vision of a particular
policy or the polity writ large, rather they identify with a commonness in a particular
mode of subjectification as it individuates in a particular context. In this sense,
682.

Burke‘s concept of identification is particularly useful in understanding individuation, as while
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individuational deliberation is not a measured negotiation of arguments and policies, but
rather the social creation of a technic that invites a wider range of identification. Those
technics whose memories, narratives, and forms are identifiable will invite greater
participation and thus have the potential to exert a wider social force. Old Economy Steve
does not advocate a specific policy or renegotiate the tenants of economics. However,
through the collective creation of a technic that houses an identifiable narrative, the
meme creates space where participants can both negotiate the nature of their collective
subjectivity through the inclusion of new iterations, and exert a greater pressure on
dominant rhetorics through the creation of a larger collective that opposes technocratic
rhetorics.
Consequently, this individuational democracy is not one of a singular public
sphere – networked or otherwise. The existence of a ―Russian internet‖ vs a more
cosmopolitan in the battle over Russian memory, demonstrates that networked spaces,
although affording greater international reach, are still comprised of multiple competing
publics defined by rhetorical technics that are not always compatible. Networked
publicity, just as other modes publicity, can enclave from, resist, or reify dominant
publics. Moreover, these spaces have a nebulous tie at best to the policies and politics
that dominate more conventional understandings of democracy and deliberation. Steve,
the NSA memes, and Russian memes do not ask participants to vote differently, instead
they hope these individuations identify with the experiences of the participants who
might circulate them. In doing so, they present subjectivities that reject the very
assumptions that drive traditional politics. The democracy of networked technics is one
of ever mutating publics, who are democratically negotiated through the new unities of
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participants who identify with the forms and collective identities of the technics that
serve as the foundations of these publics. This is a democracy of everyday symbolic
participation, not the speeches and elections of Liberal Western Democracy.
That does not mean that memes are without consequence in the realm of
traditional politics. Rather than explicitly directing publics, these memes provide an
affective bridge which has the potential to link memetic participants with already existing
publics and political action. Certainly this move has less discernible effects than other
political rhetorics. However, Jessalyn Keller notes that only focusing on ―a direct tangible
and measurable ‗effect‘ of activism ignores results like the production of feeling.‖684 It is
precisely the potential of texts like memes to evoke particular structures of feeling that
led Papacharissi to theorize the role digital technics play in the formation of ―affective
publics.‖685
Broadly, Papacharissi argues that texts proliferated by networked technologies
often do not overtly seek deliberation or consensus. Rather they use affective gestures to
attune participants to particular publics. Papacharissi notes, these technologies permit
people to feel their way into politics …[they] engage in practices of
rebroadcasting, listening, remixing content, and creatively presenting their
views – or fragments of views – in ways that evolve beyond the
conventional deliberative logic of a traditional public sphere. 686
The affective publicity enabled by networked media enables participants to connect to
existing politics through an affective gesture by internetworked media. Specifically,
684.
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Papacharissi argues that through their mass circulation, technics such as hashtags and
memes remediate personal experience in the way that they identify with the experiences
of others. A meme like Old Economy Steve publicizes participants‘ personal angst at the
current state of the economy and the NSA memes highlight dissatisfaction with security
policy. Beyond articulating these particular stances, using these circulated texts connects
these users to other participants who share similar evaluations. Papacharissi argues this
move allows the connectivity, rather than collectivity, that is central to networked
publics.687 A meme which connects or alludes to larger public attitudes through
identification with a particular structure of feeling can direct participants into larger
publics without overtly demanding political action itself.
In this context, it is easy to read a meme as personal gratification without any
larger political potential.688 However, Papacharissi does not argue that affective publics
have the same force as more traditional social movements and other mass publics.
Papacharissi instead argues the structures of feeling tapped into by native internetworked
media are ―soft.‖689 Alone, they may not motivate action. However, in allowing
participants the ability to connect with larger publics, affective publics re-interpellate that
participant as more attuned to a particular mode of political being. Such attunement then
687.
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provides an opportunity for that participant to engage in more traditional modes of
publicity – something that may not have been possible had the originating affective
gesture (e.g. circulating a meme) not provided the participant the resources to ―locate
private thoughts in a public setting.‖690 This performance both draws and manages
attention, making issues visible to a broader public – all while placing ideas in conflict,
rather than consensus. In doing so, memes, as one of the dominant texts of networked
public spheres, contain the potential to constitute networked publics
Memetic Multitudes
As memes emerge as a space for the negotiation of politics through identification
with competing individuations, they demonstrate that the processes of individuation are
intrinsically rhetorical, and that rhetoric cannot function without individuation. However,
this individuational democracy, built on the connection of diverse participants around
common production and uses of technics, also suggests that the political subjectivity that
may best describe the individuational politics of networked rhetorical technics is that of
the multitude.691
Many theorists who draw inspiration from Deleuze recognize that if control
society is reliant on new modes of economic production, it also necessarily mobilizes a
new political subject: the multitude. Because it exists outside the biopolitical logic of
population, the multitude challenges the dominant conceptions of collective arrangement.
Virno notes:

690.
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I use the term multitude, over other options such as ―the masses‖ or ―the people‖ because the
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The contemporary multitude is composed neither of ―citizens‖ nor of
―producers;‖ it occupies a middle region between ―individual and
collective;‖ for the multitude, then, the distinction between ―public‖ and
―private‖ is in no way validated. And it is precisely because of the
dissolution of the coupling of these terms, for so long held to be obvious,
that one can no longer speak of a people converging into the unity of the
state.692
In existing between the individual and the collective (to which Stiegler would add the
technical) the multitude exists in a parallel space to individuation, rather than to more
traditional associations of politics and collectivity. Rather than relying on traditional,
representational conceptions of collectivity, the multitude is ―an irreducible multiplicity;
the singular social differences that constitute the multitude must always be expressed and
can never be flattened into sameness, unity, identity, or indifference…[it is] singularities
that act in common.‖693 This relation of singularities in common is exemplified by the
ability of memes to balance individual stories through particular iterations of memes with
a sense of collective purpose found across the form of each meme.
In this way, form, which is produced across multiple singular iterations that find
relation through a memetic technic, must be understood as a manifestation of the
common – or that which is produced through relations of participants in the multutude.
Hardt and Negri explain how exploitation of the common demands the emergence of the
multitude.
Since we have begun to recognize (from the standpoint of the critique of
political economy) how the singular figures of postmodern labor do not
remain fragmented and dispersed but tend through communication and
collaboration to converge toward a common social being, we must now
immerse ourselves in this social being as in something that is at once both
692.
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rich and miserable, full of productivity and suffering and yet devoid of
form. This common social being is the powerful matrix that is central in
the production and reproduction of contemporary society and has the
potential to create a new, alternative society.694
As the new subject called forth by the conditions of communicative labor, the multitude
is the central target for control. Moreover, as control breaks the logic of the population,
the multitude emerges to explain how mobile individual consumers have the potential to
exist in some collective capacity.
Although the multitude is central to contemporary understandings of control, this
concept is largely absent from Stiegler‘s work. Recognizing that collective struggle is
best embodied by ―user groups,‖ Deleuze gestures towards a multitude-oriented
understanding of political subjectification.695 Therefore, as a response to Deleuze‘s
control thesis, which includes consideration of the very modes of immaterial production
that define the multitude, some gesture towards the multitude can add further depth to
Stiegler‘s understanding of control. In working with individuation, Stiegler moves
towards a political subject akin to the multitude (or at least with a multitudinous
character).696
Foucault famously notes that in understanding power, resistance comes first.697
Drawing from this observation, both Hardt and Negri and Virno note that control
functions through efforts to contain and direct the multitude. Virno directly links this
struggle to individuation itself. In arguing that capital seeks to appropriate the common
694.
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(which Virno notes is literally the space between individuals), Virno is speaking of the
preindividual milieu created through the process of transindividuation.698 As
demonstrated by the memetic resistances to technocratic control, the struggle to
reestablish spirit and care is precisely the effort to find a space for an individuating
multitude to exist within current industrial technologies. For Virno the individual is the
manifestation of the potentiality of the common – a process strongly akin to Stiegler‘s
spirited individuation.699 Therefore, while proletarianization represents a multitude
detached from itself, reduced to pure singularity, a politics of care opens the space for a
multitude that is at once the many and the one – a multitude that constantly challenges the
forces of proletarianization.
Further, the tendency of networked publics towards cosmopolitan irony further
enhances the argument for the multitudinous tendency of networked subjects. Not only
does the worldliness of cosmopolitism rely on care for the common – the very conditions
from which the multitude arises – but it does so by distancing one from their sense of
home. Although the ironic cosmopolitan can comment on national and local conflicts, the
enactment of this virtue destabilizes a sense of home. Turner explains:
Ironists are often homeless people who are in some sense dislodged from
their traditional worlds and find themselves in new situations where old
answers no longer work. Cosmopolitan virtue may well turn out to be the
ethic of exile.700
When participants joke about the falsity of Russian masculinity, the American security
state, or the American dream, they may be seeking to improve these conditions.
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However, by imposing distance through incongruous application of memes to these
conditions, they also cannot return to the stable (if controlling) home of these discourses.
To paraphrase a popular networked meme ―incongruity: what has been seen cannot be
unseen.‖701
However, the very alienation engendered by participation in networked, ironic,
cosmopolitanism also helps to enable the development of a multitudinous subjectivity. As
control replaces the biopolitical logic of populations with a focus on singular consumers,
the multitude, as the manifestation of the general intellect, becomes the only productive
collective subjectivity in a post-Fordist economy.702 Although Hardt and Negri argue the
capacity of the multitude to engage in immaterial labor exceeds the reach of capital, and
in doing so has a resistive orientation,703 Virno is more ambivalent towards the potential
of the multitude. Virno notes that as control breaks down the boundaries of biopolitical
power, it also destabilizes a sense of home within the many that make up the multitude.704
Although a nomadic sense of withdrawal enabled by this lack of home is part of the
political force of the multitude, this same lack can prompt the multitude to reproduce the
very structures of control in order to fabricate the sense of home lost. While the multitude
can be locations of resistance to control, it is not necessarily so, as it can often be easier
and more comforting to simply reify control. As memes move participants outside the
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normative subjectification of control, they gain the capacity to produce new and differing
modes of social relation, but as pharmakon this move always risks a return to control.
A central example of the relation between networked nomadism and the multitude
is the use of memes as a cultural commonplace. As Virno notes commonplaces, as
products of the multitude are central to both communicative production and
individuation. Specifically, Virno‘s use of commonplaces is a pun referring both to the
classical concept of cultural bound meaningful stories as well as the common as the place
where publics are both produced and reside.705 However, this double entendre is key to
understanding the multitude. While a variety of technics may be shared across a wide
range of human relations, it is only the symbolic – as the home to the general intellect –
that is both the engine of capitalism and individuation of the multitude.706 In this sense,
commonplaces are the only location that the common (the foundation of individuation)
can reside. And only a multitudinous subjectivity can fully embrace the individuational
potential of commonplace technics. The greater difference of subjectivities unified in
common, the greater range of individuations that a technic may take in opposition to
controlling forms.
In this way, a multitudinous subjectivity, grounded in mimetic uses of technics,
always exceeds the bounds of control. Certainly, much of their rhetorical production will
be re-enfolded into capitalism. The majority of the memes explored in this dissertation
are circulated for the profit of various media agencies. However, the collectivities created
by these technics also express narratives, memories and other affective forces that do not
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get fully contained by this capitalization. Specifically, the individuation of multitudinous
subjectivities allows for the constant renegotiation of the relations of varied individuals.
As I transindividuate with new (and constantly changing) technics, I am moving across a
range of potential subjectivities. This reorganization allows each act of individuation to
be a process of direct democracy. If the multitude‘s social conditions are those of
individuation, every utterance is an enactment of an individual‘s democratic influence on
those social conditions.
Moreover, if the political subject of networked individuation is the multitude, this
dissertation suggests that the resistive potential of the multitude may have a dominant
rhetorical orientation, that of a networked sophistic. Specifically, with their focus on
irreverence and play, memetic rhetorics align with the Sophists. Although the list of
individuals who fit under the label sophist include figures with a range of varied
philosophical and rhetorical views, Nathan Crick argues that they were unified by a
common ―democratic ethos rooted in an experimental attitude that draws on the resources
of speculative reason to serve the purpose of radical invention necessary for a
democratization of the productive arts.‖707 This unified stance includes a range of
conceptual commitments including, rhetorical experimentation, dissoi logi, imitation as
improvement, and a valorization to play, all in the name of improving the polis.708
Despite these elements, all of which are central to the political use of memes, Crick
asserts the ―greatest legacy‖ of the Sophists may be their ―artistic commitment to
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form.‖709 Specifically, the Sophists recognized that using commonly understood
communicative structures (form) was the only way that collective experience could
manifest influence in contingent rhetorical situations.
Although Aristotelian and Platonic rhetorical values tend to be central to
contemporary understandings of politics, the sophistical attitude of experimental play and
manipulation of form has also performed an influential role in American political
discourse. Sophistic influences are present in parodic media and in satirical performances
like the White House Correspondents dinner. However, sophistic styles have also found
spaces outside dominant media and political institutions., most notably in guerrilla theatre
and performance politics. By using hyperbolic, ironic, and intertextual performance, these
presentations – and the publics they form – work to establish spaces for the articulation of
voices traditionally excluded by dominant discourses.710 For example, the Guerrilla Girls,
a feminist art collective, used a range of visual juxtapositions and public performances to
challenge the dominance of men in the art world. These sophistic, styled, performances
provided a comic incongruity to dominant attitudes, prompting not revolution, but rather
reconsideration of established social norms.711
While this sophistic tradition certainly influences the contemporary individuations
of memes, the networked return to sophistry may be more than a reemergence of its
classical namesake. Instead, commenting on the digital circulation of visual rhetorics
Damien Smith Pfister and Carly Woods argue that contemporary visual culture might
709.
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best be understood as ―hypersophistic.‖712 Although they note that ―As a prefix, ‗hyper-‗
means ‗over, above, beyond.‘,‖ they also use the prefix to ―signal how these sophistical
attitudes are intensified through the affordances of hypertext, or the hyperimage, made
available by digital media technology.‖713 As demonstrated through the move of memetic
sophistry to varied cosmopolitan modes of expression, memes follow Pfister and Wood‘s
observations that the hypersophistic is more rapid in circulation, diverse in location, and
varied in participants. Moreover, as irony via imitatio emerges as the dominant logic of
memetic technics, play is no longer simply a way to experiment with rhetorics, but
instead may be the default mode of rhetorical production.
This default ironic play highlights the potential link between multitudinous
subjects and hypersophistic orientations. Crick notes that for the sophists rhetorical
experimentation was key to mastering the ―contingencies of life.‖714 However, for the
multitude, not only is life contingent, but the very nature of subjectivity and collective
existence is rooted in constant flux.715 While a memetically constructed public may draw
on its form for some stability, every new iteration transindividuates this form, always
already reforming it for its new contingent deployments. Therefore, as networked
technics pull participants into increasingly multitudinous subjectivities, they are similarly
further called to engage in sophistic rhetorical orientations to negotiate this politics of
individuational flux.
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Limitations and Future Directions
Although this dissertation certainly offers useful insights into the nature of digital
rhetorics and technics, this study is not without limitations. Most notably because my
analysis was grounded within a Stieglerian perspective it is bounded within the limits of
this perspective. Specifically, in focusing on technics and individuation, other meaningful
dimensions of both memes as well as specifics of the specific rhetorical controversies
may have been under covered. Similarly, other rhetorical and philosophical approaches,
such as phenomenology, argumentation, and others could yield different insights.
However, I see this limitation not as a fault of this study, but rather something inherent to
the nature of rhetorical research. This study offers but one of the many perspectives, that
when combined, help to yield a richer and more full understanding of rhetorical
phenomenon. As such, simply considering these contexts from other perspectives is a
needed step for future research. Beyond this need for diverse approaches to memes, this
dissertation also suggests a range of other directions of new research.
First and foremost, although memes, with their highly mutable and participatory
nature, are a natural fit for understanding the relation between individuation and rhetoric,
this relationship should be explored further. Following the insights of Stiegler, all
technics have the potential for individuation. Therefore, it follows that other rhetorical
technologies – including varied media forms, tropes and figures, as well as particular
addresses might be understood through the logic of individuation. The assumption that
rhetoric is a techne suggests a particular technical leaning across the history of rhetorical
studies. Consequently, future research should explore the relationship between
individuation and rhetoric writ large. Such an orientation has potential to help mediate the
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divisions between more object oriented approaches and the humanistic tradition. A
rhetorical theory of transindividuation, while grounded in complex rhetorical
relationships between the technics of the material world, also recognizes that the human
subjectivity – as another product of transindividuation – is one of the many objects that
exerts force and shifts the direction of the rhetorical forces circulating in contemporary
rhetorical ecologies.
Furthermore, this dissertation – in highlighting the role of technics in not only the
contemporary production of – but also the classical understandings of – rhetoric suggests
the need for a further rhetorical turn in contemporary theory. Certainly continental
philosophy and other theorizations have made significant moves towards the centrality of
symbolic action. However, frequently they do so by thinking of language without a
technical history.716 If the force of technics is their capacity to function as repositories of
memory, the individuating force of all technics is always mediated through the rhetorical.
We cannot individuate with any technic without some symbolic understanding of how it
has been used in the past. Consequently, it is time not for rhetoric to turn to philosophy to
keep up with its insights about the human condition. Instead philosophical thought should
return to rhetoric, particularly a pre-Platonic sophistical rhetoric, because a rhetorical
outlook has long attended to the role technics play in the understanding of politics.
Finally, memes through their highly individuational nature are a natural text for
the construction of multitudinous understandings of networked publicity. However,
following the insights of Virno, subjectivities in networked spaces – particularly when
understood through the logic of a hypersophistic – are increasingly mobile, diverse and
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diffuse – all conditions for the manufacture of the multitude. However, this same subject
is often theorized as existing either in opposition to, or without interest in, the modes of
representative government, deliberative discourse, and other more modern political and
rhetorical figurations that have dominated contemporary politics and rhetorical studies.717
Across these cases, we have seen how memetic technics orient multitudinous
subjectivities around particular anti-control stances, narratives and memories, in a way
that could potentially effect representative politics. However, the ability of such
subjectivities to influence and exist within more traditional rhetorical spaces is still
unclear. Consequently, rhetorical critics ought to take seriously the contention that
networked technics individuate towards multitudinous subjects, and explore further the
relations between these publics and the dominant political spheres that still govern
contemporary life. Can multitudinous subjectivities exert direct rhetorical force, are they
vocal critics, or do they simply provide a shared feeling that must then be directed into
more traditional movements and other representative politics? Such research not only
would increase our understandings of the ways that networked technics participate in
politics, but also more importantly the potential of resistance that truly exists in
networked publics spheres.
Conclusion
Although not all memes are politically revolutionary, when used to mobilize
alternative individuations memes are technics particularly suited to resisting control.
While such interactions have always been possible, digital media have expanded the
speed and scope by which such networks of indiduation can develop, circulate and
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expand. Following the warnings of Johanna Hartelius, I am reticent to overly romanticize
memes, or any digital space, as a democratic panacea because ―Making content public
does not automatically amount to genuine participation in the civic sphere.‖718 However,
if nothing else, memes trouble proletarianizing rhetorics by making them less certain.
Thus, despite Hartelius‘ warning, I am cautiously optimistic because as David Cratis
Williams notes, ―Democracy occurs in the domain of the uncertain.‖719
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